Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL1755
2007-06-08 08:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
ROKG RELUCTANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO WFP PROGRAM IN DPRK
how-toVZCZCXYZ0010 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #1755 1590802 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 080802Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4944 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2619 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2737 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8088 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001755
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID EAGR WFP KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG RELUCTANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO WFP PROGRAM IN DPRK
REF: A. STATE 78613
B. SEOUL 1557
Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001755
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID EAGR WFP KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG RELUCTANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO WFP PROGRAM IN DPRK
REF: A. STATE 78613
B. SEOUL 1557
Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (U) Action Request: See paragraph 4.
2. (C) On June 8, A/POL delivered ref A points recommending
that the ROKG contribute to the WFP's DPRK program as soon as
possible despite the lack of DPRK enthusiasm for the idea, to
Cho Byung-jae, Director-General for North American Affairs at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). Cho's
main response was to say that the ROKG was reluctant to
contribute to the WFP now because the contribution would call
attention to the DPRK's difficult food situation and could
lead some in the ROKG to press for immediate bilateral rice
assistance (the 400,000 metric tons concessionary loan that
is on hold). He also asked why the WFP was not making an
emergency worldwide appeal and suggested that the WFP
approach the ROKG directly.
3. (C) Separately, Kim Joon-hwan, Assistance Cooperation
Team Director at the Ministry of Unification (MOU),told
poloff in response to ref A points that the ROKG was
reviewing whether now was the appropriate time to give a
contribution to North Korea via the WFP. At the May 29-June
1 inter-Korean ministerial talks, the ROKG had held firm and
delayed its bilateral rice assistance to send a unified
message on the need for the DPRK to implement the February 13
"Initial Actions" agreement, in accord with USG messages. In
order to maintain close coordination, Kim asked what kind of
contribution the USG was considering making to the WFP.
4. (C) Post requests guidance on responding to ROKG
questions about whether the USG is planning on making a
contribution to the WFP for North Korea.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
5. (C) As a point of clarification, although MOFAT and MOU
contacts did not bring up the point on June 8, we believe
their earlier comments still stand, namely that WFP aid would
be considered in addition to, rather than as a replacement or
reduction of, bilateral aid. On May 18, MOFAT
Director-General Cho Byung-jae had told us that any potential
ROKG assistance given through the WFP could not be an
alternative to bilateral rice aid because (1) the ROKG had
committed to providing 400,000 metric tons of rice aid at the
February 27-March 2 inter-Korean Ministerial; and (2)
bilateral rice aid was technically a loan, rather than
(grant) humanitarian assistance (ref B). END COMMENT.
STANTON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID EAGR WFP KS KN
SUBJECT: ROKG RELUCTANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO WFP PROGRAM IN DPRK
REF: A. STATE 78613
B. SEOUL 1557
Classified By: A/POL Brian McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (U) Action Request: See paragraph 4.
2. (C) On June 8, A/POL delivered ref A points recommending
that the ROKG contribute to the WFP's DPRK program as soon as
possible despite the lack of DPRK enthusiasm for the idea, to
Cho Byung-jae, Director-General for North American Affairs at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). Cho's
main response was to say that the ROKG was reluctant to
contribute to the WFP now because the contribution would call
attention to the DPRK's difficult food situation and could
lead some in the ROKG to press for immediate bilateral rice
assistance (the 400,000 metric tons concessionary loan that
is on hold). He also asked why the WFP was not making an
emergency worldwide appeal and suggested that the WFP
approach the ROKG directly.
3. (C) Separately, Kim Joon-hwan, Assistance Cooperation
Team Director at the Ministry of Unification (MOU),told
poloff in response to ref A points that the ROKG was
reviewing whether now was the appropriate time to give a
contribution to North Korea via the WFP. At the May 29-June
1 inter-Korean ministerial talks, the ROKG had held firm and
delayed its bilateral rice assistance to send a unified
message on the need for the DPRK to implement the February 13
"Initial Actions" agreement, in accord with USG messages. In
order to maintain close coordination, Kim asked what kind of
contribution the USG was considering making to the WFP.
4. (C) Post requests guidance on responding to ROKG
questions about whether the USG is planning on making a
contribution to the WFP for North Korea.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
5. (C) As a point of clarification, although MOFAT and MOU
contacts did not bring up the point on June 8, we believe
their earlier comments still stand, namely that WFP aid would
be considered in addition to, rather than as a replacement or
reduction of, bilateral aid. On May 18, MOFAT
Director-General Cho Byung-jae had told us that any potential
ROKG assistance given through the WFP could not be an
alternative to bilateral rice aid because (1) the ROKG had
committed to providing 400,000 metric tons of rice aid at the
February 27-March 2 inter-Korean Ministerial; and (2)
bilateral rice aid was technically a loan, rather than
(grant) humanitarian assistance (ref B). END COMMENT.
STANTON