Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL170
2007-01-19 08:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
ROKG STILL PLANS TO ALLOW MACHINE TOOL EXPORT TO
how-toVZCZCXYZ0004 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #0170 0190817 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 190817Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2430 INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0572 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000170
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/K AND ISN. PLEASE PASS TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: PARM MTCR PREL ETTC KS PK
SUBJECT: ROKG STILL PLANS TO ALLOW MACHINE TOOL EXPORT TO
PAKISTAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 6640
B. SECSTATE 6636
C. SEOUL 4404
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000170
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/K AND ISN. PLEASE PASS TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: PARM MTCR PREL ETTC KS PK
SUBJECT: ROKG STILL PLANS TO ALLOW MACHINE TOOL EXPORT TO
PAKISTAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 6640
B. SECSTATE 6636
C. SEOUL 4404
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (U) This is an Action Request. Please see para 4.
2. (C) On January 19, poloff delivered reftel A points to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation Deputy Kim Jae-woo. Kim informed
poloff that the primary factor in the ROKG decision was the
lack of concrete evidence of association between the United
Engineering employees and Pakistan's Project Management
Organization (PMO). Kim also shared that a ROK Embassy
official had conducted a visit and site verification of
United Engineering's office in Islamabad that had failed to
produce any evidence that the machine tools would be
diverted. Kim admitted that the ROKG could not say that this
transaction posed no proliferation risks. However, he said
that the Ministry of Commerce, Energy, and Industry (MOCIE),
which is responsible for export licenses, required evidence
that the shipment would be diverted and that all information
provided to date was not sufficient to make that
determination.
3. (C) Kim noted that there was still time to change the ROKG
position since the shipment is scheduled to take place at the
end of February. However, he stressed that revoking the
export license would require definitive evidence that United
Engineering and PMO are connected, such as a detailed list of
the names and ranks of the employees and PMO individuals
involved. Kim also said that the "easiest way" to block the
export would be to include United Engineering on a U.S.
proliferation watchlist, such as the Wisconsin Project
watchlist. If this were to occur, Kim indicated that the
ROKG would have a more substantive basis on which to revoke
the export license.
4. (C) Action Request: Post requests that Department provide
details about the link between United Engineering and PMO
that can be shared with MOFAT. End Action Request.
STANTON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/K AND ISN. PLEASE PASS TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: PARM MTCR PREL ETTC KS PK
SUBJECT: ROKG STILL PLANS TO ALLOW MACHINE TOOL EXPORT TO
PAKISTAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 6640
B. SECSTATE 6636
C. SEOUL 4404
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (U) This is an Action Request. Please see para 4.
2. (C) On January 19, poloff delivered reftel A points to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation Deputy Kim Jae-woo. Kim informed
poloff that the primary factor in the ROKG decision was the
lack of concrete evidence of association between the United
Engineering employees and Pakistan's Project Management
Organization (PMO). Kim also shared that a ROK Embassy
official had conducted a visit and site verification of
United Engineering's office in Islamabad that had failed to
produce any evidence that the machine tools would be
diverted. Kim admitted that the ROKG could not say that this
transaction posed no proliferation risks. However, he said
that the Ministry of Commerce, Energy, and Industry (MOCIE),
which is responsible for export licenses, required evidence
that the shipment would be diverted and that all information
provided to date was not sufficient to make that
determination.
3. (C) Kim noted that there was still time to change the ROKG
position since the shipment is scheduled to take place at the
end of February. However, he stressed that revoking the
export license would require definitive evidence that United
Engineering and PMO are connected, such as a detailed list of
the names and ranks of the employees and PMO individuals
involved. Kim also said that the "easiest way" to block the
export would be to include United Engineering on a U.S.
proliferation watchlist, such as the Wisconsin Project
watchlist. If this were to occur, Kim indicated that the
ROKG would have a more substantive basis on which to revoke
the export license.
4. (C) Action Request: Post requests that Department provide
details about the link between United Engineering and PMO
that can be shared with MOFAT. End Action Request.
STANTON