Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL1687
2007-06-04 09:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

NORTH-SOUTH MINISTERIAL HITS RICE HEADWIND

Tags:  PREL MNUC EAID KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1687/01 1550912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040912Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4849
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2591
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2704
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8080
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001687 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MNUC EAID KS KN
SUBJECT: NORTH-SOUTH MINISTERIAL HITS RICE HEADWIND

REF: 06 SEOUL 2362

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001687

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MNUC EAID KS KN
SUBJECT: NORTH-SOUTH MINISTERIAL HITS RICE HEADWIND

REF: 06 SEOUL 2362

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 4 briefing for the diplomatic
community, Um Jong-sik, Director-General for Unification
Policy Planning at the Ministry of Unification (MOU),
described the May 29 - June 1 inter-Korean ministerial talks
as helpful in that the North Koreans showed up and did not
walk out early despite the ROKG's decision to delay its rice
assistance to North Korea until progress was made in
implementing the February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement.
Last summer during the 19th round of inter-Korean ministerial
talks in Busan, South Korea, the talks ruptured when the DPRK
failed to secure food aid amidst ROK and international
concern over DPRK nuclear and missile issues (reftel). At
the ministerial talks last week, however, the two Koreas
reached a face-saving joint statement, formally closing the
talks, noting that they would further study ways to improve
inter-Korean reconciliation. The two Koreas still planned to
hold Colonel-level military talks at Panmunjom on June 8,
some 300 ROK civilians planned to attend festivities in
Pyongyang to mark the June 15, 2000 inter-Korean summit, and
the two Koreas planned to hold natural resource talks in
North Korea later this month. Separately, Lee Jong-ju, MOU
Director for International Cooperation told poloffs on June 4
that the two Koreas at the just-concluded ministerial talks
essentially took a breather. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On June 4, Ministry of Unification (MOU)
Director-General for Unification Policy Planning Um Jong-sik
gave a briefing to the diplomatic community on the May 29 -
June 1 inter-Korean ministerial talks. Separately on June 4,
Lee Jong-ju, MOU Director for Intentional Cooperation met
with poloffs to discuss inter-Korean relations.

--------------
OPENING POSITIONS
--------------


3. (C) Ministry of Unification (MOU) Director-General Um
Jong-sik told foreign diplomats on June 4 that the South's
opening position at the May 29 - June 1 ministerial talks:
(1) emphasized the importance of implementing the February 13

"Initial Actions" agreement expeditiously; (2) briefly laid
out a vision for the establishment of a peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula; and (3) proposed inter-Korean cooperation
projects, such as holding Defense Ministerial talks,
promoting the Kaesong Industrial Complex, regularizing
inter-Korean train travel, and resolving the issues of ROK
POWs and abductees. Asked separately for clarification on
what the ROK said about its vision for a peace regime, Lee
Jong-ju, MOU Director for International Cooperation, told us
that this was not a detailed proposal, but just a reiteration
of the need to move beyond the current Armistice arrangement.


4. (C) For its part, the North insisted that it was
important for the two Koreas to work together to address the
factors that were undermining the development of inter-Korean
relations, Um said. The North's opening statement actually
referred to the "peoples of Korea" some twelve times, he
said, which reinforced the DPRK's attempt to use this
bilateral channel to appeal to Korean nationalism. The North
Korean side pointed to political, military, and economic
obstacles to greater inter-Korean reconciliation: (1) the ROK
National Security Law and limits on ROK visitation to
politically sensitive sites in North Korea; (2) U.S.-ROK
joint military exercises; and (3) ROK limits on the trade of
strategic and dual-use goods and technologies. These were
non-starters from the ROK perspective, but the DPRK felt the
need to table its issues, Um said.

-------------- ---
RICE, 2/13 AGREEMENT, AND INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
-------------- ---


5. (C) After opening remarks, the focus of the inter-Korean
ministerial talks centered on rice loans, the February 13
agreement, and inter-Korean relations, Um said. Coming into
these talks, the DPRK had to know that the ROKG would not
suddenly agree to send rice without Six-Party Talks (6PT)
progress, so the North Koreans probably had a strict mandate
to go through the motions without creating problems for
future progress. In response, the ROKG confirmed that it
would decide the timing and pace of the rice shipments in
accordance with progress in implementing the 2/13 agreement
and that without such progress the provision of rice would be
unable to win ROK public support. To this, the North Korean
side argued that all parties needed to make efforts to
implement the 2/13 agreement; the DPRK was willing to
implement the 2/13 agreement when the Banco Delta Asia (BDA)
issue was resolved, Um said. Asked what would happen if the
BDA issue remained unresolved, Um said he hoped that all
sides, North Korea, China, and the United States would show
more flexibility in reaching a resolution to the BDA issue.
Um said the ROKG used the talks to join with the
international community in sending the unified message that
resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue was key to future
progress for North Korea.


6. (C) On the promotion of inter-Korean relations, Um noted
that the ROK delegation stressed that the two Koreas have to
seek mutual understanding and cooperation to achieve greater
reconciliation. The North, however, did not want to go into
specifics on any issue other than rice assistance. The good
news, Um said, was that North Koreans did not criticize South
Korean policy in the manner of the past, indicating that the
DPRK did not want to add more tension into the relationship.

--------------
NEXT STEPS
--------------


7. (C) Um noted that although the ministerial talks did not
agree on a date for the next round of talks, inter-Korean
relations were still moving ahead. The Koreas still planned
to hold Colonel-level military talks on June 8, something
that the DPRK had requested. He expected that some 300 South
Korean civilians would attend festivities in Pyongyang
marking the anniversary of the June 15, 2000 inter-Korean
summit, although the ROKG had not yet decided how or whether
it should attend the ceremonies. Finally, the ROK was
planning on sending a survey team to North Korean Hamgyong
Province for on-site inspections of natural resource projects
June 25 to July 5, which is connected with the inter-Korean
agreement to send some USD 80 million worth of light industry
raw materials to North Korea. These kinds of events serve as
an indication of inter-Korean cooperation. As to the future
of ministerial talks, Um said the fact the joint statement
did not refer to a date for the next round was not overly
problematic. North-South ministerial talks on average
occurred every three to four months, so the ROK expected the
next round would take place later this fall and could be
arranged via other inter-Korean channels.


8. (C) Um concluded by saying that for the ROKG, the
significance of the just-concluded talks was that they were
held and completed as scheduled, considering the surrounding
circumstances. To Seoul, this showed a mature inter-Korean
relationship that could withstand difficulties. The talks
also reaffirmed for the South that inter-Korean dialogue is a
useful channel through which it can deliver its views on the
nuclear issue to the North.

--------------
AN ACADEMIC'S VIEW OF INTER-KOREAN TALKS
--------------


9. (C) Separately, Ryoo Kihl-jae, Dean of Academic Affairs
at Kyungnam University of North Korean Studies and a critic
of ROKG engagement policy, told us during a June 4 meeting
that the ROKG made a basic mistake by not making crystal
clear at the last round of ministerial talks (February 27 -
March 2) that rice aid would be contingent on implementation
of the February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement. The North
Koreans were understandably angry at not getting rice aid and
might have come to Seoul to press the South to live up to its
own commitment.


10. (U) The full text of the joint press statement follows
(unofficial ROKG translation):
The 21st Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks were held in Seoul
from May 29 to June 1, 2007.

At the talks, the two sides recognized the accomplishments
and lessons of the past 20 rounds of inter-Korean ministerial
talks and shared a view that the two sides should develop the
inter-Korean relations to a higher level that coincides with
the national spirit of the Korean people.

At the talks, the two sides thoroughly stated their
respective positions and consulted in depth on fundamental
and practical issues concerning the development of the
inter-Korean relations.

The two sides agreed to further study issues related to
promotion of peace on the Korean peninsula and inter-Korean
reconciliation and cooperation in accordance with the basic
spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration.
END TEXT.
VERSHBOW