Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL1480
2007-05-16 09:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

UNIFICATION MINISTER CLAIMS RICE AID TO DPRK CAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV MNUC KS KN 
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DE RUEHUL #1480/01 1360909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160909Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4572
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2536
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2646
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8057
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001480 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTER CLAIMS RICE AID TO DPRK CAN
BE SLOWED

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001480

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTER CLAIMS RICE AID TO DPRK CAN
BE SLOWED

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a May 16 meeting with the Ambassador,
Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung expressed enthusiasm about
the planned May 17 inter-Korean railways tests calling them a
first step toward restoring peace to the Korean Peninsula.
Lee said that inter-Korean dialogue and Six-Party Talks (6PT)
were mutually complementary and insisted that there were no
differences between U.S and ROK approaches toward North
Korea. Seoul appreciated USG flexibility and patience in the
6PT process and hoped that the USG would make one final push
to put the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue behind us. The ROKG
had used inter-Korean channels to tell the DPRK that
significant reconciliation could not occur separate from the
February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement. Seoul is planning
to start shipments of 400,000 metric tons of rice aid to
North Korea in late May, but, Lee said, deliveries would take
three to four months and the pace could be further regulated
depending on progress in the 6PT.


2. (C) The Ambassador said the USG appreciated the
significance of the one-time tests of the railways, and hoped
that interactions between North and South Koreans could be
broadened. ROKG goals in inter-Korean channels were similar
to our joint efforts in the 6PT: denuclearization,
normalization and economic cooperation. It was important to
send a unified message to North Korea on our common
objectives. The USG welcomed the ROKG's ability to regulate
the pace of inter-Korean assistance; we needed to husband our
limited leverage to keep the DPRK to its commitments. The
USG had exercised patience on BDA, but now the Six Parties
needed to move onto the next phase of DPRK denuclearization.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
INTER-KOREAN RAIL TESTS
--------------


3. (C) On May 16, Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung
remarked to the Ambassador that he viewed the planned May 17
inter-Korean railways test runs as the first step toward
ushering in an era of peace on the Korean Peninsula,

something that would also help our common objective of DPRK
denuclearization. Lee said that this event would not have
been possible without close U.S.-ROK cooperation and efforts
in the Six-Party Talks (6PT). He planned to ride on the
northbound train along the western corridor from Munsan
Station in the South and Kaesong Station in the North, along
with other ROK dignitaries including his immediate
predecessor Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok, former
Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, and ROK Vice Construction
Minister Lee Chun-hee. (NOTE: According to press reports,
ROK Construction Minister Lee Yong-sup and Vice Unification
Minister Shin Un-sang, among others, will ride on the
southbound train from Mt. Kumgang in the North to the South's
Jejin Station. Former Unification Minister Chung Dong-young
will reportedly not participate, in part because he is a
"politician related to the (ROK) presidential election." END
NOTE.)


4. (C) The Ambassador commented that the USG appreciated the
significance of the historic test runs and was interested to
see how the inter-Korean project evolved. This was a first
step, but movement toward more regular exchanges between the
peoples of North and South Korea would be something that we
would all like to see.

--------------
NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador stated that USG and ROKG objectives in
the 6PT were similar to what the ROKG was trying to achieve
in its North-South channel: denuclearization, normalization,
and economic and humanitarian cooperation with North Korea.
Inter-Korean talks and the 6PT were two sides of the same
coin. Despite rampant press speculation about potential
differences, and regardless whether one used the term
"synchronization" or "half-step behind," the latter being a
ROKG term, both sides agreed we should send a unified message
to North Korea about our shared objectives.


6. (C) Lee asserted that press reports were nothing more
than press speculation and that there were no differences in
USG and ROKG approaches to North Korea. He still believed
that North-South dialogue and the 6PT were mutually
complementary and needed to support each other. The ROKG
remained fully committed to the 6PT process and maintained
the goal of peace and denuclearization on the Peninsula; the
two goals went hand in hand. For the past three months,
following the February 13 "Initial Actions" agreement, the
ROKG had tried to regularize inter-Korean relations. At
every opportunity, Red Cross talks, Economic Cooperation
Promotion Committee talks, Ministerial talks, and General
Officer-level military talks, the ROKG emphasized the
importance of DPRK denuclearization and that without
implementation of the 2/13 agreement, significant
inter-Korean reconciliation could not materialize.


7. (C) Lee continued that on May 15 he presided over a
meeting of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation
Committee, an interagency body, that officially endorsed the
spending of funds for 400,000 metric tons of rice (some USD
170 million) and USD 80 million worth of raw materials for
light industries to North Korea. Lee reported that the
committee reached the understanding that before the entire
rice package was provided, the DPRK needed to implement the
2/13 agreement. The delivery of some 150,000 tons of
domestic rice and 250,000 tons of imported rice is projected
to take three to four months. Even if the rice shipments
began in late May, they would not be completed until late
August or September. Therefore, the ROKG would be able to
regulate the pace of the deliveries if the DPRK failed to
live up to its 6PT obligations.


8. (C) Lee recalled that the two Koreas planned to hold the
21st round of ministerial talks May 29 - June 1 in Seoul to
plan the next three months of inter-Korean cooperation. The
talks would discuss economic cooperation projects and
humanitarian assistance, and the ROKG would try to advance an
institutional framework for further dialogue. As with all
inter-Korean talks, Lee said, he would seek to support the
Six-Party process.


9. (C) The Ambassador said he understood the value of
regularizing inter-Korean contacts. Recent efforts that were
required for a one-time railway test were indicative of how
hard it was to have to start from scratch each time. The
railway tests would be symbolic, but he hoped to see real
interaction between North and South Koreans. He appreciated
the Minister's words about the need to link rice aid with
2/13 implementation and the ROKG's ability to regulate the
speed of rice deliveries. This was important because we
needed to husband our limited leverage to get the DPRK to
meet its obligations. The ROKG's decision last year to
suspend rice assistance to North Korea became a symbol of
ROKG resolve on the DPRK nuclear issue. While rice aid might
have assumed more importance than it warranted, political
reality and symbolism would need to be considered in
proceeding with rice deliveries.

--------------
BDA AND 6PT
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador noted that the USG had been patient
on the BDA issue, even when the DPRK kept changing the
goalposts from resolving the BDA case to transferring funds
from BDA to transferring funds electronically. The USG still
took the DPRK at its word that it would shutdown its Yongbyon
facilities once the BDA issue was resolved. More
importantly, we needed to get beyond Phase I of the 2/13
agreement and to the next stage. The DPRK had wasted
valuable time, and because of its obsession with BDA had
delayed the heavy fuel oil it stood to receive and the
Six-Party Foreign Ministerial meeting which could have helped
advance the process.


11. (C) Asked whether recent DPRK actions indicated that it
valued inter-Korean relations more than the 6PT process, Lee
replied that he thought the DPRK priority remained improving
relations with the United States. This was a higher priority
for Pyongyang than even the 6PT. He assessed that the DPRK
recognized that it had no real future without normalization

of relations with the United States and looked to
U.S.-Vietnam relations as a model. Last year when the ROKG
suspended rice aid following the DPRK missile launches and
nuclear test, the DPRK halted North-South relations entirely.
This showed how little leverage the ROKG had with the North
and how little Pyongyang cared about Seoul.


12. (C) One way to resolve the sanctions-as-leverage problem
was to begin genuine dialogue and cooperation to get changes
in the DPRK, Lee opined. He had always been supportive of
greater U.S.-DPRK dialogue and had used his exchanges with
DPRK interlocutors to insist that the North had better use
its window of opportunity with the current U.S.
administration before time ran out; implementation of 2/13
and progress in the 6PT was more important than BDA. Lee
said he was personally appreciative of USG efforts to resolve
BDA, particularly those of Assistant Secretary Hill and the
Ambassador, and hoped the USG would make one final push to
conclude the BDA issue.

--------------
INTER-KOREAN SUMMIT?
--------------


13. (C) The Ambassador said that a decision to hold an
inter-Korean summit was a matter to be settled by the two
Koreas. Still, the USG hoped that given our common goals of
denuclearization and peace on the Peninsula that the ROKG
would keep the USG posted to avoid any surprises.


14. (C) Lee insisted that the ROKG had no concrete plans or
project at this time despite press speculation. In his view,
a North-South summit could be a tool to help improve
inter-Korean reconciliation. Asked about North Korean
interest in a summit, Lee said he did not know DPRK thinking
on a summit. Seoul and Washington had maintained a key
alliance for fifty years, and the two capitals were friends
and partners. The ROKG would not want to surprise the USG.
In that vein, Seoul hoped that the USG would also not do
anything too surprising in terms of U.S.-DPRK relations
without consulting with the ROKG.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Unification Minister Lee clearly hopes that the BDA
issue will be resolved in time to allow the ROKG to send rice
assistance to North Korea without too much diplomatic
fallout. In late March 2007, the ROKG started a
"three-month" delivery of 300,000 tons of fertilizer aid to
North Korea and claimed to Post that the aid could be
terminated if the DPRK failed to fulfill its denuclearization
commitments. Despite the 6PT standstill, the ROKG during
April 18-22 inter-Korean economic talks agreed to start rice
deliveries, but not until "late May," again in the hope that
the DPRK would have completed its 2/13 commitments by that
time. Two months later, the ROKG is planning to start a
three-to-four month delivery of 400,000 tons of rice aid,
claiming that it can regulate the pace of delivery if needed.
Should the 6PT remain stalled over the BDA issue, however,
the ROKG, as it did with fertilizer aid, is likely to slowly
begin rice shipments and pray that political reality catches
up to its hopes. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW