Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SEOUL1444
2007-05-14 08:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

FORMER PM HAN MYEONG-SOOK SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND U.S.

Tags:  PGOV PREL KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2632
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001444 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: FORMER PM HAN MYEONG-SOOK SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND U.S.
POSITION

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

-------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001444

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: FORMER PM HAN MYEONG-SOOK SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND U.S.
POSITION

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former Prime Minister and current presidential
contender Han Myeong-sook met with the Ambassador over lunch
on May 11. Han expressed optimism that the KORUS FTA
maintained strong support in the National Assembly and may be
ratified in the fall; legislators opposed to the FTA were in
the minority. Economic collaboration with the North, such as
the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),was one of the most
effective ways to ensure peace and help the North Korean
people. Many Koreans view a North-South summit as a
complement to the Six-Party Talks rather than a hindrance.
She offered that one way the U.S. could begin to build trust
with the DPRK was to remove the DPRK from the list of State
Sponsors of Terrorism. Han said that in order to increase
the likelihood of success, Japan should not try to link the
abductees issue to the Six-Party Talks. On the domestic
political front, Han said that the non-GNP parties will try
to come together to form a united front against the GNP, much
like the two-party system in the U.S. If the current
pressure on the progressive candidates remained, Han said
there was a good chance for the Uri party to come back
together. END SUMMARY.

--------------
FTA RATIFICATION
--------------


2. (C) In a lunch meeting on May 11 with former Prime
Minister Han Myeong-sook, Han expressed her hope that the
National Assembly would take up the ratification of the KORUS
FTA this fall, rather than waiting for the new ROK
administration in the spring. She thought President Roh
would want it approved on his watch, since it was part of his
legacy. Han cautioned, however, that the FTA could become a
political issue for some of the presidential candidates,
especially those who would prefer later ratification. GNP
frontrunner Lee Myung-bak had come out in favor of delaying
ratification until next year so he could take some credit for
the agreement. Support for the FTA remained strong as long
as the GNP was in the majority in the National Assembly and
some Uri members favored the agreement, while opponents to

the FTA held little power. (COMMENT: Han's optimism about
FTA passage this fall runs counter to the MOFAT view that
ratification will likely come after the spring 2008
parliamentary elections. END COMMENT.)

--------------
OUTWARD PROCESSING ZONES
--------------


3. (C) Han noted that the KORUS FTA included a provision for
the consideration of Outward Processing Zones (OPZ) in the
future. Han noted that many in Korea interpreted this
provision as a specific reference to support the Kaesong
Industrial Complex (KIC) but recognized there was not an
explicit connection. Economic collaboration could be a
strong force to help establish peace on the Peninsula and
OPZs would play a significant role in that regard. Closer
economic ties with North Korea would also keep China in check
as it worked to monopolize resources in the DPRK. The
Ambassador agreed that inclusion of the OPZ provision was a
good solution for the FTA. While the U.S. was not willing to
include the KIC in the FTA, the OPZ clause established a
framework for considering the move in the future, based on
the agreed criteria. The U.S. agreed the KIC could help
promote reform in the DPRK, but labor and other concerns
precluded inclusion in the FTA at this point.

--------------
DENUCLEARIZATION MUST COME FIRST
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the denuclearization of the
DPRK should go hand-in-hand with their pursuit of
normalization of relations with the U.S. and negotiations to
establish a permanent peace regime. Denuclearization
remained the key for success on the other tracks. (NOTE:
Some Korean media erroneously reported on May 11 that the

U.S. supported the idea of a four-party summit at the
September APEC meeting in Australia to discuss establishing a
peace regime. END NOTE.) In addition to other efforts
designed to build trust between the U.S. and the DPRK, such
as removing sanctions against the DPRK, Han suggested that
the U.S. remove the DPRK from the list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism.

--------------
NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT COULD HELP
--------------


5. (C) Many Koreans felt that a North-South summit could
help promote progress in the 6PT and denuclearization of the
DPRK, Han said. Since the U.S. came out and said that ROK
support for the North should remain a "half-step" behind the
6PT, some Koreans were concerned this might slow
rapprochement efforts. Korea, rather, was hoping for a
"synergy" effect between the two. The Ambassador noted that
the "half-step" notion was a ROKG theme that had often been
voiced to the Ambassador and senior USG officials by ROKG
interlocutors. Given the limited amount of leverage that
other parties have on the DPRK, everyone needed to be wise in
how available carrots and sticks were used. If a North-South
summit occurred, the U.S. would hope to see substantive
progress on denuclearization and not merely symbolic
gestures.

--------------
KEEP JAPANESE ABDUCTEES SEPARATE FROM 6PT
--------------


6. (C) Han said that the Japanese should not directly link
the abductees issue to the broader denuclearization goal of
the 6PT. By linking the two issues, Japan ran the risk of
negatively impacting the major goal of denuclearization.
Many people in Korea did not agree with Japan's approach,
especially if it hinders progress in the 6PT. According to
Han, given Japan's 36 years of colonial rule and recent
"ambiguous" statements about Comfort Women, Koreans did not
think it was right for Japan to link the abductees issue to
the 6PT.

--------------
FUTURE OF THE URI PARTY
--------------


7. (C) According to Han, the Korean people are looking for a
"change-oriented" government. When asked how the
progressive candidates were likely to align themselves in the
coming months, Han said that the non-GNP candidates were in a
crisis. At the Uri National Convention, delegates promised
to form an integrated party that would lead to a two-party
system (GNP and non-GNP),much like the Republican and
Democratic structure in the U.S. The first priority was to
form a unified party. If that was not possible, they would
seek to identify a single candidate to represent the non-GNP
perspective. As long as there was pressure to unite, the
candidates were likely to ultimately form a coalition.


8. (C) When asked if former GNP member Sohn Hak-kyu was
among the figures who could be the unifying force of the
progressives, Han expressed doubt that he had the requisite
energy to bring the various candidates together.
Additionally, given the importance Korean people attach to
loyalty, Sohn was not likely to garner strong public support
after his departureQrom the GNP party in March.

--------------
DON'T MISS OUT
--------------


9. (C) Han noted that some fellow Uri party lawmakers
recently traveled to Pyongyang and reported that the DPRK
appreciated U.S. efforts to help resolve the Banco Delta Asia
(BDA) issue. She added her personal encouragement for
continued patience with the DPRK in order to resolve BDA and
eventually move on to the other phases of the February 13
Initial Actions Agreement. As soon as BDA was resolved, Han
said that she expected "rapid progress" in the next phase and
looked forward to a six-party ministerial meeting.


10. (C) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. had done all that

was required to resolve BDA, and more. Much time had been
wasted and the DPRK should not miss out on the chance to make
an historic deal during President Bush's term in office -- a
deal that would enjoy bipartisan support. Han agreed that
the time was right for the U.S. and the DPRK to work toward a
deal and the ROK should collaborate closely to assist where
possible.
VERSHBOW