URI PARTY VISIT TO PYONGYANG: DPRK SAID IT IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CLASSIFIED BY STATEMENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: URI PARTY VISIT TO PYONGYANG: DPRK SAID IT IS
COMMITTED TO INITIAL ACTIONS AGREEMENT

REF: SEOUL 1387

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW
FOR REASONS 1.4(B,D)
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SUMMARY
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1. (C) SUMMARY: Five Uri Party parliamentarians, led by
potential presidential candidate Rep. Kim Hyuk-kyu, met with
the Ambassador on May 9 to brief him on their May 2-5 trip to
Pyongyang. Kim said that the North Korean side had stressed:
(a) its commitment to implementing the February 13 "Initial
Actions" agreement; and (b) its eagerness to establish
diplomatic ties with the United States. Kim said that his
delegation -- all members of Uri's Northeast Asian Peace
Committee -- visited Pyongyang in part to help build trust
between the U.S. and North Korea, which it feared would
diminish if the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue were not
resolved soon.


2. (C) Rep. Lee Hwa-young said that this July 4 would be the
35th anniversary of the 1972 North-South Joint Communique for
improving inter-Korean relations and that the North wanted to
host an international political forum -- its first -- for the
occasion. The Ambassador remarked that if so, the forum
should be inclusive, reflecting diverse points of view. Rep.
Lee Kwang-jae, who is considered to be President Roh
Moo-hyun's "right-hand," remarked that North Korea harbored
some distrust of China, especially in the way it handled BDA,
and that it did not like being so dependent on China for aid.
This was why, Kim Hyuk-kyu maintained, the U.S. and ROK
should give aid to North Korea in tandem with (not a
half-step behind) Six-Party Talks (6PT) progress. Lee
Kwang-jae described two competing factions in North Korea:
those who wanted to join the international community and
those who still subscribed to the old way of thinking. END
SUMMARY.

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DPRK'S MESSAGE: PLAN TO IMPLEMENT FEB. 13 AGREEMENT
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3. (C) Rep. Kim Hyuk-kyu, part of the pro-Roh faction in the
National Assembly and likely to make a bid for the
Presidency, told the Ambassador on May 9 that he and four
other members of Uri's Northeast Asia Peace Committee
(reftel) went to Pyongyang May 2-5 to see if North Korea
intended to implement the steps outlined in the February 13
Initial Actions agreement once the BDA issue was resolved.
DPRK interlocutors repeatedly said yes, including Vice Chair
of the Asia Pacific Peace Committee, Chae Song-chol.


4. (C) Kim said they told the North Koreans that it was
important to establish mutual trust between the U.S. and DPRK
as a means to resolve other issues. Kim said he shared his
views as someone who understood American politics and culture
well. (NOTE: Kim lived in the U.S. from 1971 to 1991 and
became a successful businessman, serving as president of the
Korean Businessmen's Association of New York. Former
President Kim Young-sam persuaded him to join Korean politics
by appointing him Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs at the
Blue House. Kim left the GNP in 2003 and joined the Uri
Party. END NOTE.) The DPRK's response was that it truly
wanted diplomatic ties with the U.S.; the North Koreans asked
the Uri delegation to convey this message to the U.S. Rep.
Kim Jong-yull added the delegation had said that the world
was watching to see if the DPRK abided by the Initial Actions
agreement. If it did not, it would lose the trust of the
world, not just the U.S. He had remarked to their
interlocutors that the U.S. kept its word -- even in American
movies, you never saw characters who stabbed people in the
back. The Ambassador quipped that this was good, since Kim
Jong-il liked to watch U.S. movies.

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RETURNING THE PUEBLO TO THE U.S.
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5. (C) Kim Hyuk-kyu had told his interlocutors that it was
important for the DPRK to take the initiative to build trust,
and said returning the USS Pueblo would be a good opportunity
for Kim Jong-il to do that -- not just with the U.S., but
also with the rest of the world. He noted that neither the
DPRK nor the U.S. would be able actually to use the Pueblo,
so returning it would be a symbolic expression of building
friendship. Kim recounted how the North Koreans had reacted
with surprise to this suggestion, asking if the delegation
had consulted with the U.S. before visiting Pyongyang, which
Kim denied. Rep. Kim Jong-yull added that the North Koreans
were unhappy and became red-faced at the delegation's
suggestion. They had said they used the Pueblo as
educational material because it was proof of U.S. attacks.
Kim Hyuk-kyu said he had told them, "Since you've done so
much education, why not return it?" Kim Jong-yull said that
he had told their interlocutors that if the DPRK returned the
Pueblo, it would prove that that DPRK had changed and could
be trusted. The Ambassador remarked that this was
complicated. Legally, the Pueblo was not the property of the
DPRK, so the DPRK should return it to the U.S. on those
grounds. At the same time, he said he doubted that returning
it would have a positive impact on the U.S. and might even
rekindle old animosity toward North Korea. Lee Kwang-jae
said that the North Koreans had raised the same concerns.


6. (C) The Ambassador thanked the delegation for its
assurances to North Korea that the U.S. was a country that
kept its word, especially since he had doubts about what
North Korea intended to do. He confirmed that there was
currently very little trust between the U.S. and DPRK. From
the joint U.S.-ROK perspective, North Korea had broken its
promises to denuclearize made in 1992 and 1994. But the
Six-Party Talks (6PT) were a better framework, the Ambassador
said, and now we wanted to move forward with the September
19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 Initial Actions
agreement. He said the USG thought the Initial Actions
agreement was very significant because it established clear
commitments and timetables.


7. (C) Regarding establishing diplomatic ties, the Ambassador
said that the U.S. was ready to begin the process, as
evidenced by the first U.S.-DPRK working group meeting within
30 days of the Initial Actions agreement being signed. But
the USG believed the process must proceed in parallel to the
denuclearization process as well as the process of
establishing a peace regime. If everything went well,
hopefully these could be achieved in 2008. We would not be
able to establish diplomatic ties first, he said, as the Uri
members were suggesting; but we could take intermediate steps
to help build trust with North Korea, such as considering
removing the DPRK from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list,
reviewing the Trading with the Enemy Act, and engaging in
economic and humanitarian exchanges. Opening an Embassy in
the DPRK would be the last stage. The prerequisite for all
these steps, of course, would be North Korea moving down the
path of denuclearization by shutting down and then disabling
Yongbyon, declaring all nuclear programs, and finally,
verifiably dismantling all its weapons and programs.

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DPRK: WE WILL ABIDE BY THE INITIAL ACTIONS AGREEMENT
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8. (C) Kim Hyuk-kyu responded by saying that the Uri
delegation had suggested that North Korea should invite the
IAEA inspectors back once BDA was resolved. Their
interlocutors had repeatedly said that they would abide by
the Initial Actions agreement. Kim said he appreciated that
the U.S. had been patient. Since the U.S. was strong and the
DPRK was weak, perhaps it was time for the U.S. to "embrace"
North Korea.


9. (C) The Ambassador said that he was encouraged by the
North Koreans' assurances that the DPRK plans to implement
the Initial Actions agreement, even if it was late doing so.
But, he remarked, the DPRK was losing out on benefits such as
heavy fuel oil (HFO) and the goodwill it had gained by
signing the Initial Actions agreement. President Bush was
committed to finding a diplomatic solution. As he had told
President Roh during the APEC meeting in Hanoi last year, the
U.S. was prepared to officially end the Korean War and
establish peace, as much as he might find it difficult to
sign such an agreement with Kim Jong-il. This would depend
on North Korea's readiness to denuclearize. If we could put


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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO COMMEMORATE 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE
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10. (C) Lee Hwa-young, who was instrumental in setting up
former PM Lee Hae-chan's March visit to Pyongyang through
unofficial channels (reftels),said his interlocutors were
energized about establishing diplomatic ties with the U.S.
and shutting down the Yongbyon nuclear facility; their
attitude was more forthcoming than during his previous three
visits to Pyongyang.


11. (C) Lee Hwa-young said that North Korean interlocutors
had told the Uri delegation that they wanted to host an
international meeting in Pyongyang on July 4th to commemorate
the 35th anniversary of the 1972 North-South Joint
Communique, for two reasons: 1) to let the world know that
the North and South were pursuing peace and dialogue, which
would also be advantageous to the Uri Party in advance of the
Dec. 2007 ROK presidential elections, he said, smiling; and
2) to convey a message of commitment to peace to the U.S.
Lee Kwang-jae added that the July 4 international forum would
be the first political event that the DPRK would be hosting.
Given that this was the DPRK's suggestion, he sensed that it
wanted to draw attention to making peace on the Peninsula.
The Ambassador said that the notion of an international
conference was interesting, but he hoped that the DPRK would
invite people who represented diverse points of view, both
from South Korea and other countries. After all, it was Park
Chung-hee who had signed the 1972 Communique.

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DPRK DISTRUSTFUL OF CHINA, ESPECIALLY AFTER BDA
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12. (C) Lee Hwa-young said that the North Koreans believed
that China was partially to blame for the BDA delays, and
were also resentful of their dependence on China for aid.
Hence, the U.S. should take advantage of this window of
opportunity to improve relations with the DPRK. (Comment:
This view is consistent with ROK angst about China's growing
influence in the DPRK. End Comment.) The Ambassador said
that this was all the more reason for North Korea to get
beyond BDA and re-engage with the U.S. in the 6PT.

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PRO-ENGAGEMENT AND TRADITIONAL FACTIONS IN DPRK
-------------- --


13. (C) Lee Kwang-jae said that in the DPRK, there was
competition between two factions: those who wanted to join
the international community and those who were still
entrenched in the "old way of thinking." The former wanted
to expand economically, but now that "strategic materials"
were banned from entering North Korea (to the Kaesong
Industrial Complex (KIC)),the group was vulnerable to attack
from more conservative forces. Lee recounted how their
interlocutors had said, "Don't even mention KIC -- we're very
disappointed." He said that once North Korea was back on
track implementing the Initial Actions agreement, the U.S.
should implement economic measures to strengthen the position
of the pro-engagement group. In the end, it was about who
"could bring more bread to North Korea."

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COMMENT
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14. (C) Many pundits speculate that the purpose of Kim
Hyuk-kyu's visit was to set up a summer summit. That Lee
Kwang-jae, once considered the "right hand" of President Roh,
joined the group lends weight to speculation that the group
was on a presidential mission. Kim, from South Gyeongsang
Province, fits Roh's vision of a moderate from the southeast
who might be able to carry on Roh's political vision as the
next president.
VERSHBOW