ELECTION EXPERTS SHARE VIEWS ON FTA AND ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: ELECTION EXPERTS SHARE VIEWS ON FTA AND ELECTIONS

REF: SEOUL 985

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a luncheon meeting with the Ambassador,
a pollster, an ex-spokesperson for presidential candidate
Chung Mong-joon, a political consultant and a professor
shared their views of the current political landscape in
Korea and on the factors that would determine the outcome of
December's presidential election. One theme in the
discussion was how Korea had changed politically in the past
five years. In the 2002 elections, President Roh was elected
because people wanted to see change in the government and
because anti-American sentiment was running high. In the
2007 election, the majority of voters would focus on the
economy and particularly whether the next president could lay
out a vision that would make Korea an advanced country. A
secondary concern was peace and security on the Korean
Peninsula. In 2002, Korea was not a big player in global
markets whereas today it demanded the respect of world
economies. Based on this perspective, Korea would elect the
candidate who people think most deftly could merge political
savvy with economic principles.


2. (C) Although the guests' views varied when asked who was
the most likely candidate to win the presidential election,
they all agreed that President Roh would continue to play a
very active role in the presidential election. Roh was
likely to support a progressive candidate who was best suited
to go head-to-head with the GNP candidate. Roh's currently
high levels of support are a result of perceived decisiveness
and leadership on difficult issues (OPCON and FTA) and less
on any policy choice or particular outcome from those
decisions. The FTA was not likely to play a considerable
role in determining the next president of Korea, and neither
would a North-South summit. END SUMMARY.

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R-E-S-P-E-C-T
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3. (C) Political consultant and leading political
commentator Park Sung-min portrayed the political landscape
in Korea as driven by Korea's desire to be respected. In
2002, Korean voters were upset because they did not feel the
world respected Korea or its place in the world economy and
that the U.S. did not handle the school-girl incident well.
Now that Korea's economy was the 11th largest in the world,
Koreans were more satisfied with their standing. Agreeing to
receive wartime operational control (OPCON) and protecting
rice and other sensitive areas during the FTA negotiations
further supported Koreans' belief that Korea was being taken
seriously by the U.S. Polling firm President Hong Hyung-sik
agreed with Park that Korea finally had enough confidence in
its ability to compete in global markets. President Roh's
resurgent popular support reflected the belief among Koreans
that they have arrived on the global scene whereas previous
low levels of support marked dissatisfaction with Korea's
lack of global competitiveness.

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WHO ARE THE IDEAL CANDIDATES FOR THE NON-GNP PARTIES?
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4. (C) Political Science Professor Jaung Hoon from Chung-Ang
University made his case for former Seoul National University
President Chung Un-chan as the most viable presidential
candidate for the progressive side (see reftel). Jaung said
that Chung had a strong economic vision, exemplified by his
previous role as an advisor to the Bank of Korea. Economic
issues were still closely linked to regionalism and Chung had
the upper hand in this area as well, hailing from the
Chungcheong Province. Even if he could unite Chungcheong and
Jeolla Provinces, Chung would need to show that he can
translate his expertise into political power. Political
expert Kim Haeng countered that Chung looked good on the
surface but lacked public recognition and the skills of a
seasoned politician. Chung could not survive in the "evil"
arena of Korean politics. Kim also discounted former PM Lee
Hae-chan's prospects.


5. (C) Park broke down the progressives into three groups:
Pro-Roh (led by President Roh),Anti-Roh (led by former
President Kim Dae-jung) and the Sohn Hak-kyu/Chung Un-chan
group. Park noted that in the third group, neither candidate
was taking the initiative to gain significant support.
Former Gyeonggi Province Governor Sohn should have left the
GNP party sooner if he wanted to set his candidacy apart from
Chung's. President Roh, on the other hand, continued to
raise important issues and fight for these issues. Roh can
choose to work with the GNP on some issues (FTA) and yet
pursue others not in line with the GNP (inter-Korean summit).
Koreans cared less about issues and more about strong
leadership; hence, Roh's recent stronger polling numbers.

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GNP PRIMARY
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6. (C) The Ambassador queried the guests if they thought
former GNP leader Park Geun-hye had any chance of defeating
former Seoul Mayor Lee Myung-bak and capture the GNP
nomination, given Lee's continuing 2:1 lead in the polls.
Kim responded that if a Lee scandal emerges, even a minor
scandal, it could have a strong impact on his current
standing as the front-runner. Hong noted that the current
high levels of support for the GNP candidates were based more
on individual personalities and less on policies. Given this
precarious position, a candidate could quickly lose support
if linked to a scandal. Professor Jaung disagreed saying a
scandal would not undo Lee, since Koreans generally accepted
less-than-perfect politicians.

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GNP: ELECTION IN THE BAG?
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7. (C) Park listed three events that, should they occur,
could prevent the GNP from winning the election: Roh's
resignation (highly unlikely with his rebound in public
support after the FTA); dramatic change on the Peninsula
(emergency situation in DPRK); or if either Lee or Park were
to leave the GNP to run as an independent and thereby split
the GNP vote. After the GNP candidates register with the
party at the end of this month, they would be "locked in" and
could not leave the party, Jaung said. Although this was the
case for the candidates, lawmakers were not subject to
similar constraints, Park countered. If Park won the GNP
nomination, lawmakers who supported Lee might choose to flee
the party and cause a rift among GNP supporters in the
public. Conversely, if Lee won, Park's supporters would not
likely leave the GNP.

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GNP: HOW TO CHANGE NK POLICY
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8. (C) Jaung said that the GNP had a long way to go in its
attempt to revise its North Korea policy. This type of
change at the party level was not easy and could not happen
overnight. Jaung said it was ironic that the GNP lawmakers
leading the charge to revise the policy were part of the "old
guard" rather than the younger generation. At the candidate
level, Park had the least amount of room to change as she was
known as a hardliner.


9. (C) Hong said that South Korean views on North Korea have
changed dramatically in the past five years. Even before the
DPRK nuclear test, South Koreans' had begun to distrust Kim
Jong-il. Currently, South Korean views on North Korea were
based less on ideological differences and more on
humanitarian needs. As South Koreans looked for ways to help
North Koreans as individuals without supporting the DPRK
regime, candidates have yet to explain how they can help
achieve this goal. While South Koreans look for a new vision
toward North Korea, the GNP remained mired in the past.


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ROH FIGHTS OFF HIS LAME-DUCK STATUS
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10. (C) Kim said that President Roh took great pride in his
political ability and therefore wants to ensure a strong
legacy after he leaves office. Roh was less concerned with
who replaced him as president and more concerned that a
candidate emerge that shared his policy views. Based on this
way of thinking, former PM Lee Hae-chan, Health Minister Ryu
Shi-min, just-departed PM Han Myeong-sook and former South
Gyeongsang Province Governor Kim Hyuk-kyu would be acceptable
to him. Kim added that if Park Geun-hye wins the GNP primary
in August, Roh would likely throw his support behind Han
Myeong-sook, a woman, as the best candidate to contend
against Ms. Park. However, if none of these candidates'
fortunes rise, Roh could support Sohn Hak-kyu, Park stated.
All the attendees agreed that Roh would play a large role in
the elections.

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FTA: NOT A FACTOR IN THE ELECTION
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11. (C) Jaung identified three reasons why U.S.-ROK
relations would not be an issue in the presidential election.
First, the accidental killing of the two schoolgirls in 2002
triggered a strong anti-American response among the people
that influenced their voting behavior. The FTA was not
likely to elicit a similar emotional response. Second, there
was a different mood in the ROK in 2007, with less focus on
nationalism and more concern for economics and job creation.
Third, President Roh wanted to keep the discussion of Korea's
economy separate from FTA ratification. Park agreed with
Jaung, adding that anti-FTA protests would not likely garner
strong support. Korea recognized a need to grow and expand,
and most Koreans thought the FTA provided an opportunity for
growth.


12. (C) Kim echoed Jaung's comments and said that the
victims in 2002 were young schoolgirls. The only "victims"
of the FTA might be farmers. Although they might be vocal,
farmers do not have a central base of power. Looking at
history, the Korea-Chile FTA yielded fair protections and
assistance for groups disaffected by the FTA. Many in Korea
recognized that the agriculture sector was not competitive
and realized it was time for a change.

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DITTO FOR NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT
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13. (C) Jaung speculated that even if a North-South summit
were held before the election, it would not have a strong
impact on the elections. Following the North's nuclear test,
there was little room for North-South negotiations outside of
the Six-Party Talks. In order for the summit to be
considered a success, it would have to go above and beyond
the 2000 summit and President Roh was not in a position to
offer broad concessions to the DPRK. Given the limited
agenda possible for the summit, it could not drastically
change the political landscape in the months preceding the
December election.
VERSHBOW