BOSNIA - CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE EUROPEANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000995

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),
L(MANSFIELD); NSC FOR BRAUN; USNIC FOR MCLEAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EU BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE EUROPEANS

REF: A. MAY 7 FOOKS-MURPHY E-MAIL


B. STATE 22980

C. SARAJEVO 41

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Christian Schwarz-Schilling, in his capacity
as European Union Special Representative (EUSR),briefed
Quint Ambassadors (plus the European Commission Ambassador)
on the proposal to create a Constitutional Reform Commission
(CRC),which would be responsible for guiding a longer-term
constitutional reform process in Bosnia. All ambassadors
expressed general support for the process and for a U.S.-EU
partnership on "phase II" constitutional reform, but several
also expressed concern that the draft concept paper provided
for too great a role for the international community in the
process. Several ambassadors also objected to the proposed
size of the secretariat, which would provide technical and
administrative support. We stressed two points. First,
absent a strong guiding hand from the international
community, the prospects for reaching an agreement on
constitutional reform were slight. An "ownership" strategy
would not produce the results the U.S. and EU wanted.
Second, this process required careful political management
given the current political environment in Bosnia. It did
not make sense to force an agreement. In that context, we
expressed concern about an EUSR and German proposal to hold a
"ceremony" in mid-June announcing support for a
Constitutional Reform Commission. From our perspective, it
would be useful for Washington officials to underscore these
messages with Schwarz-Schilling during his visit to
Washington the week of May 14. END SUMMARY

EUSR Outlines Long-term Constitutional Reform Process
-------------- --------------


2. (C) At a May 8 meeting Christian Schwarz-Schilling, in his
capacity as EU Special Representative (EUSR),briefed UK,
German, French, Italian and European Commission ambassadors
on a U.S.-EU proposal to establish a longer-term process of
constitutional reform regardless of what happens to the
existing, U.S.-brokered package of amendments (Ref B). The
EUSR said that he had been working closely with his own
expert group and the U.S. for several months to develop a
proposal that could be launched by a political agreement
among Bosnian political party leaders. The proposal involves
the creation of a Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC),
which would consist of eight representatives from Bosnia's
major political parties and would be supported by a
secretariat composed of international and Bosnian technical

SIPDIS
experts. An American, a European and a Bosnian would
co-chair the CRC (Note: The Bosnian co-chair would rotate
among the CRC Bosnian membership. End Note.)

Ownership vs. Guiding Hand
--------------


3. (C) The European ambassadors expressed their strong
support for "the overall process of constitutional reform,"
but expressed concern about the scope of international
involvement in the process. That said, they argued that
placing an American and a European at the head of the
Commission and including international experts among the
secretariat staff undercut the principle of "ownership."

SIPDIS
European ambassadors maintained that U.S. and European
"intervention" in the constitutional reform process ought to
be limited, and they urged the EUSR to restructure the
proposal to provide Bosnians with a greater responsibility
for shaping proposed amendments and driving the associated
political process. The EC Ambassador underscored that
constitutional reform is not a requirement for EU accession.
Ambassador replied that progress on constitutional reform,
like every other major reform in Bosnia, required a strong
guiding hand from the international community. That did not
mean writing the constitution for the Bosnians, but rather
providing them political support when tough choices had to be
made. For the Bosnians, the constitutional reform process
would not be a graduate school seminar, but rather a bitter
political struggle that would bare their still festering
distrust and animosity.

Timing is Everything
--------------

SARAJEVO 00000995 002 OF 003




4. (C) The Ambassador repeated our commitment, as part of
this process, to consult with party leaders to assess the
political viability of the U.S.-brokered package of
amendments, but he also stressed that consultations on
"meshing" the U.S.-brokered package with the longer-term
process would have to be carefully orchestrated. Some
Bosnian leaders might use the U.S.-EU proposal as a pretext
to walk away from the constitutional reform process
altogether, if it involves abandoning the U.S.-brokered
package. Others, particularly opponents of the U.S.-brokered
package, might use the U.S.-EU proposal to claim a political
victory and vindication for their previous positions, which
might embolden them to press even more aggressively for their
"all or nothing" approach to constitutional reform. We would
have to find the right moment in the current political
environment to press ahead, the Ambassador concluded.


5. (C) Though there was general agreement on this point, both
the EUSR and the German Ambassador expressed their interest
in holding a formal event in mid-June to announce U.S.-EU
support for a longer-term constitutional reform process,
including a pledge to provide technical and financial support
for the process. The EC Ambassador suggested that it might
be best to hold such a ceremony only once political party
leaders had agreed to sign a political declaration supporting
the CRC's creation. EUSR argued that a U.S.-EU event could
be designed to put political pressure on the party leaders to
sign such a declaration and did not need to be connected to a
specific milestone in the long-term constitutional reform
process. (Note: On the margins of the meeting, the German
Ambassador told us that while Berlin would prefer a mid-June
event, he thought Germany might ultimately be flexible about
timing. End Note.)

Size Matters
--------------


6. (C) The German, French, and EC Ambassador also expressed
concern about the size of the proposed Secretariat, which
would include 10 internationals (including the two co-chairs)
and 23 Bosnians. The EC Ambassador suggested that the EU and
Economic Affairs Section of the Secretariat be cut in half
from three to six people. At one point, the German
Ambassador proposed that international technical experts fly
into Bosnia "as needed" as they did when supporting the
constitutional drafting process in Afghanistan. EUSR
countered that outside experts his staff had consulted were
surprised at how small the proposed secretariat would be. He
noted that the Defense Reform Commission ultimately involved
almost 120 people, stressing that the CRC's task was arguably
much more complex and politically challenging. (Comment: We
are agnostic about how many EU-related experts the CRC might
require and would certainly not object to cuts. End Comment)

Next Steps
--------------


7. (C) Despite the lack of consensus on some of aspects of
the Constitutional Reform Commission, EUSR plans to brief EU
Heads of Mission and the Steering Board Ambassadors this week
on the proposal, albeit in much less detail. He will also
brief the EU Political-Security Committee in Brussels on
Friday, May 11 before traveling next week to Washington. In
the meantime, EUSR staff will seek "line-in, line-out"
suggestions from the Germans, British, French, Italians, and
European Delegation with the aim of finalizing the proposal
in the next week. EUSR has suggested that U.S.-EUSR
consultations with political party leaders might begin as
soon as he returns from Washington (on Friday May 18),but we
have signaled that we believe clear agreement on the concept
paper outlining a longer-term constitutional process is
necessary before we begin consulting party leaders. The EC
Ambassador made a point of noting that "this briefing should
not be seen as an endorsement by the Commission of the
proposal."

Comment
--------------


8. (C) We are increasingly concerned about whether this is
the right moment to push constitutional reform, whether the
U.S.-brokered package or a longer-term process. It could

SARAJEVO 00000995 003 OF 003


further inflame inter-ethnic political tensions as well as
strengthen the political hand of Bosniak member of the
Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, who remains the biggest
obstacle to reaching political consensus on major reforms.
We expect EUSR to press us to move quickly nonetheless, since
he sees some sort of agreement on a long-term constitutional
reform process as a legacy issue (hence the full court press
on the mid-June "ceremony"). The Germans and others eager to
throw him a bone before his June 30 departure may well
support him. It would be useful for Washington to underscore
to EUSR that while we remain committed to a US.-EU-led
constitutional reform process, we must carefully consider the
political consequences of trying to rush an agreement. In
that context, we are skeptical about the wisdom of a mid-June
"ceremony" absent a clear commitment from political leaders.
We suspect this last message will have to be delivered to
Berlin as well.
MCELHANEY