AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 27 MEETING WITH HARIS SILAJDZIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000946

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 27 MEETING WITH HARIS SILAJDZIC

Classified By: CDA Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

Summary
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1. (C) The Ambassador met with Bosniak Presidency member
Haris Silajdzic on April 27. Silajdzic who had recently
returned from a visit to Doha briefed on a USD 100 million
Qatari fund for investment in Bosnia and asserted he was
attempting to refocus the Presidency on economic development
issues. Silajdzic said the Srebrenica controversy remained
emotional and could "get ugly" if not resolved soon with a
meaningful measures such as granting the municipality special
legal status. Silajdzic raised, for the first time, a
proposal to address the "history of genocide in Bosnia" by
changing the name of the Republika Srpska (RS) claiming that
the name of the entity legitimized ethnic cleansing. On
police reform Silajdzic suggested that the parties could keep
the SAA process alive by agreeing to accept the
national-level portion of the draft police structure and
return to the issue of local policing at a later date. The
Ambassador replied that such an agreement would still not put
Bosnia in compliance with EU SAA requirements. In a
discussion of constitutional reform Silajdzic stated outright
that he remained opposed to the March package adding that
Serb support for entity voting shows that the RS seeks to
preserve "isolation and ghettoization" in Bosnia. The
Ambassador pointed out that Silajdzic's divisive, maximalist
position threatened to consign Bosnia to permanent political
deadlock. Silajdzic replied that his bottom line was "a
better deal," asserted he would pursue it as long as it took
but refused to be drawn out on his political vision. End
Summary.

Qatari Investment: New Economic Focus?
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2. (C) Silajdzic opened the meeting with a briefing on his
recent visit to Qatar where he met with the Qatari Prime
Minister and also briefly with visiting UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon. Silajdzic confirmed press reports on the
establishment of a USD 100 million Qatari investment fund for
both public and private projects in Bosnia. Silajdzic
asserted that during a recent Tri-Presidency meeting to
discuss the Qatari fund the Presidency members agreed to put
political disagreements "on hold" to focus on economic
issues. Bosnia has obvious political problems but they
should not be allowed to block critical economic development,
Silajdzic said. However, Bosnia will need the help of the
United States to bypass the current political deadlock and
turn national attention to economic issues. He acknowledged
that there are currently very few potential projects for the
Qatari investment fund but raised Corridor 5-C as a
possibility. The Ambassador reminded Silajdzic that Corridor
5-C would very likely require World Bank and IMF financing
and would therefore involve a lengthy tender process. Bosnia
should be prepared for this by preparing the necessary
feasibility studies and political consensus.

Srebrenica
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3. (C) The Ambassador reviewed with Silajdzic USG assistance
projects in Srebrenica and mission outreach with political
leaders in the wake of ICJ-related tensions. The Ambassador
noted he had recently spoken to Milorad Dodik who had tabled
concrete proposals for the municipality and had made some
helpful statements on the Britannic burial controversy.
Silajdzic thanked the Ambassador and the USG for the measures
but said the issue remained emotional one which could "get
ugly" if not resolved soon. The Federation and State
governments had appropriated a small sum of about USD one
million for Srebrenica projects but economic and humanitarian
steps alone will not resolve the problem. A comprehensive
solution will also require a symbolic component as well,
Silajdzic said. For example, a Bosniak police chief in
Srebrenica and Serbia's delivery of war crimes suspects to
The Hague would be important steps towards reconciliation.
Silajdzic pointed out that he had attempted to address the
latter by proposing a diplomatic note to Serbia that had had
resulted in a Radmanovic veto. The most important symbolic
element, however, would be granting special legal status to
Srebrenica.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked Silajdzic to explain his concept
of special status for Srebrenica. Silajdzic evaded the
question replying only that "genocide victims deserve special
administrative status." Silajdzic said he would be
unwavering in his support for state-level legislation
creating a special status for Srebrenica but promised not to
"throw oil on the fire." The Ambassador pointed out that
pressing forward on Srebrenica legislation at this sensitive

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time was precisely the sort of political issue that could
jeopardize the new economic focus that Silajdzic had
proposed.

Silajdzic: Change the Name of the Republika Srpska
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5. (C) In an unusual departure from his previous position on
the abolishing RS, Silajdzic stated that the legacy of
Srebrenica, which had been returned to international
attention by the ICJ verdict, could be conclusively resolved
by changing the name of the Republika Srpska. Renaming the
RS, and therefore addressing the ethnic cleansing implicit in
its name, would also obviate the need to grant Srebrenica
special status. Silajdzic claimed he had already floated
this idea with Milorad Dodik, who had promised to "consider
it." Silajdzic said a name change would be cosmetic, and not
result any significant change in the in the ethnic makeup or
political structure of the RS but would be an effective means
to acknowledge the history of genocide in Bosnia. Silajdzic
said that, like the Federation, the name of the Republika
Srpska should not refer to only one of the constituent
peoples but should be inclusive. He suggested that a name
such as "the Republic of Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats" would be
acceptable.


6. (C) The Ambassador remarked that this was the kind of
divisive, maximalist position that A/S Fried had warned
against during his April 4 visit. The Ambassador pointed out
that unless Silajdzic was willing to adopt a politically
realistic strategy on constitutional, police reforms,
Srebrenica, the name of the RS, and entity voting he would
consign Bosnia to permanent political deadlock. The
Ambassador asked Silajdzic if he could articulate a timeline
for his political goals or would hold out indefinitely.
Silajdzic replied that his bottom line was "a better deal,"
asserted he would pursue it as long as it took but refused to
be drawn out on his political vision. In response to
questions from the Ambassador Silajdzic said he would not
support a third entity but would support a Bosnia of regions
"very similar to the plan put forward by the Catholic
Church." Silajdzic acknowledged that the elimination of
entity voting was a key component of his strategy. He stated
that if this was a maximalist position "then I am sorry" but
the "very existence of the Republika Srpska is a maximalist
position."

Police Reform
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that Milorad Dodik had made
significant concessions on police reform but could not be
expected compromise alone. He urged Silajdzic to accept the
March 14 proposal pointing out that the term "RS Police" in
the text would quickly cease to have any operational meaning
in the new police structure. Silajdzic reiterated his
resolve to eliminate the term from any agreement on police
reform. He suggested, however, that the parties could accept
the national-level, portion of the draft organigram and
return to the contentious issue of local policing at a later
date. Such an agreement would allow the EC to save face and
keep the SAA process alive for the moment, Silajdzic said.
The Ambassador replied that the issue of local policing was a
key element of the three EC principles and an interim
agreement on the national structure alone would not put
Bosnia in compliance with EU SAA requirements.

New York Ceremony
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8. (C) The Ambassador asked about plans to convene a
commemoration of the UN recognition of Bosnian independence
on May 21 at the Bosnian mission in New York. Silajdzic
acknowledged that the event was in the planning stages and
asserted that the Presidency reached a formal consensus
approving the proposal. The event would involve a reception
at the Bosnian mission, a press conference and speeches by
each of the three Presidency members. Silajdzic promised to
"be reserved and nice in my remarks" and not "cause problems
for Radmanovic." Silajdzic said he hoped the Presidency
would also meet with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
Silajdzic also intimated he planned to visit Washington from
May 22-24 for meetings with Congress and an address at a
Council on Foreign Relations event and said he would also be
requesting appointments with USG officials.

Constitutional Reform
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9. (C) The Ambassador noted that the High Representative is
eager to begin implementing plans for a constitutional reform
secretariat. The USG is willing to take part in the project

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but it will be up to Bosnians to negotiate the substance of
the reforms. Silajdzic stated flatly that he remained firmly
opposed to the March package. Silajdzic embarked on a
lengthy digression cataloging complaints about the
constitutional reform process including the international
community's failure to explain "democratic standards."
Silajdzic stated that Serb parties' insistence on preserving
entity voting demonstrated that while Bosniaks want
integration and moderation, the RS is seeking isolation and
ghettoization. Silajdzic also returned to the
recommendations of the European Parliament and the Council of
Europe as a justification for his opposition to the March
package. The Ambassador pointed out that in comparison with
the endorsement of EU member state governments, objections of
the Council of Europe and the EP were not substantive.



CEFKIN