BOSNIA: FOREIGN MINISTER ALKALAJ SHOULD HEAR A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000935

SIPDIS

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC
FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: FOREIGN MINISTER ALKALAJ SHOULD HEAR A
STRONG MESSAGE IN WASHINGTON

REF: A. SARAJEVO 863

B. SARAJEVO 791

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Bosnian Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj
arrives in Washington April 30 for a week-long visit. Having
served as the Bosnian Ambassador to the U.S (1994- 2000),
Alkalaj is no stranger to Washington, but this will be his
first U.S. visit as Foreign Minister. Although he assumed
his current post with a great ambition to reform the
Ministry, it remains largely ineffective and
compartmentalized among competing ethnic interests.
Unfortunately, Alkalaj himself has served more as a defender
of Tri-Presidency member Haris Silajdzic,s positions. It
will be critical that he hear from his USG interlocutors a
strong message on the need to exercise responsible national
leadership and to start becoming part of the solution in
countering Haris Silajdzic,s destructive radicalization of
the national political discourse.


2. (C) Summary continued: Alkalaj, who, in his role as NATO
Ambassador (2004-2007) played a genuinely constructive role
in Bosnia,s defense reform process, will be well-prepared to
discuss status of this reform and Bosnia,s
Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) program. We expect he will also
be eager to discuss Kosovo status. Although he has generally
expressed confidence that a Kosovo settlement will not
adversely affect BiH, he more recently evinced to us some
concern that Serbian government officials had started to
suggest that imposition of the Ahtisaari plan would spark
regional instability. End Summary.


3. (SBU) FM Sven Alkalaj is scheduled to visit Washington
April 30-May 4. At State, in addition to his meeting with
A/S Fried, he has asked to meet with Undersecretary Burns and
has expressed the hope for a brief drop-by with the
Secretary. Outside State, he is seeking meetings at the NSC,

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DOD and with several members of Congress, including the SFRC
majority and minority leaders. He will also attend a dinner
hosted by the American Jewish Council and meet with
representatives of the Bosnia diaspora.

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Foreign Ministry as Agent of Silajdzic
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4. (C) Alkalaj is a member of Haris Silajdzic's Party for
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) and a close confidant of the
Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency. (Note: It was
Silajdzic who initially persuaded Alkalaj to leave his
successful business career to serve as Ambassador to the U.S.
in 1994). Alkalaj,s appointment as FM this past January was
initially hailed by the international community. Through his
service as Bosnian ambassador to the U.S. and later NATO,
Alkalaj had burnished a reputation as an intelligent,
effective diplomatic professional. It was also hoped that
Alkalaj,s status as a minority (Alkalaj is Jewish) -- and
therefore not a member of any of Bosnia,s three constituent
peoples -- would enhance his ability to bridge parochial
ethnic interests. However, in his role as Foreign Minister,
Alkalaj has served less as the executor of Bosnian foreign
policy than as a defender of Silajdzic's interests.
Specifically, Alkalaj has been active in explaining SBiH
opposition to the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional
reforms and Silajdzic's recent efforts to block a police
reform agreement (Ref A). That said, Alkalaj is aware that
Silajdzic's policies are beginning to strain Bosnia's
bilateral relations with third countries. He often attempts
to downplay Silajdzic's rhetoric by asserting that Silajdzic
is at heart a Western-oriented reformer with a strong
affinity for the United States. Alkalaj has the necessary
confidence of, and access to, Silajdzic to be able accurately
convey messages, including negative ones. In that context
should be used as a conduit to express USG concern over
Silajdzic and SBiH positions. Nonetheless, Alkalaj appears
to have little ability to moderate Silajdzic's actions.


5. (C) Silajdzic has repeatedly tried to use Alkalaj to
attempt to marginalize Serb Tri-Presidency member Nebojsa
Radmanovic and engineer confrontations with the Republika
Srpska. In January, at the instruction of Silajdzic, Alkalaj
nullified an existing bilateral agreement with Serbia on dual
citizenship citing the breakup of Serbia and Montenegro.
Silajdzic has also plunged the Presidency into crisis by
tabling a proposal to instruct Alkalaj to convey a bilateral
message to Serbia demanding action on the International Court

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of Justice Verdict (Ref A),forcing Radmanovic to veto the
instruction. Most recently, we have learned that n Silajdzic
will ask Alkalaj to instruct Bosnia's UN Mission in New York
to convene a May 21 ceremony, to be attended by all three
Presidency members, commemorating the anniversary of U.S.
recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The decision and
preparations were made without informing Serb Presidency
member Radmanovic and appears to be an additional attempt by
Silajdzic to put him off balance and precipitate an open
conflict.

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Alkalaj Expecting Stern Message
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6. (C) On April 24 DCM previewed Alkalaj's visit to
Washington and underscored that his USG interlocutors will
expect to discuss concrete options for resuming the reform
process in Bosnia. Alkalaj is aware of USG concerns over the
growing nationalism paralyzing Bosnian politics having
received a stern message from A/S Fried on April 4. (Ref B)
However, Alkalaj offered no new ideas on ways forward and
returned to familiar Silajdzic formulations such as opening
the March package to a review by constitutional experts and
opposition to entity voting. On police reform, he stated
flatly that Silajdzic "will not budge" on his demand to bar
any reference to "the RS police" in a Police Reform
agreement. Post suggests that Department officials reiterate
to Alkalaj that the current policies of his party and party
President are not serving the interest of Bosnian citizens
and will only further complicate U.S.-Bosnian relations.

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Kosovo and Regional Security
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7. (C) Alkalaj will be prepared to discuss regional issues,
particularly Kosovo. On April 24 Alkalaj briefed the DCM on
his recent bilateral visit to Serbia noting President Boris
Tadic's public statement that Serbia respects the territorial
integrity of a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. Alkalaj
highlighted the statement as an illustration that no one in
the region expects Kosovo status to impact the domestic
political situation of Bosnia. He stated that all parties in
Bosnia are prepared for, and expect Kosovo independence and
believed that the public reaction would be minimal.
Nonetheless, it will be difficult for Bosnia to immediately
recognize an independent Kosovo due to public pressure on
Serb parties. Alkalaj said that further delay in settling
Kosovo status, rather than independence, is a greater threat
to internal stability in Bosnia and that a resolution would
contribute to normalizing the political dialogue here.
(Note: On April 26 Alkalaj shared with us a Serbian
government non-paper opposing the Ahtisaari plan. He told us
that the paper had been provided to him by a "friendly Middle
Eastern diplomat," who had reported that when the paper was
delivered in his capital the Serbian Ambassador had stressed
that imposition of the Ahtisaari plan had the potential to
disrupt regional stability. Therefore, Washington
interlocutors may find Alkalaj somewhat less sanguine about
the proposed Kosovo settlement. End Note.)


8. (C) As former NATO Ambassador, Alkalaj is well-versed in
political-military and regional security issues and was a
staunch advocate for Bosnia's membership in NATO's
Partnership for Peace. Alkalaj is a strong supporter of
defense reform and has good relations with former Defense
Minister and incoming NATO ambassador Nikola Radovanovic. In
this context he will be well briefed on, and supportive of
Bosnia's continued integration into trans-Atlantic security
architecture.

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MFA Remains Dysfunctional
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9. (C) Prior to assuming the role of Foreign Minister,
Alkalaj, articulated a compelling vision of his intention to
transform Bosnia's dysfunctional Ministry of Foreign Affairs
into a cohesive and modern agency. Since taking office,
however, he has been stymied by budget shortfalls, rigid
hiring systems coupled with the continued requirements for
ethnic quotas, and the persistent tendency of Ministry staff,
including Alkalaj himself, to use their diplomatic perches to
guard the political interests of the constituent group they
represents. As a result, the Ministry remains severely
handicapped in its efforts to articulate and implement a

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cohesive foreign policy vision for Bosnia.
MCELHANEY