BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC CONTINUES TO PROVOKE POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000863

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SKOPJE FOR EUR (DICARLO),D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE
(HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI; NSC FOR BRAUN; USNIC FOR
WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE; SECDEF FOR FATA AND BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KAWC KJUS MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC CONTINUES TO PROVOKE POLITICAL
CRISIS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 753

B. SARAJEVO 832

C. SARAJEVO 808

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since he returned to Bosnian politics during
last year's elections, Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency
Haris Siladjic has actively worked toward creating a Bosniak
Muslim rejectionist front that, in his words to the
Ambassador, "will stand up to the Serbs and be as
obstructionist as they are." In doing so, Siladjic has
radicalized the political dialogue here. His election
campaign was based on defeating the US brokered
constitutional amendments that in his words "supported
genocide because the Serb entity was not abolished in that
process." His approach directly challenges Dayton, both in
the case of constitutional reform, and in the case of
Srebrenica. With an ICJ decision that did not directly
charge Serbia with the crime, Siladjic has pedaled the story
that "Republika Srpska is guilty, and the international
community must now take action against it." He is behind the
movement in Srebrenica to raise tensions there, peddling the
line that unless the city can be extracted from the RS,
returnees should pick up and leave. He has refused to
compromise on a police reform that will make possible the
signing of an association agreement with the EU. Recently,
he pushed through a resolution in the three-person
presidency, opposed by the Serb but supported by the Croat,
which "demands" that Belgrade implement the ICJ decision in
full. This 2-1 decision has occasioned a veto process in the
Repulika Srpska assembly, which will begin April 23. In
light of press stories that evidence in ICTY custody would
have supported an ICJ guilty verdict against Belgrade,
Siladjic is talking about taking the Bosnian case to the UN
Security Council. It is increasingly clear that Siladjic's
agenda, rather than to get a better deal for Bosniaks, is to
raise political tensions to the point that: the international
community presence will remain, thereby maintaining control
over the Serbs; the Dayton constitution will be scrapped, and
its authors will be "obliged" to negotiate a "fair" deal,
including abolition of the odious Serb entity and creation of
a unitary state (under Muslim majority control). The time
has come to focus our attention on Siladjic, who unchecked,
will only work to worsen the situation. END SUMMARY

ICJ Verdict Prompts Standoff at the Presidency
-------------- -


2. (C) The fallout from the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) verdict that genocide occurred in Srebrenica from about
July 13, 1995 onward continues. The latest row erupted late
Friday afternoon, April 13 when Serb Tri-Presidency member
Nebojsa Radmanovic announced his decision to veto a
Presidency decision instructing the MFA to "demand" that
Serbia honor its commitments under the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Radmanovic objected
to the decision's undiplomatic language and the process by
which is was adopted (i.e., by a 2-1 decision with Serbs in
the minority; Croat Zeljko Komsic and Bosniak as well as
author Haris Silajdzic supported it). He also told us
privately that he believed Silajdzic's real aim in pushing
for the decision was to create a pretext for FM Alkalaj to
take punitive action against Serbia, if it fails to comply
with the Bosnian "demand." For the past week, we have sought
to build consensus within the Presidency around alternative
language that was more diplomatic and more consistent with
the ICJ's proposed remedy (i.e., cooperation by Serbian
authorities with The Hague). Though both Radmanovic and
Komsic expressed a willingness to compromise, Silajdzic
flatly refused. The Republika Srpska National Assembly
(RSNA) will meet on April 23 to consider Radmanovic's veto,
and will no doubt sustain it.

Silajdzic Quietly Planning Appeal to the UN
--------------


3. (C) Silajdzic likely sees an RSNA veto as a political win,
even if it costs him the April 11 Presidency decision. A
veto would undoubtedly create political problems for Bosnian

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Serbs, who would have a difficult time deflecting charges
that they are opposed to Serbian cooperation with The Hague,
for example. A veto would also underscore Silajdzic's
contention that Dayton's entity/ethnic-based structures do
not work and must be eliminated. Regardless of the outcome
in the RSNA, Silajdzic has said he would take Bosnia's
ICJ-related grievances to the UN Security Council (UNSC). In
theory, this would require yet another Presidency decision,
but Silajdzic, with FM Alaklaj's help, could bypass the
government's decision-making apparatus and go directly to the
UN, just as former PM Terzic did in late 2006 when he
addressed the UNSC without the government's approval. Either
scenario presents Silajdzic with yet another opportunity to
provoke a Bosniak-Serb political crisis.


4. (C) Separately, Silajdzic has publicly seized on media
reports that the ICJ did not have access to all archived
Yugoslav documents to call for new a new ICJ case. In an
open letter published in the Croatian daily Jutarnji List,
former ICTY Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice claimed that Carla Del
Ponte's negotiations with Serbia over submitting documents to
the Milosevic trial constituted "collusion" with Belgrade
that, in turn, resulted in a suppression of evidence in the
recent ICJ case. The letter followed a New York Times
article, which received wide coverage in the Bosnian press,
asserting that the ICJ verdict failed to consider key
documents related to Serbia's role in the 1992-95 war.
Silajdzic has argued that the alleged incomplete nature of
the available evidence is grounds for reopening or refiling
the ICJ case, which Serbs have already vowed to block.
Silajdzic's arguments have resonated with Bosniaks, who were
already angry and bitter over the initial verdict.


Srebrenica (and Bratunac) - Exploiting Bosniak Victims
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The latest controversies over the ICJ verdict come
against the backdrop of a general radicalization among
Bosniaks, particularly in the Eastern RS, where the Bosnian
Serb ethnic cleansing campaign was most vicious and genocide
took place. Silajdzic continues to claim that the ICJ
concluded the RS was responsible for the genocide in and
around Srebrenica (though the Court did not) and that as a
consequence of this the RS must be abolished. Silajdzic's
vigorous campaign for Srebrenica's secession is an effort to
provoke a political crisis over the Dayton territorial
settlement; his accusations that Srebrenica's Bosniaks had
"once again been abandoned" is an attempt to drive a wedge
between Bosniaks and the international community and further
radicalize Bosniaks. Our response (i.e., shifting focus to
practical steps Bosnia's political leaders could take to
improve the lives of all Srebrenica's citizens),has finally
begun to defuse some of the political heat over Srebrenica,
but Silajdzic continues to search for opportunities to
provoke political crisis that would further radicalize
Bosniaks.


6. (C) The planned May 12 burial of 98 of the 603 Bonsiak
victims from the 1992 Bratunac massacre at a mosque in the
municipality may provide Silajdzic with just such an
opportunity. The burial is strongly opposed by Bratunac
Serbs, most of whom are members of the Serb Democratic Party
(SDS) or other Serb radical parties, and municipal officials
have sought to place one road block after another in front of
the victims' families. On April 18, Bosnian Islamic leader
Reis Ceric visited Bratunac and publicly asserted that
Bosniaks, although traditionally a peaceful and tolerant
people, are rapidly losing patience, adding that events in
Bratunac explained why Bosniaks wanted to abolish the RS. We
are working closely with OHR and officials in Banja Luka to
resolve the looming crisis and allow the families to bury
their loved ones, but radical Serb bigotry and some
Sarajevo-based Bosniaks' interest in provoking a crisis could
produce some ugly scenes on May 12.

Kosovo: What is Good for the Goose...
--------------


7. (C) Undersecretary Burns' April 17 testimony on Kosovo

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status before the House Foreign Affairs Committee received
prominent coverage here and has returned the issue of Kosovo
independence to the forefront of public debate in Bosnia.
Local commentators have begun to speculate that the U.S.
might unilaterally recognize Kosovo's independence and the
resulting impact on Bosnian stability. The day before the
Undersecretary's testimony, Milorad Zivkovic (SNSD),Serb
Deputy Speaker of the State House of Representatives was
quoted in an uncharacteristically abrasive statement as
saying "over the past fifteen years it is the Serbs who have
lived through the worst and most ruthless ethnic cleansing.
It is great cynicism to mention ethnic cleansing in the
moment when Kosovo is happening." We anticipate that
unhelpful speculation over the direction of U.S. Kosovo
policy will prove a tempting outlet for Serb politicians to
counter calls for Srebrenica secession.


8. (C) But Bosnian Serb politicians are not the only concern.
Several Bosniaks, including some of Silajdzic's advisors,
have privately raised a much different parallel between
Kosovo and Bosnia. They ask how the U.S. can justify
responding so forcefully to Serbia's ethnic
cleansing/genocidal campaign in Kosovo, but allow the results
of a similar (and far more deadly) ethnic cleansing/genocidal
campaign in Bosnia to remain enshrined in the Dayton
constitution. These Bosniaks argue that the U.S. and the
international community have a moral obligation to reverse
the results of the 1992-1995 war and eliminate the RS. To
the best of our knowledge, Silajdzic and his allies have not
made such arguments publicly, but this is very much their
line. We are also wary that Silajdzic may use the "Kosovo
recognition" issue as a club with which to provoke Bosnian
Serbs, who have repeatedly warned us not to press the
recognition question.

OHR and EU Absent
--------------


9. (C) Since the ICJ verdict OHR, with the exception of PDHR
Gregorian, have remained largely silent on the developing
controversies. Although High Representative
Schwarz-Schilling has attempted to intervene in both the
Srebrenica secession initiative and the Presidency veto, he
been either ignored or publicly ridiculed. Schwarz-Schilling
is aware of the dangers posed by Silajdzic, but
Schwarz-Schilling's past performance has so discreditted him
that he is no longer capable of positively shaping the
Bosnian political environment. The European performance has
been little better. Though privately concerned about
developments in Bosnia, the EU and EU Ambassadors are
reluctant to express these concerns forcefully in private or
even allude to them publicly. They have also been prone to
get bogged down in process issues and/or legal questions
rather than focus on the core policy challenge Silajdzic now
poses.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Silajdzic's insistence on provoking political crises
has sucked what little post-election momentum existed for
reform out of Bosnian politics. It is becoming increasingly
clear to us that crisis, rather than "a better political
deal," is his real agenda. The Ambassador, reiterating A/S
Fried's strong message to Siljadzic on April 4, has told him
privately that this must stop, and he has also warned other
Bosniak political leaders that Silajdzic's agenda, which they
have signed on to (more out of fear than conviction),will
lead Bosniaks nowhere. We are now talking with OHR and our
European colleagues about ratcheting up the pressure on
Silajdzic and actively seeking to draw other Bosniak leaders
away from him. This will also require our working to resolve
political disputes Silajdzic seeks to exploit as well as
keeping the Bosnian Serbs in line, some of whom would be
eager to aggravate any tension between the international
community and the Bosniaks. By separate message, we are
sending proposals for U.S./European joint initiatives to
convince Silajdzic to change course.
MCELHANEY