BOSNIA: SANADER VISIT ADVANCES BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000757

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),
EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHCOMB/BELL),NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2011
TAGS: PREL ECON HR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SANADER VISIT ADVANCES BILATERAL
RELATIONS, BUT NOT HDZ UNITY

REF: A. ZAGREB 317

B. 06 SARAJEVO 2279

C. 06 SARAJEVO 2268

Classified By: POLCOUNS Michael J. Murphy. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) SUMMARY: Bosnian government officials and the Croatian
DCM described Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader's March
28-30 visit to Bosnia as positive and constructive. His
impact on internal Bosnian Croat politics was less clear.
Croatia and Bosnia concluded agreements on dual citizenship
and border security collaboration. Sanader offered solutions
to lingering territorial disputes, which the BiH government
promised to consider, and said the Croatian government
supported Bosnia and Serbia's efforts to move towards EU and
NATO membership. He expressed support for critical reforms in
Bosnia, as long as those reforms were achieved without
disenfranchising or disadvantaging the Croat minority.
Sanader also urged the two main Bosnian Croat nationalist
parties to take a common position on constitutional reform.
In addition to furthering bilateral ties, the visit raised
Sanader's profile with Bosnian residents who will be eligible
to vote in Croatian national elections in November. END
SUMMARY.

HDZs: SO NEAR AND YET SO FAR
--------------


2. (SBU) During his March 28-30 official visit to Bosnia (REF
A),Sanader downplayed his desire to reconcile the two main
Bosnian Croat nationalist parties. On March 28 he told local
reporters he would meet with HDZ-BiH leader Dragan Covic and
HDZ-1990 leader Bozo Ljubic "if there was time."
Nevertheless, there was widespread speculation that Sanader's
real purpose in visiting Bosnia was to unify the two HDZs, or
at least bring them to a common position on constitutional
reform. The timing of the visit suggested to many that
Sanader was here also to secure Covic and Ljubic's support
for HDZ-Croatia in advance of Croatia's November
parliamentary elections.


3. (SBU) Five seats in the Croatian National Assembly
represent the so-called "11th electoral unit," i.e., the
Croat diaspora. Bosnian residents (including some Bosniaks
and Serbs with dual citizenship) make up roughly 310,000 of
the 365,000 registered Croatian diaspora voters. Sanader has
close ties to HDZ-1990, the newer, smaller and weaker Croat
nationalist party in BiH, and may need HDZ-BiH support to win
seats in the 11th electoral unit. Voter turn-out in BiH for
Croatian elections has declined sharply, from 86 percent in
2000 to 58 percent in 2003. As the October 2006 elections in
Bosnia demonstrated, HDZ-BiH has the more effective party
machine for getting out the vote (REF B).


4. (C) Bosnian and Croatian government representatives told
us Sanader assured his interlocutors that Croatia did not
intend to interfere in any way with substantive discussions
between the constituent peoples on constitutional reform.
Croatian DCM Dunja Jevak said Croatia's only goal was to see
the two parties form a consensus position that protected
Bosnian Croats from losing any rights or "equality" because
of constitutional changes. DCM Jevak told us she thought the
two Croat party leaders "got the message."


5. (C) During a joint press conference on March 29, Sanader,
Ljubic and Covic announced that HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990 agreed
to seek a common position on constitutional changes. Sources
in the HDZ-1990 indicated to us that both sides were
committed to making a genuine effort. However, in subsequent
public statements and private meetings, Covic (who has a
history of not honoring deals with Ljubic) said there is no
consensus and suggested the HDZ-BiH would go its own way in
upcoming constitutional reform talks.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP AGREEMENT A WIN-WIN
--------------


6. (C) Croatia and Bosnia concluded an agreement on dual
citizenship during Sanader's visit. The agreement reaffirms
that people who currently hold dual Bosnian and Croatian
citizenship (including Bosniaks and Serbs) will retain that

SARAJEVO 00000757 002 OF 003


status. President Radmanovic's Chief of Cabinet Miroslav
Bojicic told us the agreement is particularly advantageous to
Bosnians, who see more economic opportunities in Croatia and
also hope to be able to travel more easily to Western Europe
once Croatia joins the EU. (COMMENT: At the same time, the
agreement is also a way for Sanader to demonstrate to
diaspora voters that he is working in their interest. END
COMMENT.)

PROMOTING EU INTEGRATION, NOT CROAT EMIGRATION
-------------- -


7. (C) Foreign Ministry Assistant Minister for Bilateral
Affairs Jadranka Negodic told us FM Sven Alkalaj and BiH
Prime Minister Nikola Spiric did not believe Sanader was
encouraging Bosnian Croats to look to Zagreb to solve their
problems. She said Bosnian leaders were pleased with
Sanader's statements of support for domestic reforms that
further integrated Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic institutions,
for the benefit of all constituent peoples. DCM Jevak said
Sanader's government did not want Croats in BiH emigrating to
Croatia once it joins the EU, as that would be a burden on
the country's economy and infrastructure. On the contrary,
she explained, Sanader was committed to making Croats feel
"at home" in Bosnia. Towards that end, his government was
seeking closer economic ties, and also considering providing
financial support from the Croatian state budget to Croat
educational and cultural institutions in Bosnia, such as the
Croat Cultural Society "Napredak."

CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
--------------


8. (U) Negodic and Bojicic praised Sanader's unexpectedly
constructive approach to several outstanding territorial
issues. In particular, he offered Bosnia Most Favored Nation
Status regarding use of the Ploce port. (NOTE: The port was
built using Bosnian government funds during the Communist
era, but now lies in Croatian territory. END NOTE.)
According to DCM Jevak, this would give Bosnian shipping
firms unlimited access to the port under the same fees and
regulations as Croatian companies, and entitle them to
representation on the Ploce Port Administration Council.
Prime Minister Spiric told Sanader the Bosnian government
would consider the offer.


9. (U) The two sides agreed to defer discussion on
construction of a controversial trans-border bridge until
after experts had produced a report on technical
specifications. The bridge would connect the Croatian-owned
Peljesac peninsula to the Croatian mainland by overarching a
portion of Neum. Sanader also proposed Croatia and BiH
submit the question of which country rightfully controlled
the waters off the Neum shore to international maritime
arbitration. Neum is Bosnia's only port city, but control of
the port is of limited utility without unfettered access to
the Adriatic sea.


10. (SBU) No way forward was found, however, on resolving the
ownership of two small islands off Neum's coast that are
claimed by both countries, or the question of where the
border actually lies along the Una river in northwest Bosnia.
Bojicic told us no one expected Sanader's visit to produce
concrete solutions to these disputes, but his government
appreciated Sanader's proactive efforts to restart
discussions. The two governments concluded an agreement
that, regardless of where the border lies, they would
collaborate more closely on border patrol and security.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) There was consensus among Bosnian and Croatian
government representatives that the bilateral relations
aspect of Sanader's three-day visit to Bosnia was productive.
But the Croatian Prime Minister's trip was as much a
campaign swing as an official visit. Sanader tried hard to
woo BiH residents who are eligible to vote in Croatia's
national elections with the dual citizenship agreement and
promises of economic aid. However, whether his attentions
translate into Bosnia-based votes in November depends largely

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on HDZ-BiH. It appears Sanader's efforts to mediate a common
position on constitutional reform between HDZ-BiH and
HDZ-1990, let alone unify the two parties, were unsuccessful,
at least for the moment. It is not clear what Covic wants in
exchange for using the well-organized HDZ-BiH machine to get
out the vote for Sanader. On thing is certain: Covic sees no
domestic political advantage in reconciling with his rival
Ljubic simply to please the Sanader government. He has not
forgotten that Sanader openly backed the rebellion within the
HDZ last summer that led to the creation of HDZ-1990 and then
threw his support behind the fledgling party during October
elections (REF C).
MCELHANEY