BOSNIA - BOSNIAK POLITICAL LEADERS WARY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000753

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAK POLITICAL LEADERS WARY OF
CROSSING SILAJDZIC ON SREBRENICA

REF: SARAJEVO 706 AND PRIOR

SARAJEVO 00000753 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 29 and April 2, we met separately
with Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic,
President of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) Sulejman
Tihic, and President of the Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Zlatko Lagumdzija to discuss the situation in Srebrenica and
urge them to refrain from making an already tense situation
worse by supporting the secession movement. We encouraged
all three to focus on practical measures designed to improve
socio-economic conditions in Srebrenica. Silajdzic argued
that Bosniaks could not ignore the International Court of
Justice's verdict that genocide had ccurred in Srebrenica
and that the verdict must have "consequences on the ground."
Tihic and Lagumdzija accepted that Srebenica's secession from
Republika Srpska was unrealistic and agreed that Silajdzic
was leading Bosniaks in the wrong direction. Nonetheless,
they both said they were unwilling to challenge him given
their own political weaknesses. END SUMMARY

Silajdzic: Integrate Us or We Will Radicalize
--------------


2. (C) Silajdzic warned that Bosniaks cannot ignore the
International Criminal Court's (ICJ) verdict that genocide
was committed in Srebrenica. He accused the international
community of putting undue pressure on Bosniaks to "let it
go" and focus on the future, but there would be no positive
future for Bosnia unless it dealt with its past. His support
for Srebenica's secession from Republika Srpska (RS) simply
reflected the will of its residents. Instead OHR was
attacking the victims of genocide and "siding with the
Serbs." As a consequence, Bosniaks felt more abandoned,
isolated, and insecure than at any time since the 1992-1995
war. Bosniaks want to integrate into European society, but
if they are "ghettoized," they will become radicalized,
Silajdzic warned.


3. (C) Ambassador encouraged Silajdzic to offer constructive
suggestions for addressing post-ICJ concerns among Bosniaks,
but warned that nationalist rhetoric would only make the
situation worse. Silajdzic suggested that U.S. and Bosnian
experts sit down to discuss the ICJ verdict and its
implications, but added that the verdict must have concrete
consequences "on the ground." The RS goal has been and
remains the annihilation of the Bosniaks, he said. Bosnian
Serb politicians were striving to keep the RS as autonomous
as possible in order to maintain the ethnic cleansing they
carried out during the war, and then finally, to secure the
RS's annexation to Serbia, Silajdzic continued. Given these
goals, Bosniaks will never feel secure in a country so
sharply divided along ethnic lines, he concluded.

Tihic: It's Not My Fault
--------------


4. (C) Tihic opened the meeting by stressing that Bosniak
political leaders were united in their view that Srebrenica
should receive special status outside the Republika Srpska.
He understood warnings from the international community that
it would not tolerate unilateral changes to the Dayton
territorial settlement and realized Srebenica's secession
from the RS was unlikely. Nonetheless, Bosniaks would go
ahead with their parliamentary motion to change the
constitution and create a special district. Bosniaks "had
the right" to pursue special status because the ICJ had ruled
that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica, and the U.S. had an
obligation to support the proposal. Tihic cited the
Srebrenica 10th anniversary resolution passed by the U.S.
Congress (2005) to justify the second assertion. Tihic
claimed that he had tried to calm emotions in and over
Srebrenica, but had failed. He blamed Lagumdzija for
stirring up SDP councilors in Srebrenica.


5. (C) When pressed by the Ambassador over the politically
destructive course upon which he and his fellow Bosniak
leaders were embarking, Tihic shrugged. He explained that
Bosniaks would label him a traitor if he compromised over
Srebrenica. Tihic conceded that Silajdzic was setting the
Bosniak political agenda and that much of what Silajdzic was

SARAJEVO 00000753 002.4 OF 002


advocating was destructive and unrealistic. Tihic argued
that his political position was too weak to challenge
Silajdzic, however, adding that any compromises had to come
from Silajdzic. In response to a direct question from the
Ambassador, Tihic acknowledged that he knew the position he
and the SDA had staked out on Srebrenica was wrong, but
predicted that as Silajdzic failed to deliver on his
promises, public support for him would decline. Only at that
point would he step in and challenge Silajdzic as well as his
own SDA hardliners, Tihic said.

Lagumdzija: Why Should I Take Any Risks?
--------------


6. (C) Lagumdzija's comments echoed Tihic's. He acknowledged
that he had talked with SDP councilors in Srebrenica before
the Municipal Assembly passed its secession resolution, but
argued that the councilors' July deadline gave Bosniak
political leaders and the international community ample time
to defuse tensions before there was a genuine political
crisis over secession. He stressed that if the international
community "delivered a few things for Srebrenica," it would
quickly take the wind out of the sails of the hardliners.
Lagumdzija conceded that secession was wrong and the
political movement behind it counterproductive, but said he
was not politically strong enough to take on Silajdzic - the
driving force behind secession. Challenging Silajdzic now,
while his political powers were at their peak, would destroy
him and the SDP, Lagumdzija continued. He asked how the
international community, including the U.S., could expect him
and his party to take such a big political risk when they
seemed unprepared to deliver a clear, public message to
Silajdzic about his destructive behavior.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Our bilateral meetings with the Bosniak political
leadership largely mirrored previous discussions (Reftel).
Silajdzic shows no willingness to back off his agenda or work
constructively to reach consensus - a word he defines as
acquiescence in the face of Serb crimes. Tihic and
Lagumdzija recognize that their current political paths will
bring no concrete benefits to their constituents, but they
are terrified that challenging Silajdzic will destroy their
own positions and those of their parties. Instead, they
argue, they will split from Silajdzic once it becomes clear
to Bosniaks that he cannot deliver and Bosniaks tire of him.
They insist that this moment will come well before
Silajdzic's agenda makes compromise with the Serbs (and
Croats) impossible. We are not so confident. Neither Tihic
nor Lagumdzija are a profile in political courage. We may
need to find ways to press them towards a divorce with
Silajdzic.
MCELHANEY