Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO706
2007-03-30 12:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - BOSNIAK LEADERSHIP DISMISSES WARNINGS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0068
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0706/01 0891232
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301232Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5800
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000706 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC
FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAK LEADERSHIP DISMISSES WARNINGS
OVER SREBRENICA

REF: A. SARAJEVO 686

B. SARAJEVO 677

C. SARAJEVO 606

D. SARAJEVO 579

E. SARAJEVO 556

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000706

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC
FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAK LEADERSHIP DISMISSES WARNINGS
OVER SREBRENICA

REF: A. SARAJEVO 686

B. SARAJEVO 677

C. SARAJEVO 606

D. SARAJEVO 579

E. SARAJEVO 556

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 29, the Ambassador and High
Representative Schwarz Schilling met with the Bosniak
political leadership to express their concern about growing
political tensions over Srebrenica. They stressed the
international community's commitment to helping Srebrenica
residents and urged the Bosniaks to focus on practical steps
they might take to improve their lives as well. The Bosniaks
criticized the HighRep and chastised the international
community for neglecting Srebrenica for 12 years. They
claimed that they had no choice but to respond to the will of
their constituents. They informed the Ambassador and the
HighRep that they planned to table a constitutional amendment
in parliament that would ultimately allow Srebrenica to
secede from Republika Srpska. The Ambassador warned that
risked provoking a serious political crisis that threatened
the stability of Bosnia and the Dayton territorial
settlement, but the Bosniaks replied that they would "rather
fight in parliament than in the streets." END SUMMARY

U.S./OHR Warn Bosniaks Over Srebrenica
--------------


2. (C) At a meeting with Bosniak political leaders (Haris
Silajdzic, Sulejman Tihic and Zlatko Lagumdzija),the
Ambassador and High Representative Schwarz-Schilling warned
that the Srebrenica Municipal Council's March 24 resolution
threatening to secede from the RS if conditions for special
status are not met by July 11 had dangerously raised the
political temperature in Bosnia. Schwarz-Schilling repeated
his March 27 warning that if the municipal assembly were to
act on this, then he would have no choice but to take robust
action (Ref A). Threats of secession are not acceptable, no
matter who issues them, he added. Bosniak political leaders

needed to take steps to calm the situation over Srebrenica
and address the issues that will make a difference for people
there, the Ambassador stressed.


3. (C) We all want the same things for Srebrenica, a
sustainable return process, economic development, and robust
judicial proceedings that lead to justice for the victims,
the Ambassador and Schwarz-Schilling continued.
Schwarz-Schilling informed the Bosniaks that the PIC Steering
Board Ambassadors (SBA) had agreed to form a working group,
chaired by OHR, to address these issues. At the same time,
Federation politicians needed examine steps they might take,
such as amending entity and cantonal health, pension, and
veterans benefit laws, in order to make life easier for
returnees. The Ambassador and Schwarz-Schilling also
encouraged Bosniak leaders to support proposals by RS PM
Dodik to assist Srebrenica as Srebrenica Mayor Malkic has
done, including Srebrenica's designation as a special
economic zone.

Bosniaks United in Defiance
--------------


4. (C) Bosniak leaders responded in turn, but the points they
made were virtually identical. They claimed that the
international community's failure over the last 12 years to
address the situation in Srebrenica, rather than their
actions or those of their councilors in Srebrenica, was
responsible for the current crisis there. The Bosniaks
challenged the HighRep's assertion that the Municipal
Council's resolution was unconstitutional or ant-Dayton and
chastised him for threatening to use his Bonn Powers. You
are threatening the victims instead of punishing the
perpetrators of genocide, they said. In any case, the threat
was meaningless, since the Bosniaks of Srebrenica had already
endured far more punishment than the OHR could deliver. They
dismissed Dodik's promised as empty rhetoric, characterized
the special economic zone as a "ghetto," and argued that
Srebrenica's residents wanted justice and freedom, not "new
homes with gold roofs."


SARAJEVO 00000706 002 OF 002



5. (C) The citizens of Srebrenica were angry, could not be
placated, and they could not control them, the Bosniaks
asserted. Srebrenica residents now expected their leadership
to deliver on the commitments made to them at the initial
special status meeting on March 12 (Ref D). The Bosniak
leadership had promised "progress" by April 12, and they had
a political obligation to act. With that in mind, they told
the Ambassador and HighRep that they planned to introduce a
constitutional amendment into parliament that would allow
parliament to create a special district anywhere in Bosnia.
Over the longer term, they would demand any deal on police
reform include creation of a special police district for
Srebrenica, the appointment of a Bosniak Chief of Police for
Srebrenica, removal of all "war criminals" working for the RS
(Ref B),and improved employment opportunities in municipal
government for Bosniaks in Srebrenica.

Better to Fight in Parliament than Fight in the Streets
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The HighRep and Ambassador noted that constitutional
changes required consensus and that the way to build
consensus was to engage in constructive political dialogue
with political opponents. Putting a special status amendment
before parliament would provoke ugly political exchanges
between the Bosniaks and Serbs, likely encourage calls for
special status from elsewhere in the country, including in
the Federation, and probably lead to a political crisis.
Practical proposals to aid Srebrenica's residents would be
among the first victims of this crisis, the Ambassador and
HighRep stressed. The Bosniaks claimed they had no choice,
adding, "Better to fight in parliament than to fight in the
streets." The International Court of Justice's verdict that
genocide had occurred in Srebrenica had to have consequences,
the Bosniaks concluded.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The Bosniak political leadership seems determined to
provoke a more serious political crisis over Srebrenica
special status. Their claim that Bosniaks writ large are
upset by the ICJ verdict and are angry that many Serb war
criminals have escaped justice is fair. Their claim that
Srebrenica's residents are demanding to secede from the RS is
inaccurate (Ref A). Srebrenica residents are interested in
improving their lives, not in the political theater the
Bosniak political leadership is so intent on providing. We
continue to stress our commitment to helping Srebrenica and
returnee communities throughout Bosnia and to try and focus
the political discussion on practical steps political leaders
of all ethnic groups could take to improve people's lives.
The Bosniaks keep turning up the volume on their nationalist
rhetoric, however. Eventually, this is likely to provoke the
Serbs and make matters worse.
MCELHANEY