Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO651
2007-03-23 16:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - NOT WHERE WE WANT IT TO BE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5752
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000651 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - NOT WHERE WE WANT IT TO BE

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000651

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - NOT WHERE WE WANT IT TO BE

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: One year ago, Bosnia's prospects looked
brighter than they had at any moment since Dayton. Today,
the accomplishments of post-war reconstruction have been
placed in question. Externally, the drawdown of the
international presence here, coupled with Europe's stupor
over future enlargement, has signaled to Bosnian politicians
that the road to Brussels is a long one. NATO's PFP
announcement has helped to raise hopes for entry into Western
institutions, but much more is needed to treat the current
malaise. The Serbs here used the Montenegro referendum and
now, Kosovo, to argue for further dividing the country;
Bosniaks retort that the internal "entity" boundaries should
be abolished altogether. Nationalism's resurgence during the
2006 election campaign has continued unabated. A weak
national government, formed four months after the election,
is only marginally able to take decisions. The Bosniak
member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, now the major
spoiler, and the Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik, cannot
agree on steps to depoliticize the police. The Bosniaks are
frustrated and disappointed that the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) did not find Serbia guilty of genocide, and
they are looking for another culprit (i.e., the institutions
of the Republika Srpska). The loss of respect for the Office
of the High Representative (OHR) has meant both diminishing
status for the internationals and conflicts among them. In
the short term, we need to: 1) isolate the nationalists by
laying down strong markers to Silajdzic and Dodik; 2)
underline that the U.S. will "be there," that genocide and
internecine warfare are in the past - and that the future is
NATO, the EU, and normality; 3) focus attention on reform
across the board, but particularly on the police and the
constitution. Your visit to Bosnia April 4-6 visit is an
opportunity to address these short-term challenges, even as

we preserve our options on bigger ticket issues. END SUMMARY.

What A Difference a Year Makes
--------------


2. (C) A year ago confidence was high that, just over 10
years after Dayton, Bosnia was ready to assume responsibility
for managing its own affairs. A preliminary deal on police
reform had paved the way for the EU to open negotiations with
Bosnia on Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),
which some predicted might be signed by December 2006. U.S.
leadership had just produced agreement among six parties on a
package of constitutional amendments designed to make the
country's governing structures more efficient and functional.
Under the relatively moderate leadership of Sulejman Tihic,
whom you met in Washington, the largest Bosniak party, the
Party of Democratic Action (SDA),had taken some initial
steps toward the political center. Known as America's
favorite up north, Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad
Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) had
emerged as the most popular party in the RS, poised to break
Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party's (SDS) 10-year stranglehold
on RS politics. With these and other factors in mind, the
U.S. supported plans to close OHR in June 2007.

Bosnian Nationalism Strikes Back
--------------


3. (C) Today, Bosnia is mired in what many consider its worst
political crisis since the 1990s. Rather than representing a
further step towards the normalization of the country,
Bosnia's 2006 elections, dominated by nationalist rhetoric
from all sides, polarized politics here. Dodik broke SDS's
grip on power in the RS by borrowing their nationalist
rhetoric, including repeated threats to hold a referendum on
RS independence. War time leader Haris Silajdzic's
successful campaign for the Bosniak seat in the
Tri-Presidency was fueled by misleading attacks and fear
mongering about the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional
amendments. Constitutional reform also split the Croats, and
the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BiH) broke in
two, with the Catholic Church supporting the new anti-reform
party. The rhetorical excess continued during the four month
period it took political leaders to form a coalition
government. Although progress has been made with Dodik in
moderating his rhetoric, Silajdzic appears to want to
radicalize the situation, thereby creating conditions for a
more robust and heavier international presence - what he sees
as an insurance policy against Serb and Croat irredentism.

SARAJEVO 00000651 002 OF 002



Silajdzic's Destructive Agenda
--------------


4. (C) Silajdzic's approach to contemporary Bosnia's problems
is a serious impediment to reform. He is not focused on
securing the country's integration into Euro-Atlantic
institutions; he is focused on the past. Silajdzic is frank
about his agenda: reopening the Dayton settlement and
abolishing the Serb entity. His pathology about the RS has
emerged as perhaps the biggest obstacle to a police reform
deal that would facilitate initialing of the SAA. The
International Court of Justice's (ICJ) February 26 verdict
that genocide occurred in Srebrenica has emboldened Silajdzic
to press harder for territorial changes within Bosnia.
Unfortunately, his nationalism has found a receptive audience
among Bosniaks, many of whom welcome a leader willing to
"stand-up to the Serbs" and who are angry that Milosevic died
un-convicted and Karadzic and Mladic remain at large. Some
moderate Bosniaks have taken note of Silajdzic's siren call
and have publicly echoed him rather than play more
constructive political roles.

Things Could Get Worse
--------------


5. (C) Dodik's recent rhetorical moderation is a welcome, if
anomalous, development. Apart from an initial misstep the
day the verdict was announced, Dodik has handled the ICJ case
and its fallout in Srebrenica responsibly. Undoubtedly,
Dodik is interested in building on his 2006 economic
successes in the RS and continuing his campaign to attract
investment there. (Note: Dodik's behavior in 2006 was both
frustrating and encouraging. His often irresponsible rhetoric
was married to a determined push for economic reform and
against organized crime. End Note.) However, with the
Bosniaks seemingly intent on pursuing a hard line anti-RS
nationalist agenda come hell or high water, a dustup where
Bosniaks provoke Dodik into a comment or action that further
poisons the inter-ethnic political dynamic is a distinct
possibility. The prospects for sustained progress on reform
in this environment, particularly reforms that require
difficult concessions from any group, are uncertain at best.

Comment: What This Means for the U.S.
--------------


6. (C) Bosnia's downward political spiral and concern over
possible fallout here on Kosovo prompted the U.S. to back a
one-year extension of OHR's mandate. OHR's credibility and
capacity to effectively shape events in Bosnia has taken a
big hit under High Representative Christian
Schwarz-Schilling's ineffective leadership. The EU's clumsy
management of the police reform process has done little to
build faith among Bosnians that leadership from Brussels can
substitute for the current vacuum at OHR.
Schwarz-Schilling's hands off management of an ever more
difficult situation evoke many a Bronx cheer from Bosnians of
all political stripes. Progress in Bosnia requires U.S.
leadership, but the current political climate constrains our
ability to press hard for big ticket reforms in the short
term.


7. (C) The immediate challenge is arresting continued
political polarization, particularly between Bosniaks and
Serbs. Over the next several weeks, this requires dampening
tensions in and over Srebrenica. More generally, we need to
stop nationalist urges from getting the upper hand.
Silajdzic, who tells us that he only signed Dayton because
"there was a gun at his head," needs to be told clearly that
extremism will drain his international support and that we
will not tolerate his attacks on Dayton. Dodik needs to know
that his efforts to tone down Bosniak-bashing will pay
dividends, but also that he cannot use the many opportunities
Kosovo will offer to enflame the situation here. Moderates
need our support. Once the situation calms and the coherence
of the High Rep's office are restored, we will be in a better
position to get the American-brokered reform process jump
started. As the most senior American representative since
Nick Burns was here in October 2005, your messages will come
across clearly. Bosnians appreciate the unvarnished truth.
MCELHANEY