BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC BLOCKS POLICE REFORM DEAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000595

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KJUS KCRM EU BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC BLOCKS POLICE REFORM DEAL

REF: A. SARAJEVO 552

B. SARAJEVO 492

C. SARAJEVO 456

D. SARAJEVO 444

Classified By: Ambassador McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: March 12 police reform talks organized by
High Representative Schwarz-Schilling collapsed after Bosniak
member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic refused an offer
from Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik to transfer competency
and authority for the RS police to the state, provided the
name "RS Police" was kept in some form. Party for Democratic
Action (SDA) President Sulejman Tihic seemed willing to
explore the proposal, but in the end sided with Silajdzic
rather than risk splitting the Bosniak negotiating team. The
EC Ambassador made clear that resolving outstanding issues
was a prerequisite for initialing the Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA). Agreeing to the Police Reform
Directorate (PRD) report would not be enough. Silajdzic's
stubborn refusal to countenance even a reference to the RS in
police reform legislation has emerged as perhaps the biggest
obstacle to a police reform deal (assuming Dodik does not now
withdraw his March 12 proposal). END SUMMARY


2. (C) On March 14, the High Representative made a last ditch
attempt to reach a deal on police reform by convening talks
involving Party for Democratic Action (SDA) President
Sulejman Tihic, Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency and
members of Party for BiH (SBiH) Haris Silajdzic, Republika
Srpska (RS) Prime Minister and President of the Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD),and Party for Democratic
Progress (PDP) President Mladen Ivanic. Principal Deputy
High Representative Raffi Gregorian, the U.S. and European
Commission (EC) Ambassadors, and Head of the European Police
Mission (EUPM) General Coppola also participated in the
talks. Prior to the talks PDHR Gregorian AND Ambassador had
had a series of bilateral meetings with the participants as
well as other political leaders to explore possible
compromises on issues separating the parties.
Agreement on Police Report Not Enough to Initial AA
-------------- --------------


3. (C) At the outset, the EC Ambassador stressed that
approval by the parties of the Polic Reform Directorate's
(PRD) report and the draft "Agreement on Implementation and
Timelines for Police Reform" would not be sufficient for the
EC to initial a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
with Bosnia. Though all parties agree that the PRD report is
a good basis for moving forward, it is clear that significant
areas of disagreement remain, he said. Only once these
outstanding issues have been resolved and the parties have
some way to deal with the undefined areas of the report could
the EC Delegation recommend to EC Commissioner Rehn that the
SAA be initialed. The EC would not dictate how parties
resolved their outstanding issues, the EC Ambassador
concluded, adding, the only requirement is that the
compromises reached are consistent with the three EC
principles. Silajdzic complained that he had been led to
believe agreement on the PRD report and implementation
timeline was enough for the EC and asked why the EC had
changed its position. The EC Ambassador replied that
Commissioner Rehn "would not take the risk" of initialing the
SAA without "a genuine agreement on police reform."

Dodik Makes Major Concession
--------------


4. (C) The biggest impediment to agreement prior to the March
14 talks had been the unwillingness of RS PM Dodik to
unequivocally accept the first EU principle and its legal
consequences that all local police bodies would have the
status of administrative organs of the Bosnian state (under
the Ministry of Security). Dodik balked at engaging in a
line-in, line-out discussion of a detailed set of papers
prepared by OHR on other outstanding issues. The papers
outlined how proposals offered by both Bosniak and Serb
parties could be made consistent with the EC principles and
included 1) Creation of a High Council for Local Police; 2)
How members of the Independent Police Board would be
nominated; 3) Creation of an Office of the Inspector General;
4) The responsibilities of Assistant Directors of Police; 5)

SARAJEVO 00000595 002 OF 003


Organization of Local Police Bodies; 6) Creation of a Local
Police body for Srebrenica; 7) Creation of a Local Police
Body covering the greater Sarajevo metropolitan area, and; 8)
A proposal for transitioning budgetary responsibilities to
the state modeled on the defense reform process.


5. (C) Instead, Dodik said that detailed exchanges along the
lines proposed by OHR were pointless without agreement on
fundamental issues. With that in place, all aspects of the
OHR's proposals could be accepted by the RS, he added. (Note:
With the exception of OHR's proposal to create a greater
Sarajevo police body, Dodik was quick to add. End Note.)
Dramatically, Dodik then announced that he would accept a
state law that established and regulated local police
operating within the territory of the RS under the direction
of a BiH Director of Police and the Ministry of Security as
specified in the PRD report. However, the name "RS Police"
needed to remain connected the the local police body or
bodies responsible for policing the territorial units within
the RS, he added, but repeating that these forces would be
under the command and control of the Ministry of Security,
not the RS government. (Note: Ivanic did not endorse Dodik's
proposal. End Note.)

Tihic Sees the Opening, but Silajdzic Kills the Deal
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Tihic responded by suggesting that the territory of
the RS should contain more than one local police body rather
than a single police body (e.g., local police forces
headquartered in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Trebinje). He also
stressed the importance that one of those police bodies be
based in Srebrenica. Dodik accepted Tihic's proposal to
create a Srebrenica police body (Comment: And therefore
implicitly Tihic's proposal to create more than one police
body within the RS. End Comment),but also stressed that
these forces would need to be called "RS Police."
Preservation of the name "RS Police" was a political
imperative for him, Dodik stressed, adding, otherwise he
could not secure support for his decision to transfer control
of the police from the entity to the state. Tihic also urged
Dodik to accept the proposal for a greater Sarajevo police
force.


7. (C) Silajdzic rejected Dodik's proposal out of hand. The
PRD report and the timeline are a compromise, he said,
repeating his familiar mantra, and he would not make any more
concessions to the RS. The name "RS Police" was completely
unacceptable. The RS Police had committed genocide,
Silajdzic continued. Police reform needed to result in local
police forces and areas based strictly on technical criteria
which "crossed the inter-entity boundary line everywhere."
Silajdzic then went further, underscoring that any reference
to "Republika Srpska" as well as to "RS Police" in police
reform legislation would be unacceptable. Schwarz-Schilling
asked Silajdzic how Bosnia would make progress towards
Euro-Atlantic integration, if he took such an uncompromising
approach. "(The international community) will not make any
more progress at our expense," Silajdzic responded angrily.
Silajdzic's refusal to budge brought the talks to an end.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) There was consensus among the international
participants in the March 12 talks that Dodik had made a
major concession, one that would have paved the way for a
deal on police reform (albeit after some additional likely
tough negotiating over the addendum to the PRD report),had
Silajdzic and Tihic accepted it. For the first time since
political talks began, Tihic presented positions at odds with
those offered by Silajdzic, which suggests, unlike Silajdzic,
he may have grasped the significance of Dodik's proposal.
Silajdzic told the Ambassador he would not accept anything
less than complete extinction of the RS Police. Publicly,
we, OHR, and the EC plan to stress that the talks produced a
lot of movement and the absence of agreement was
disappointing. Privately, the EC Ambassador said he will
recommend Commissioner Rehn deliver a stern message to
Silajdzic making clear that Silajdzic is disproportionately
responsible for the talks' collapse. In the meantime, OHR
sees its main challenge now as keeping Dodik's offer on the
table while developing a strategy for moving the Bosniaks to

SARAJEVO 00000595 003 OF 003


more reasonable ground.
MCELHANEY