Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO556
2007-03-12 16:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - TENSIONS RISE AS BOSNIAKS CALL FOR

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS MARR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2833
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0556/01 0711625
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121625Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5669
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000556 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - TENSIONS RISE AS BOSNIAKS CALL FOR
SREBRENICA "SPECIAL DISTRICT"

REF: A. SARAJEVO 456

B. SARAJEVO 362

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000556

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - TENSIONS RISE AS BOSNIAKS CALL FOR
SREBRENICA "SPECIAL DISTRICT"

REF: A. SARAJEVO 456

B. SARAJEVO 362

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the February 26 International Court of
Justice Verdict (ICJ) that genocide was committed in
Srebrenica, there have been growing calls for giving the
municipality special status within Bosnia. This campaign has
been stoked by Bosniak politicians, particularly Bosniak
member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, who wants to
use the ICJ verdict as vehicle for opening up the Dayton
territorial settlement. Over the weekend, Bosniaks raised
the political heat by threatening, albeit privately, to
declare Srebrenica's special status (outside Republika
Srpska) at a March 12 meeting called by the municipality's
mayor. The Ambassador and High Representative Christian
Schwarz-Schilling spoke separately with the major Bosniak
leaders as well as Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik and told
them to avoid any rhetoric or actions that further inflamed
the already tense situation in Srebrenica. Though the full
conclusions of the March 12 meeting were not available as of
this writing, early press reports are that participants
endorsed the special status proposal, though not unilateral
action. Separately, the HighRep told the Ambassador that he
is increasingly worried about the direction Bosnian politics
is taking and with EUFOR's drawdown plans. END SUMMARY

Special Status for Srebrenica
--------------


2. (SBU) The February 26 ICJ verdict confirming that genocide
was committed in Srebrenica has sparked increasingly strident
statements about the municipality's future status within
Republika Srpska (RS). A group of returnees calling itself
themselves the "Initiative Committee for the Collective
Expatriation of Returnees of Srebrenica Municipality" has
called on Bosniaks to move out of Srebrenica en masse on

March 14 because, claiming the situation there has become
unbearable for returnees. The group is led by Camil
Durakovic, but the most vocal member of the group is Hakija
Meholjic, a Bosniak originally from Srebrenica, now resident
in Tuzla. They have also called for "special status" for
Srebrenica, a position endorsed by the Mothers of Srebrenica
and Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, who
asserted on March 5, "Considering the fact that the Court
decided that the authorities of the RS committed genocide in
Srebrenica, it is necessary to restore the special status of
that former protected zone of the United Nations and of the
other municipalities of eastern Bosnia from which the victims
of genocide came, and to work actively and persist in a step
by step restoration of constitutional arrangements that will
completely annul the results of genocide."


3. (SBU) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) President Sulejman
Tihic has also embraced the special status proposal, but also
emphasized any change to Srebrenica's constitutional status
must be agreed within existing constitutional procedures.
Silajdzic and Tihic's agenda is broader than Srebrenica,
however. On March 7, the two men issued a joint statement
asserting that because the ICJ "...established that the
Republika Srpska institutions committed genocide in
Srebrenica...there is a clear need to examine the
constitutional arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including the administrative-territorial divisions." RS
politicians have rejected these arguments and criticized
"Federation politicians" for distorting and politicizing the
ICJ's verdict. After some initially unhelpful statements, RS
PM Milorad Dodik's comments on the verdict have stressed his
government's willingness to invest more money in Srebrenica
and the need for reconciliation. In a March 11 interview
with a Belgrade based daily, Dodik acknowledged that genocide
had occurred in Srebrenica.

The Mayor Calls Public Meeting to Calm Things Down
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) In an effort to calm tensions and discourage support
for the mass emigration campaign, Srebrenica mayor
Abdurrahman Malkic (SDA),invited political leaders from both
entities and members of the international community to a
meeting in Srebrenica on Monday, March 12. Malkic does not

SARAJEVO 00000556 002 OF 003


support the move-out campaign, but has long advocated for
"special status" for Srebrenica. His proposal calls for the
creation of an enterprise zone to encourage more investment
in Srebrenica and establishment of an infrastructure
development fund for the municipality, but not for a change
in the constitution. All the leading Bosniak politicians
attended the Malkic meeting, but RS officials refused to
attend after several Bosniak politicians publicly predicted
the meeting would endorse special status for Srebrenica.
Dodik responded swiftly and sharply to these comments by
underscoring his duty to protect the constitutional and legal
position of the RS. Any attempt to violate this structure
would cause the RS government to put in place a provisional
administration, he warned. Dodik also warned foreign
ambassadors to stay away from the meeting, noting he would
interpret their attendance as "support for the
destabilization of the RS constitutional framework and the
destruction of the Dayton Accords." (Note: The Turkish and
several Organization of Islamic Conference Ambassadors
attended. At a March 9 meeting, other SBA Ambassadors agreed
not to attend. End Note.)

U.S. and OHR Work Behind the Scenes
--------------


5. (C) However well intentioned, Malkic's call for a public
meeting stoked the fire over Srebrenica rather than doused
it, and over the weekend the Bosniaks raised the rhetorical
ante by suggesting the meeting ought to simply declare a
special status for Srebrenica. In separate private exchanges
with the Ambassador and High Representative Schwarz-Schilling
over the weekend and Monday, March 12, Silajdzic and Tihic
proclaimed that they were no longer prepared to submit to the
"Serb agenda" in Bosnia. Both men chastised the
international community for its "tepid" response to the ICJ
verdict, particularly the international community's failure
to embrace their logic that the verdict required a change in
Bosnia's constitutional structures. "Why is the
international community protecting the perpetrators of
genocide rather than helping its victims?" they asked. In
his meeting with the HighRep, Silajdzic threatened to send
Bosniak police to Srebrenica saying, "we have stronger police
than the Serbs." Silajdzic also demanded that the HighRep
impose police reform and told Schwarz-Schilling that if he
was unprepared to use the Bonn Powers, he ought "to go home."


6. (C) Both the Ambassador and the HighRep warned Silajdzic
and Tihic that the international community would not tolerate
any action by Bosniaks that undermined Dayton, including a
unilateral declaration of special status for Srebrenica.
Constitutional change required consensus and support from
two-thirds of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Ambassador and
HighRep emphasized. They urged Silajdzic and Tihic to use
the Malkic meeting to reduce tensions within the
municipality, suggesting that they focus discussion on
economic and social conditions there and what might be done
to improve them. (Note: The Ambassador delivered the same
message to Social Democratic Party leader Zlatko Lagumdzija.
End Note) Silajdzic and Tihic responded that the call for
special status for Srebrenica was a grass roots movement, to
which Bosniak political leaders had a responsibility to
listen. The Ambassador also called Dodik and urged him to
refrain from making any statements that might further inflame
tensions in Srebrenica. Dodik agreed, and reiterated his
willingness to invest more RS resources in the municipality.

High Rep Worried About Direction of Bosnian Politics
-------------- --------------


7. (C) At a meeting the morning of March 12, the HighRep told
the Ambassador that he was "seriously concerned" about the
direction in which Bosnia was headed. Together, Dodik and
Silajdzic would block any reform over the next several
months, the HighRep predicted. The ICJ verdict did not call
into question Bosnia's constitutional structures, but the
Bosniaks were seeking to exploit the verdict anyway, he
stressed. He characterized the Srebrenica status issue as "a
target of opportunity" and accused Silajdzic of orchestrating
tensions over it. The HighRep informed the Ambassador that
he sought confirmation that EUFOR could effectively intervene
in Srebrenica if events got out of hand. (Note: EUFOR
maintained a small but visible presence in Srebrenica today.

SARAJEVO 00000556 003 OF 003


End Note.) He also urged the EUFOR Commander to stop planning
for additional troop reductions, a message the HighRep told
the Ambassador he would deliver forcefully to the European
Council as well. EUFOR needed to think more about its
capacity to reinforce its operations in Bosnia and to deliver
clear public messages about its ability and willingness to do
so if circumstances warranted.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The Bosniaks, particularly Silajdzic and his party,
had expected the ICJ to rule that Serbia had committed
genocide in Bosnia, which they believed would have provided
them with a clear legal basis to eliminate the RS. Instead,
the ICJ ruled on much narrower grounds that genocide had been
committed only in Srebrenica. For Silajdzic, special status
for Srebrenica is a vehcile for making the best of a
disappointing ICJ outcome and demanding changes to the Dayton
territorial settlement. The ICJ ruling has also fueled the
rise of Bosniak nationalism, which began during the 2006
national election campaign. In this climate, the average
Bosniak is sympathetic to Silajdzic's point of view, which is
one reason why Tihic and Lagumdzija participated in the March
12 meeting. Growing Bosniak nationalism coupled with Dodik's
penchant for rhetorical excess could mean Bosniak-Serb
stalemate over most meaningful reforms for some time to come.
The immediate challenge is ensuring the Silajdzic does not
provoke a more serious crisis in or over Srebrenica, however.
As of this writing, full conclusions from the March 12
meeting are unavailable, but according to early press
reports, the meeting endorsed the special status proposal,
but not unilateral action, which, if accurate, would
represent a step back from Silajdzic's weekend threats.
MCELHANEY