Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO510
2007-03-06 15:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - NEW BATTLE BEGINS OVER CITIZENSHIP LAW

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PREF PTER BK 
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O 061501Z MAR 07 ***ZDK***
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5627
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000510 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DICARLO, EUR/SCE FOR HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB, NSC
FOR BRAUN, PRM FOR OLSON AND COHEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF PTER BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - NEW BATTLE BEGINS OVER CITIZENSHIP LAW

REF: SARAJEVO 348 AND PRIOR

SARAJEVO 00000510 001.4 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000510

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DICARLO, EUR/SCE FOR HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB, NSC
FOR BRAUN, PRM FOR OLSON AND COHEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF PTER BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - NEW BATTLE BEGINS OVER CITIZENSHIP LAW

REF: SARAJEVO 348 AND PRIOR

SARAJEVO 00000510 001.4 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The opening salvo in what could prove to be
an ugly political battle over amendments to the Bosnian Law
on Citizenship came on February 27, when FM Sven Alkalaj
(Party for BiH (SBiH)) sent a diplomatic note to the Serbian
MFA informing it that the bilateral agreement on dual
citizenship between Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro was no
longer in force. Alkalaj claims that because Montenegro is
now a separate country, the bilateral agreement no longer
governs dual Bosnian-Serbian citizenship. The Serbian MFA
claims Alkalaj's interpretation is incorrect, as Serbia is
the successor state to Serbia and Montenegro -- a view shared
by Bosnian Serbs. The announcement, coming just one day
after the countroversial International Court of Justice (ICJ)
ruling in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and
Montenegro, touched off calls for Alkalaj's immediate
dismissal by Serb politicians. Bosniaks and Serbs insist
their opposing views are based on moral and constitutional
concerns respectively. But the reality is that nationalist
politics are fueling the debate. Though the U.S. does not
have a dog in the fight, the acrimony is likely to complicate
our longstanding effort to amend Article 10 of the Law on
Citizenship, which would close a loophole that undermines a
key U.S. counterterrorism priority in Bosnia. END SUMMARY.

Background: How We Got Here
--------------


2. (C) Article 17 of the Law on Citizenship, promulgated by
then-High Representative Carlos Westendorp in 1998, provides
that Bosnians may not retain their BiH citizenship if they
become citizens of another country unless Bosnia and that
country have signed a dual citizenship agreement. Bosniak
politicians, especially those from SBiH, want Article 17,

which applies to all Bosnians who acquired foreign
citizenship after January 1, 1998, repealed. They argue that
Article 17 forces those Bosnians displaced by the 1992-95 war
(mostly Bosniaks from the RS) to choose between maintaining
their Bosnian citizenship or accepting the citizenship of the
countries to which they fled. This is because countries
where these people now live (i.e., Western Europe and the
U.S.) are unable or unwilling to conclude dual citizenship
agreements with Bosnia. Article 17's effect, Bosniaks argue,
is to "continue ethnic cleansing by other means." (Comment:
A senior staffer for Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency
Haris Silajdzic labeled Article 17's implications
"Nazi-like." While the "moral highground" is undoubtedly
important to Silajdzic and his staff, we suspect
old-fashioned ward politics also drive SBiH's views on this
issue. The Bosniak diaspora is seen as an SBiH constituency,
and if they lost their Bosnian citizeship, they would lose
their right to vote in Bosian elections. End Comment.)


3. (C) Bosniaks ave tried three times to amend the Law on
Citizenhip to address their concerns, but on each occasio
the Serbs have used entity voting to block any changes. This
occurred most recently in 2006, just prior to the October
elections. Bosnian Serbs contend that amending or repealing
Article 17 of the Law on Citizenship would be
unconstitutional. (Note: Article I.7.(d) of the Dayton
Constitution allows Bosnians to hold dual citizenship,
"provided that there is a bilateral agreement...between
Bosnia and Herzegovina and that state governing this matter."
End Note.) The Bosniaks, unsurprisingly, dispute the Serb
interpretation of Dayton. They argue the Dayton language has
the same effect as a similar provision in U.S. law, which
states that while U.S. citizens may also hold foreign
citizenship, in the eyes of U.S. law, they are always
American.


4. (C) Beyond the argument that repealing Article 17 would
be unconstitutional, Bosnian Serbs also have political
motives for opposing a change. Bosnian Serbs who fled during
the war settled for the most part in neighboring countries
with which Bosnia has bilateral agreements on dual
citizenship (i.e., Mainly Serbia, but Croatia also has a dual
citizenship agreement with Bosnia),thereby preserving the
right of diaspora Bosnian Serbs to continue to vote in
Bosnian elections and collect pensions and other benefits.
By refusing to amend the law, Bosnian Serb politicians are

SARAJEVO 00000510 002.2 OF 003


able to protect the interests of their constituents without
the risk that large numbers of diaspora Bosniaks will vote in
(or return to) the RS, diluting their authority in the entity.


5. (U) Article 17 was supposed to go into effect in 2003,
which prompted in late 2002 the first of the three Bosniak
attempts to repeal or amend it. When Bosnian political
parties failed to pass an amendment to allow unrestricted
dual citizenship (in line with standard European practice),
then-High Representative Paddy Ashdown used the Bonn Powers
to amend the Law on Citizenship so that Bosnians who became
citizens of another country prior to January 1, 1998 could
maintain their Bosnian citizenship, even in the absence of a
bilateral agreement, until January 1, 2013. The Ashdown
decision appeared to have provided a reprieve to all BosniansNIQQhQe mgh larger
number of Bosnians who obtained foreign citizenship after
January 1, 1998 remains in question. (Comment: Our judgment
is that this analysis has some merit. End Comment.)

The Current Situation
--------------


7. (U) On February 27, just one day after the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict in the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnian Foreign
Minister Sven Alkalaj (SBiH) informed the Serbian government
that the bilateral agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Serbia and Montenegro on dual citizenship was no longer
in force. By way of explanation, Alkalaj asserted that as
the state of Serbia and Montenegro no longer existed, the
agreement was void. The Serbian government disagreed, noting
that Serbia was the legal successor state to Serbia and
Montenegro (a claim backed up in the ICJ verdict, as the
Court affirmed in its February 26 decision that Serbia is the
legal successor to Serbia and Montenegro).


8. (C) Bosnian Serb leaders were outraged by Alkalaj's
decision, and called for his immediate dismissal. It also
brought the issue of revising the Law on Citizenship to the
forefront of political debate in Bosnia. Though they insist
Alkalaj is on solid legal ground, Silajdzic's staffers tell
us that Alkalaj's decision was an attempt to force the hand
of Serb politicians. By declaring the bilateral agreement
with Serbia void, SBiH believes the Bosnian Serbs will be
forced to accept repeal of Article 17 or negotiate an
amendment to it in order to protect the interests of their
constituents living in Serbia.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The current controversy over Article 17 of the Law on
Citizenship will, in the short term, complicate U.S. efforts
to amend Article 10 of the same law to prevent former
mujahideen stripped of their Bosnian citizenship from
reapplying for Bosnian passports. This outcome, as we have
reported in the past, would undercut a top USG
counterterrorism priority in Bosnia (Reftel). That said, the
controversy may also have created some space for a political
deal on citizenship issues that would address Bosniak
concerns and advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives. The
amendment to Article 10 is supported by the Bosnian Serbs and
Croats, but is opposed by SBiH and some elements of the other
major Bosniak party, the Party for Democratic Action (SDA).
These forces combined to block the change to Article 10 in
the fall of 2006. A deal between the Bosniaks and Serbs,
whereby Serbs would agree to support unrestricted dual
citizenship if the Bosniaks would agree to eliminate the
right of those stripped of citizenship to reapply would make
political sense.


10. (C) Nonetheless, a political deal may prove to be a
tough sell. While Serbs support the amendment to Article 10,
it is not a high priority for them. As such, they may not
see that as sufficient "compensation" for them to agree to a
provision on unrestricted dual citizenship. Equally,
hardline Bosniak nationalist elements in both SBiH and SDA
have lingering strong ties with many of the foreign fighters
who were granted Bosnian citizenship for wartime military

SARAJEVO 00000510 003.2 OF 003


service. More problematic, Silajdzic's advisers have
signaled an initial unwillingness to strike any type of deal
with the Bosnian Serbs, who the Bosniaks argue should reverse
their position on Article 17 as "a good faith gesture
designed to build mutual trust." We have not previewed the
specifics of a compromise on the citizenship law with either
side, since our judgment is that doing so at this time might
further complicate prospects for the proposed amendment to
Article 10 and embroil us in what ought to be a matter for
Bosnian parliamentarians to resolve. However, we will remain
alert to possibilities that can advance our counterterrorism
agenda. END COMMENT.
MCELHANEY