BOSNIA: POLITICIANS BLAME INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 000444

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2011
TAGS: KCRM KJUS EUN PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: POLITICIANS BLAME INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
FOR BREAKDOWN OF POLICE REFORM NEGOTIATIONS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 293

B. 06 SARAJEVO 3271

C. 06 SARAJEVO 2999 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Taking diametrically opposed positions,
Federation-based and Republika Srpska-based political leaders
reached an impasse following a week of increasingly
confrontational negotiations over adopting a Draft
Implementation Plan for Police Reform (the "Implementation
Plan") (REF. B). The OHR Principle Deputy High
Representative (PDHR),German EU Presidency Ambassador and
U.S. Ambassador tried to facilitate a compromise consistent
with the three EU principles. However, Bosniak leaders
rejected what they viewed as further dilution of the plan.
Croat party heads took a neutral stance during discussions.
The international community, particularly the High
Representatives' office, came under heavy criticism in the
media for appearing to make excessive concessions to RS Prime
Minister Dodik, and also from Dodik, for allegedly siding
with the Bosniaks. Council of Ministers Chair Spiric proved
to be an ineffective mediator, unable (or unwilling) to focus
the discussions. At this point, it appears unlikely the EU
will be able to initial an SAA with Bosnia any time soon.
END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Between February 16-24, BiH Council of Ministers Chair
Nikola Spiric hosted a series of lengthy, increasingly
contentious political negotiations on adopting the Police
Reform Directorate's (PRD) Draft Implementation Plan for
Police Reform (the "Implementation Plan") (REF. C). OHR, EU
Special Representative, the German Ambassador (as EU
Presidency representative) and U.S. Ambassador attended the
sessions.


3. (U) Serb leader Dodik said he was willing to make
"significant concessions," e.g., accepting the state-level
Ministry of Security's exclusive authority to set police
policy and overall budget levels. However, embedding his
devil in the details, he insisted that the RS Ministry of
Interior control the implementation of that budget, and a
"Ministerial Board" be created to choose the local police
chiefs. The board would include political appointees such as
the RS Minister of Interior. As OHR pointed out, these
provisions directly undercut the three EU principles, i.e.,
no political interference with police, state-level
legislative and budgetary control, and local police areas
determined by operational efficiency, rather than political
considerations.


4. (U) Bosniak (SDA) leaders Sulejman Tihic and (SBiH) Haris
Silajdzic, as well as Zlatko Lagumdzija, maintained that
political agreement to accept the three EU principles had
been reached in 2005, and that the current Implementation
Plan was "already a compromise, not the basis for a new
compromise." HDZ-1990 head Martin Raguz and HDZ-BiH head
Dragan Covic said they were willing to accept the report
as-is. However, if there were a new discussion aimed at
retaining the RS police in some form, the Croat parties would
insist that the cantonal police receive the same
consideration.


5. (C) In an effort to bridge the gap, the High
Representative's office put forward a proposed addendum to
the Implementation Plan, which allowed for a Ministerial
Board with advisory functions. The parties were invited to
comment on the draft addendum. (NOTE: The Ambassador had
shared the addendum with Dodik in Banja Luka on February 20
in advance of the following session in the hopes that Dodik
would see it as a way to save face in the RS while still
accepting the essential reforms. END NOTE.) However, instead
Dodik seized the opportunity to again undercut the
Implementation Plan. At the February 21 talks, he suggested
including language that effectively negated all three EU
principles. At that point, Bosniaks Silajdzic and Tihic
announced they would not participate in further discussions.
It was clear the negotiations were at a stand-still.


6. (U) The February 23 session lasted only 10 minutes.
Silajdzic and Tihic declined to attend and sent no party
representatives. Lagumdzija declared the talks a farce and
walked out. Dodik continued to bluster in the media that he
was trying to find common ground, but not at the expense of
his RS constituency. The High Representative sent a letter
to all the parties encouraging them to continue trying to
reach agreement, but insisting that the three principles were
non-negotiable. (NOTE: Embassy has sent a copy of the joint
letter to EUR/SCE.) Unfortunately, in the local media

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politicians portrayed this letter as further proof that the
internationals were cow-towing to Dodik. At his meeting with
Silajdzic on February 24, the Ambassador, together with the
German and British ambassadors, urged him to remain engaged
in the dialogue. Silajdzic appeared receptive, but made no
specific commitments.


7. (C) COMMENT: These were negotiations in name only, as
neither Dodik nor the Bosniak parties had any intention of
bending on their respective positions. They preferred
instead to posture to each other and in the media. In the
first significant test of his leadership since becoming the
Council of Ministers Chair, Spiric showed initiative in
bringing the parties together to try to reach concensus on
police reform. Unfortunately, he proved to be an
ineffective, and not altogether neutral, mediator. While he
made many emotional appeals to the group to reach a
compromise, Spiric did not offer any substantive suggestions
to move the discussion forward. More significantly, he
seemed unwilling or unable to persuade Dodik to modify the RS
stance.


8. (C) COMMENT (cont.): Bosniak politicians seized on the
proposed addendum and the High Representative's letter to
decry international bias towards placating Dodik. At the
same time, Dodik used the documents as further proof the
internationals were trying to impose conditions that favored
the Federation at the RS's expense. After his key role in
the successful Defense Reform process, Bosnian expectations
were high that the Principle Deputy High Representative would
salvage the floundering Police Reform process (REF. A),and
the media singled him out for harsh criticism as this week
unfolded. The Ambassador has supported the negotiations and
remind the public that the political leaders, not the
internationals, are responsible for the current impasse.
Unfortunately, their headline-grabbing tactics overwhelmed
efforts to explain the nuances of the High Representative's
office's position, particularly with regard to the proposed
addendum.


9. (C) COMMENT (cont.): Time is quickly running out, casting
a huge shadow over chances that the EU and the Bosnian
government will be able to initial an SAA agreement in the
near future. The inter-party discussions might benefit from
a cooling-off period at this point. During this time,
Embassy will seek to impress upon key Bosnian leaders the
negative implications for the SAA and Bosnia's future of
their unwillingness to make progress, and already has begun
to lobby major party leaders to meet in a closed session to
try to find common ground. END COMMENT.
MCELHANEY