BOSNIA: OSD DASD FATA VISIT TO SARAJEVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000373

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR FATA AND BEIN, DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D
(SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),S/WCI, AND
EUR/RPM (BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN AND
MCLANE, USNATO FOR REID, UNDERWOORD, SHAFFER, NAPLES FOR
ULRICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: OSD DASD FATA VISIT TO SARAJEVO

REF: 06 SARAJEVO 2908

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Your visit comes after two years of nearly
uninterrupted progress in the defense sphere in Bosnia.
Bosnia has successfully created a unified, single Armed
Forces and maintains a robust and continuously straightening
security relationship with the United States. Leaders and the
public alike widely hailed the decision to invite Bosnia to
join the Partnership for Peace (PfP),and view it as
affirmation that Bosnia's future lies within the
Euro-Atlantic community. But despite the unmistakable signs
that Bosnia is moving forward, it is clear that much of this
progress has shaky foundations. Comprehensive defense reform
remains a work in progress, with some of its key elements
long-delayed. On many bilateral security issues, we are
coming up against an increasingly polarized political
environment that makes some of our initiatives, such as
support for coalition operations in Iraq, a tough sell.
Finally, there remains a general lack of understanding of
what PfP membership and NATO integration means in real terms.
Your meetings with the senior Bosnian leadership present a
good opportunity to push our bilateral security agenda;
assess the progress of defense reform; and deliver a strong
message in support of Bosnia's continued Euro-Atlantic
integration. End summary.


DEFENSE REFORM: STILL WORK TO BE DONE
--------------


2. (C) Defense reform is indisputably one of the biggest
success stories in Bosnia since Dayton. In a two year
period, Bosnia adopted a Law on Defense, abolished the two
entity-level Ministries of Defense and created a single state
institution in their place. Consulting with NATO HQ, the
Ministry of Defense decided on a force structure for the new,
joint Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the
Presidency approved in July 2006. The new units created
under the decision have been established, and should be
fully-staffed by mid-summer. A clear and direct command and
control structure has been developed and adopted. The new
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces have worked well
together, and undertaken successful joint planning activities
such as the deployment of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal
(EOD) unit to Iraq. The new state-level institutions met the
conditions for PfP membership, and the decision to invite
Bosnia into the organization was partially seen as validation
of the progress to date. We have devoted substantial
resources and prestige into this process, and can be
objectively pleased with the results we have seen to date.


3. (C) There also indisputably exists, however, substantial
ground to be covered in the implementation of vital elements
of defense reform. By most accounts, since the Presidency
decision on the force structure in July, reform
implementation has slowed. Long-awaited personnel decisions
for the staffing of both the Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces were continuously delayed until January. On the
military side, this delayed the retirement of 2000 members of
the service who did not fit into the new force structure.
(Note: Outside analysts consider that it will take at least a
decade to stand-up a truly integrated, multi-ethnic force.
End Note.) Many civilian offices in the ministry remain
under-staffed. There has also been a continued failure to
resolve outstanding property issues between the state-level
Ministry of Defense and the entities, with most defense
articles and property remaining in the possession of the
entity governments. Another cause for concern is the
recently proposed defense budget cuts at this crucial
juncture in the reform process, just as Bosnia is joining
PfP. During your meetings with the senior Bosnian leadership,
you will want to underscore the absolute necessity to see
defense reforms through to their conclusion, and adequately
fund the Armed Forces to a level to allow them to be active
PfP participants.



4. (C) There is also a short-term leadership vacuum at the
Ministry of Defense that may temporarily slow the pace of
reform. Former Defense Minister Nikola Radovanovic left
office last week, and his successor, former Federation
general Selmo Cikotic will not assume duty until late April
(Note. The Bosnian Law on Defense requires that the minister
be at least three years removed from military service.
Cikotic retired from the Armed Forces in April 2004. End
note.) To fill the gap, Deputy Minister Maria Pendes is
serving as Acting Minister. Radovanovic was a capable
minister, whose apolitical, technocratic leadership well
served the reform agenda in its early implementation stages.
By all accounts, Cikotic is of the same mold, and we hope
that he can exercise decisive leadership to move our joint
goals forward in the coming years.

BILATERAL AGENDA WRAPPED IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
--------------


5. (C) Our bilateral security relationship with Bosnia is
strong and strengthening. Without U.S. material and
technical assistance provided to the government, defense
reform would not have been possible. We have targeted our
security assistance to supporting the Bosnian Armed Forces'
efforts to create a NATO-compatible force capable of
deploying on overseas missions. To that end, we have
supported the creation and training of the EOD unit, which
has deployed four platoon rotations to Iraq since 2005. The
Presidency recently extended the mission's mandate until the
end of 2007. Parliament is expected to confirm the decision
at the end of February. The Presidency also recently
approved an arms and ammunition donation to Afghanistan at
our initiative. We concluded a Status of Forces Agreement
with Bosnia in 2006. The senior defense leadership, and most
political leaders as well, have expressed a strong desire to
expand our joint security relationship.


6. (C) We do foresee, however, some problems ahead. Bosnian
politics, particularly on the Bosniak side, have drifted in
an increasingly rightward and nationalist direction. We have
already seen the effects of this on some items in our
bilateral agenda, and we anticipate further challenges in the
future. Newly elected Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency
Haris Silajdzic has made his opposition to expanding
coalition support activities known, and he is often the
roadblock within the Bosnian Presidency when it comes to
receiving support for our security agenda (see reftel).
Silajdzic's foil on the Presidency for these issues has
unexpectedly been Bosnian-Serb President Nebojsha Radmanovic,
who pushed the EOD extension and Afghan arms donation through
the Presidency. In your discussions at the Presidency you
will probably see this dynamic at work, and you should take
the opportunity to stress to Silajdzic the importance of our
strategic relationship and the need for Bosnia to be an
active participant in coalition support operations.

U.S. DRAWDOWN, EAGLE BASE CLOSURE
--------------


7. (C) The decision to remove the last U.S. troops from
Bosnia was not popular here, especially among Bosniaks. For
many Bosnians, the U.S. military and political presence in
Bosnia is viewed as the glue that holds the country together.
Despite the fact that the U.S. maintained only a few hundred
troops (with very limited capabilities) in country in the
past couple of years, a majority of Bosnians considered their
withdrawal to have an adverse effect on the security
situation. Though the PfP invitation has gone a long way to
fill the resulting security void, substantial anxiety remains
following the drawdown.


8. (C) In this context, we think it is important to
appropriately handle the closure and transfer of Eagle Base
in Tuzla. Former President Tihic approached us in the Fall
and informed us that Tuzla municipal and Canton authorities
planned to turn the airstrip at Eagle Base into a civilian
airport. Tihic requested that equipment necessary for the
airport's maintenance be donated to Bosnian authorities.
EUCOM and USAFE have worked hard to meet this request, and we
are prepared to donate or sell most of the items requested.
The current plan is turn the entire facility over to the
Bosnians on June 30. We hope to organize an appropriate and
high-level transfer ceremony that highlights the major
success of the 11-year U.S military mission and Bosnia's
capacity to now provide its own security.

NATO- STRONG AS ITS WEAKEST LINK
--------------


9. (C) Full NATO membership enjoys strong public and elite
support across ethnic lines. While European Union accession
is perhaps a decade or more away, Bosnians view membership in
the premier collective security organization to be within
reach and absolutely necessary for their country's long-term
peace and prosperity, The PfP invitation was widely hailed
here as the first tangible proof that Bosnia's future lies in
Euro-Atlantic institutions, and a signal that real progress
has been realized in the past decade. The Bosnian political
and military leadership have announced their intentions to
put Bosnia on the fast-track for full membership, and some
top officials have even publicly asserted that membership is
a possibility by 2009.


10. (C) This over-optimistic prognosis is indicative of the
fundamental inability for the elite and public alike to grasp
what NATO means and requires in real terms and presents us
with the delicate task of keeping the Bosnians motivated,
while simultaneously injecting a dose of realism into the
discussions. In the two months since Bosnia acceded to PfP,
there has been little political and public discussion about
what the path forward entails, particularly the necessity of
reform across the board, including in civilian institutions.
Bosnia is inarguably in a better position than other PfP
invitees in that the NATO-directed defense reform process
established a military and Defense Ministry that should
eventually be capable of NATO membership. But most Bosnian
leaders do not seem to understand that NATO requires a host
of commitments from the entire state, not just the Ministry
of Defense. In your discussions with the Bosnian leadership,
you will want to directly address how, as Assistant NATO
Secretary-General John Colston recently put it in his visit

SIPDIS
to Sarajevo, "militaries do not join NATO, entire states join
NATO." At the same time you will not want to sound a too
pessimistic note about timetables that will discourage the
genuinely committed leadership from the task ahead.


11. (SBU) Your meetings with the senior government officials
and parliamentarians are an opportunity to interject a fresh
voice in support of our policy goals. We look forward to
welcoming you to Sarajevo.
MCELHANEY