BOSNIA: USG MESSAGE ON KOSOVO DELIVERED TO KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000292

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DICARLO, EUR/SCE FOR HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB, NSC
FOR BRAUN, JCS FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK YI
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: USG MESSAGE ON KOSOVO DELIVERED TO KEY
BOSNIAN LEADERS

REF: A. STATE 12957


B. SARAJEVO 162

C. 06 STATE 196703

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Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with all three members of
the Bosnian Tri-Presidency and the DCM with Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs February 5 and 6 to discuss the Ahtisaari
Kosovo plan. All of the Embassy's interlocutors expressed
cautious support for the proposal, and none said they were
concerned about possible knock-on effects of the plan in
Bosnia over the short term. They also agreed that a UN
Security Council Resolution was absolutely necessary to
provide Bosnian officials with the political cover they would
need to recognize Kosovo independence and ensure the success
of the plan. Bosniak Tri-Presidency Member Haris Silajdzic
in particular seemed more concerned about RS PM Dodik's power
and moves to strengthen the RS, attracting more foreign
investment to the Federation and determining a Bosnian plan
of action on the status of the "Algerian Six" group of
detainees in Guantanamo. END SUMMARY.


AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES AHTISAARI PROPOSAL WITH TRI-PRESIDENCY
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In separate meetings with the three members of the
Bosnian Tri-Presidency, Ambassador delivered Ref. A points on
Kosovo. In their February 5 discussion, Croat Tri-Presidency
Member Zeljko Komsic said he fully supported the Ahtisaari
process, and agreed that moving ahead sooner rather than
later with a final status resolution in the UN Security
Council was the best course of action. Komsic (who once was
BiH Ambassador to Serbia/Montenegro) said he had no illusions
that Belgrade would ever truly accept Kosovo's status outside
Serbia, but they nevertheless understood the reality that
Kosovo is no longer a part of Serbia and has not been for a
long time. The most important factor to ensuring the success
of any Kosovo final status settlement is to make sure Kosovo
Serbs stay in Kosovo, he added. Unlike in Bosnia, where the
different ethnic groups lived and worked together for many
years before the war, Kosovo Serbs and Albanians lived
separate existences. It was now time for the Kosovo Serbs to
integrate themselves into Kosovo society and engage at all
levels, he said, adding, if Kosovo Serbs leave, no matter
where they go, they will have a destabilizing influence.


3. (C) Concerned about the positions of Russia and China in
the UN Security Council, Komsic said he would speak to the
new Chinese ambassador to Bosnia to stress with him the
importance of being constructive on Kosovo for the sake of
regional stability. Komsic said the regional instability
that could result from the unresolved status of Kosovo would
not be of any benefit to either China or Russia. He noted
that a UNSC Resolution would provide the cover Bosnia would
need to recognize Kosovo independence, but absent such a
resolution, it would be difficult to imagine Bosnian Serb
politicians agreeing to a unilateral recognition of Kosovo's
independence.


4. (C) Bosniak Tri-Presidency Member Haris Silajdzic told
the Ambassador he believed the recently-presented Ahtisaari
proposal was a "psychological buffer" for the Serbs -- they
already know they have lost Kosovo. He said Bosnia wishes
Kosovo well, but in the end, it has nothing to do with Bosnia
and he hoped the entire process could be concluded soon. He
then launched into a familiar refrain -- the greatest problem
Bosnia faces is the Republika Srpska (RS) trying to create
its own state separate from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Silajdzic said that Serbia supports this goal, and presented
"proof" of RS intentions in the form of a U.S. Department of
Justice Registration Statement completed by a U.S. lobbying
firm as the U.S. representative of the Government of the RS.
Silajdzic said the RS was in effect setting up parallel
embassies in foreign countries by establishing RS
representative offices separate from Bosnian embassies.


5. (C) Serb Tri-Presidency Member Nebojsa Radmanovic said he
believed that leaders in Serbia know that the Ahtisaari plan
is the best way forward, but none has the political power or
courage to say so publicly. The only real issue, he said,

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was finding a way to get Serb leaders to accept the
settlement "little by little." First and foremost, we had to
find a way to support Serbian President Tadic, the leader
closest to accepting the Ahtisaari proposal by getting other
Serb leaders to back him up (especially PM Kostunica). Serb
leaders are faced with an impossible decision, he said.
After years of propaganda telling Serbs that Kosovo must
always remain part of Serbia, they must now explain why they
would agree to let it go. Whichever Serb leader agrees to
grant Kosovo independence will forever be remembered as the
one who lost it -- no Serb wants to go down in history with
that epitaph. Radmanovic said the Russian position on the
settlement will be vitally important in the Security Council.
If Russia vetoes the plan, it would make recognition of
Kosovo independence virtually impossible for Serb politicians
(including in Bosnia). Finally, Radmanovic said that while
it was possible that at some point in the future Kosovo may
be used as an example to support separatist movements, he
foresaw no short term problems, either in Bosnia or
elsewhere.

LITTLE INTEREST FROM THE MFA ON KOSOVO
--------------


6. (C) DCM delivered Ref. A points to outgoing Deputy FM
Anton Rill February 6. Rill, noting the meeting likely would
be his last as Deputy FM, agreed that the resolution of
Kosovo's status needed to take place sooner rather than
later, if only for the fact that to his mind, the internal
issues of Bosnia and Herzegovina were more pressing. He
expressed confidence that the Kosovo matter could be resolved
peacefully, but expressed dismay about the strengthened
position of the RS vis-a-vis the rest of Bosnia. Rill added
that while he respected the economic development RS PM Dodik
was promoting, he was concerned that Dodik's power seemed to
be increasing, while the situation in the Federation was
worsening.

SILAJDZIC ON ATTRACTING INVESTMENT...
--------------


7. (C) In addition to the discussion on Kosovo, Silajdzic
said one of his main priorities was to attract foreign
investment to improve the Bosnian economy. Although he was
troubled by what he perceived as Dodik's attempts to build a
parallel state in the RS, he admired the work he had done to
attract additional investment. One key problem among State
and Federation-level ministers in previous years was their
unwillingness to take risks to improve the business climate.
Instead, Silajdzic said, they just sat in their ministries
and waited out their mandate. In the new State and
Federation governments, Silajdzic said he wanted ministers to
take a problem-solving approach to improving the economic
situation -- if laws need to be changed, then change them, he
said. Silajdzic added that he had been in contact with
several Kuwaiti investors interested in doing business in
Bosnia, remarking that one Kuwaiti firm was ready to finance
the construction of the north-south Corridor 5C highway.
"Just give us the papers, and we will sign them," they told
him. Silajdzic said Dodik also had expressed an interest in
working with Kuwaiti investors, and had asked Silajdzic to
take him on a trip to Kuwait for investor meetings.
(Silajdzic said no plans have been made as of yet.)

...AND GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
--------------


8. (C) Finally, on the issue of the so-called "Algerian Six"
Guantanamo detainees, Silajdzic told the Ambassador he had
met with the group's American (human rights) lawyer earlier
on February 5. Silajdzic said he was seeking to clarify the
status of those detainees holding Bosnian citizenship.
Referring to our earlier demarche (Refs. B and C),Silajdzic
seemed to be attempting to determine whether the U.S. was
planning to release the men in the near future and whether
the U.S. was looking for a signal that the Bosnian government
would be willing to accept their repatriation. The
Ambassador told Silajdzic he had no new information since the
earlier demarche was delivered (Refs. B and C).


9. (C) COMMENT: High-level Bosnian officials do not appear
concerned that Kosovo will cause political problems in
Bosnia. One thing is clear, however; a UN Security Council

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Resolution on Kosovo will be key to ensuring Bosnia's
recognition of the final status agreement. Absent such a UN
endorsement, Bosnian officials will find it difficult, if not
impossible, to overcome Bosnian Serb objections to proceed
with a unilateral endorsement of Kosovo independence. The
accompanying rhetoric would not be constructive either.
Although none have been as explicit as the Russians, many
Bosnian Serb politicians have hinted that a gradual move
toward acceptance, rather than an immediate push for a UNSC
resolution, would make it easier to bring Serbian leaders on
board. In our continuing dialogue with RS PM Dodik, our Banja
Luka office shared the demarche with him, eliciting an
understanding response. END COMMENT.
MCELHANEY