Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2648
2007-12-11 18:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR DEFENSE MINISTER

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9074
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2648/01 3451804
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111804Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7507
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0197
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002648 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEFENSE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ENGLAND, FATA, CAGAN, BEIN
DEPT FOR EUR (A/S FRIED, DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR DEFENSE MINISTER
CIKOTIC'S DECEMBER 17-21 VISIT TO WASHINGTON

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2295

B. ENGLAND-CIKOTIC LETTER

C. SARAJEVO 2586

D. SARAJEVO 2296

E. SARAJEVO 2142

F. SARAJEVO 2047

G. SARAJEVO 1999

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002648

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEFENSE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ENGLAND, FATA, CAGAN, BEIN
DEPT FOR EUR (A/S FRIED, DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH,
SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR DEFENSE MINISTER
CIKOTIC'S DECEMBER 17-21 VISIT TO WASHINGTON

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2295

B. ENGLAND-CIKOTIC LETTER

C. SARAJEVO 2586

D. SARAJEVO 2296

E. SARAJEVO 2142

F. SARAJEVO 2047

G. SARAJEVO 1999

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Defense Minister Selmo Cikotic comes to
Washington December 17-21 for Bilateral Defense Consultations
(BDCs) and other meetings ready to present his vision
completing Bosnia's defense reform, expanding Bosnia's
participation in coalition support operations, and expediting
NATO accession. On defense reform, the Minister will seek
assistance resolving defense property issues between the
entities and the state, which have been blocked by the RS
government. Cikotic will support the deployment of additional
Bosnian forces to Iraq, including up to a company sized-unit,
but will highlight that logistical constraints, mostly
related to the unresolved property issues, hinder his ability
to make a large commitment. He will present an ambitious
agenda for accelerating the NATO integration process,
possibly including on offer of a Membership Action Plan (MAP)
at the Bucharest Summit. The Minister's visit presents an
excellent opportunity for senior US policymakers to engage on
these important issues with one of our strongest partners in
the region. We believe it is important to encourage Cikotic
to maintain his and the Bosnian government's already strong
commitment to full alliance accession and the defense reform
agenda. End Summary.

CIKOTIC: STRONG US PARTNER
--------------


2. (C) Though in office for only nine months, Defense
Minister Selmo Cikotic has brought new energy to the NATO and
defense reform agenda in Bosnia. He has a well-earned
reputation as a competent technocrat and has become a model

Minister. Under his leadership, the MOD has developed a
reputation for an apolitical approach to policy, free from
the ethnic infighting that plagues almost all other Bosnian
state-level institutions. During the recent political crisis
in Bosnia, Cikotic demonstrated his level-headed and
even-handed leadership to maintain a stable security
environment. When he discovered that Bosnian Serb generals
had met with RS Prime Minister Dodik while rumors of ethnic
seperatism were gathering weight (Ref A),Cikotic quietly
sought information about the substance of the meeting and
elected not to make it a major issue that would further
inflame both political circles and the public. (Comment. This
approach was smart as both a political and practical matter,
as the crisis seemed precipitated to raise regional tensions
in advance of the Kosovo final status decision. End
Comment.) Cikotic's experiences during the 1992-1995 war and
his time as Bosnian Defense Attache in Washington have shaped
his world view. He is strongly pro-American, a close ally on
matters of bilateral defense and security policy, and a
forceful advocate for a strong US leadership role in Bosnia.
He is not shy about reminding his interlocutors that all
major reform initiatives in Bosnia, particularly defense
reform, have been US-led or directed. Cikotic can be expected
to be well-prepared for his discussions with senior USG
officials, and will present intelligent and pragmatic
policy-prescriptions for issues on the agenda.

LOOKING TO EXPAND OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS
--------------


3. (C) Cikotic is a strong proponent of increasing Bosnia's
deployments to overseas peace-support operations. At his
direction, the MOD recently drafted a comprehensive report on
proposed overseas missions for 2008. Included in that plan
was the continued deployment of Bosnia's Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) platoon in Iraq, which has supported OIF since

2005. The plan also contained the USG request for Bosnia to
deploy an infantry "platoon-plus" or company (anywhere from
50-150 men) in mid- 2008 for fixed-site security in Iraq (Ref

SARAJEVO 00002648 002 OF 003


B). The politics of expanded deployments remain fluid, and
increasing Bosnia's contributions to the Iraq mission in
particular is not a certainty. We encountered some
resistance from Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris
Silajdzic to continuing the EOD deployment into 2007, but
since his participation in the USG-organizied and funded trip
to Iraq for the Bosnian Tri-Presidency in May 2007, his
anxieties about the EOD unit's deployment have declined.
Cikotic has told us on numerous occasions that he would also
like to deploy forces in support of NATO operations in
Afghanistan, and he may raise this possibility in Washington.


THE SUCCESS OF DEFENSE REFORM
--------------


4. (C) Defense reform has been one of the greatest success
stories of post-Dayton Bosnia. The US-led process
successfully merged the two entity Ministry of Defenses and
created a joint Armed Forces out of three formerly warring
armies. External and internal observers alike have praised
the creation of a unified, multi-ethnic Armed forces and
single Ministry of Defense, both of which offer compelling
evidence that functioning state-level institutions necessary
for Euro-Atlantic integration can be created and sustained.
In 2007, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces, under the
leadership of Cikotic and CHOD LTG Sifet Podzic,
reinvigorated a defense reform process that had stalled in
the last half of 2006 while Bosnia was preoccupied with
national elections. Most notably, by December 1, the two men
had stood-up the Bosnian Armed Forces' new force structure.

DEFENSE PROPERTY A STICKING POINT; IMPACTS DEPLOYMENTS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) While defense reform is unarguably a major success, it
remains incomplete. Most importantly, the entities and state
have yet to resolve defense property issues. In July 2007,
the entity and state leaderships reached a political
agreement on defense property that was to provide the basis
for formal agreements that would transfer movable (arms,
ammunition, vehicles, etc.) and immovable (land, bases)
property from the entities to the state. Nearly a half year
later, there has been little progress in finalizing a
transfer agreement for either movable or immovable defense
property. Recent actions by the RS government (Ref C)
indicate that they are backing away from the commitments in
the political agreement and seeking to maintain control over
surplus arms and ammunition. This position is at odds with
the political agreement signed by RS Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik and raises profound concerns about RS intentions and
commitments to principles laid down by NATO, OSCE and EUFOR
18 months ago that all weapons, ammunition and explosives
would be transferred to the state. Minister Cikotic is
particularly concerned about the apparent about face by the
RS on defense property and will urge Washington to pressure
Dodik to conclude an agreement consistent with the July 2007
political agreement as quickly as possible, which he will
note is crucial to Bosnia's NATO aspirations and ability to
deploy additional forces to Iraq. (Note. The Ambassador and
High Representative Miroslav Lajcak are both making
approaches to Dodik on this issue. End Note.)

NATO: CIKOTIC LOOKS FOR USG SUPPORT AT BUCHAREST
-------------- ---


6. (C) Bosnia has made significant, and perhaps unexpected,
progress in its first year in PfP. The MOD and MFA have
finished drafting Bosnia's first Individual Partnership
Action Plan (IPAP) and hope to have it approved by the
Council of Ministers, Presidency, and Parliament by
mid-February 2008. Bosnia completed its first Partnership
and Review Process (PARP) survey in September, which received
a positive assessment from NATO's International Staff. In a
time of increased political polarization here, the NATO
agenda has been uncontentious: NATO membership continues to
enjoy wide support among the political elite and general
public alike (including a majority of the Bosnian Serb
population, according to polling data).

SARAJEVO 00002648 003 OF 003




7. (C) Cikotic will seek to enlist USG support for
accelerating Bosnia's integration with NATO during his visit
to Washington. Cikotic has told us that he plans to
hand-carry a letter from all three members of Bosnia's
Tri-Presidency to Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice
detailing Bosnia's substantial accomplishments on NATO and
PfP activities and urging a positive assessment of Bosnia's
efforts at NATO's Bucharest Summit. Cikotic has told us that
he believes Bosnia should seek a Membership Action Plan (MAP)
at Bucharest (with full membership by the 2010 NATO Summit),
and he may bring up this idea in Washington. At the least,
Cikotic will urge, Bosnia should be mentioned separately from
the other new PfP members in the Bucharest Communique, and be
offered an Intensified Dialogue. Cikotic views the accession
process as a unifying issue for the country. He believes
progress towards NATO membership will encourage the
government to undertake further structural reforms that would
improve the functionality of the state. In discussing the
issue with Cikotic, we have counseled pragmatism, and urged
him and the rest of the Bosnian government to embrace plans
and a timetable for NATO accession that is ambitious but
sustainable for Bosnian institutions.

COMMENT: AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW MUTUAL SUPPORT
-------------- -


8. (C) Cikotic's visit to Washington comes at an opportune
time considering the number of important items currently on
our bilateral defense agenda. Cikotic should be told that the
failure to resolve defense property will be negatively viewed
at the Bucharest Summit-- a message he can take back to
Bosnia and share with Prime Minister Spiric and the RS
leadership. He should also be encouraged to continue
Bosnia's support for the Iraq mission, and look to expand the
deployment along the lines already proposed by the USG. On
both of the issues Cikotic will be an ally, and he can use
the message from senior Washington policymakers to help make
the case back home. Cikotic views securing USG support for
an accelerated timetable for Bosnia's NATO integration as the
most important element of his trip. A positive message at
Bucharest (de-linking Bosnia from Serbia and Montenegro in
the communique and invitation to begin an Intensified
Dialogue) would boost defense, and possibly the broader,
reform agenda here and further our objective of anchoring
Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic institutions. In Washington, we
must be encouraging, and, without over-committing ourselves,
provide Cikotic the leverage at home to bolster his strong
leadership on defense reform and NATO accession.
ENGLISH