A/S FRIED'S VISIT TO BOSNIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002636

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S VISIT TO BOSNIA


Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During a December 4-5 visit to Sarajevo, EUR
Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried met with Republika Srpska
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, Bosniak Presidency member
Haris Silajdzic, Party for Democratic Action president
Sulejman Tihic, Social Democratic Party president Zlatko
Lagumdzija and High Representative Miroslav Lajcak.
Interlocutors were unanimously upbeat (for the short term)
in the wake of the recent political agreement and the
initialing of Bosnia's Stabilization and Association Agreement
with the EU.


2. (C) Summary continued. High Representative Lajcak
said he believed that international pressure and the threat of
isolation had caused Dodik to abandon confrontation. But the
underlying political questions that caused the crisis remained
unresolved, and Dodik could achieve de
facto secession from Bosnia relatively easily. He urged
the PIC not to close OHR in February. Milorad Dodik denied
having made parallels between Kosovo and the RS, and
asserted that such parallels are false. Dodik promised
that the RS would maintain order after Kosovo independence,
he would instruct SNSD deputies to support police reform
legislation, and he would call publicly for Kosovo Serbs to
stay and live peacefully in Kosovo. Haris Silajdzic was
focused on "Belgrade's designs on Bosnia" and cataloged a
dubious list of nefarious Serbian activities. He
characterized Dodik as a "businessman not a nationalist"
who is nonetheless being influenced by nationalism in
Belgrade. Silajdzic said that until the resolution of
Kosovo status, meaningful political reforms would not be
possible. Tihic argued that Bosnia's fundamental problem
was that the state lacked the credibility and autonomy
required to sustain itself and state-level institutions
lacked meaningful capabilities. Lagumdzija promised to
play a more constructive role in opposition - to attack the
governing coalition for not having fulfilled its promises,
not for the compromises needed to move Bosnia toward
Europe. End Summary.


Lajcak and the Quint
--------------


3. (C) At a December 4 dinner with High Representative
Miroslav Lajcak, PDHR Raffi Gregorian and the French,
German, and Italian Ambassadors A/S Fried began by
observing that, only a few weeks ago, Bosnia seemed on the
verge of serious instability. However, the police reform
agreement and subsequent initialing of the Stabilization
and Association Agreement (SAA) now seem to have put the
reform agenda back on track. High Representative Lajcak
agreed that the agreement had come at a crucial time in
Bosnia's history. He acknowledged that the Mostar
Declaration and the police reform action plan were
political, rather than substantive documents but they
nonetheless constituted a significant achievement since
they represented the first time the political parties had
reached consensus independently.


4. (C) Asked by A/S Fried why RS PM Milorad Dodik
ultimately chose to compromise, Lajcak replied that he
believed the threat of international isolation caused Dodik
to reconsider confrontation. However, Dodik also realized
that by accepting the action plan he could meet SAA
conditionality while maintaining the RS Police. Lajcak
added that both Dodik and Haris Silajdzic believe they can
use the SAA to advance their competing interests; Dodik
will use the agreement to call for the closure of OHR while
Silajdzic will attempt to harness the EU accession process
to his efforts to eliminate the RS.


5. (C) All participants expressed concern over Russia's
recent disruptive role in Bosnia noting public statements
by Vladimir Putin and FM Sergei Lavrov linking the RS to
Kosovo status. Participants noted that Belgrade had
initially echoed Russian rhetoric but had significantly
moderated its stance since the delivery of the Quint
demarche. German Ambassador Michael Schmunck predicted
that there would be a serious confrontation with the
Russians at the February PIC over the extension of OHR.

Lajcak on OHR Closure
--------------


6. (C) Lajcak stated that, given the seriousness of the
recent crisis, it was inconceivable that the PIC would
consider closing OHR in February. He noted that the
underlying political problems that caused the political
crisis remained unresolved. Lajcak emphasized that Dodik
and the RS do not need a referendum to achieve de facto
secession from Bosnia. As presaged by the recent crisis,
SNSD could go into opposition and withdraw from state
government. Such a decision would be perfectly
constitutional but would result in the de facto
disintegration of the state. OHR would be powerless to use
the Bonn Powers against Dodik in that scenario. In that
context, Lajcak urged Quint capitals to keep financial and
travel sanctions against RS leaders as an option in the
toolbox of responses to RS obstructionism.


7. (C) Lajcak explained that he would convene leaders of
coalition political parties to resume discussion of
constitutional reform next week. Noting that he is
"against deadlines and commissions," Lajcak said that the
political climate was not right for intensive engagement on
constitutional reform and he would simply encourage a
return to exploratory dialogue. Lajcak planned to leave
negotiations to the parties for a period of approximately
six months. Although the international community would
eventually have to step in, he would let the parties "fight
it out" in the meantime.

Dodik
--------------


8. (C) During a December 5 meeting with Republika Srpksa
(RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, A/S Fried briefed on
Kosovo developments, emphasizing that Kostunica and Tadic
cannot prevent the inevitable. A/S Fried noted that Dodik
can play an important and positive role in the coming
months. If Dodik chose to demonstrate leadership and
statesmanship, he would have the gratitude of the United
States and Europe.


9. (C) Dodik said he did not seek to exploit the Kosovo
process to question the Bosnian state or advance a
secessionist agenda. Bosnia and Herzegovina is
indisputable, Dodik stated, and asked that the U.S. also
not allow others to make the RS disputable. Some
individuals in Bosnia hate the RS, just as some in the RS
want to secede from Bosnia, Dodik said. The best solution
is a Bosnia under Dayton in the EU and the most important
goal now is signing the SAA. Bosnia's core political
problems can be resolved at a later date, Dodik said.


10. (C) Dodik stated that he was prepared to publicly call
for Kosovo Serbs to remain in Kosovo and live in peace.
Regardless of the outcome of Kosovo negotiations, the RS
will remain peaceful and stable. Kosovo independence would
likely result in minor protests and demonstrations in the
RS but the situation would remain under control and there
will be no significant unrest. Dodik said that he was prepared
to play a constructive role, including in public.

RS-Kosovo Parallels False
--------------


11. (C) Dismissing assertions that he had suggested any
linkages between the future of the RS and Kosovo, Dodik
said parallels between Kosovo and the RS are false.
Developments over the last five or six days had proved
this. The United States can be confident that RS leaders
will not contribute to the problem. Dodik said that in the
course of his frequent conversations with Kostunica he has
concluded that the Serbian PM is conceptually unprepared
for Kosovo independence. Nonetheless, Kosovo independence
will create "lots of noise" in Serbia that will quickly die
down, Dodik predicted, adding that Kosovo independence will
become accepted in Serbia relatively quickly.


12. (C) A/S Fried urged Dodik to publicly refute parallels
between Kosovo and the RS. In this way RS leaders could
demonstrate that their entity is not an extremist creation
and forestall attempts by Belgrade to manipulate the RS.
Dodik asserted that he was in full control of the situation
in the RS and Serbian leaders could never exert a
destabilizing impact. Serbian extremists could attempt to
send infiltrators to the RS but "we will find them," Dodik
said.

Police Reform
--------------


13. (C) Dodik stated that he would instruct SNSD deputies
to support legislation codifying the police reform action
plan as long as it reflects the existing agreement which
acknowledged the role of the RS Police. Dodik asserted
that, during a December 4 meeting, Olli Rehn told him the
implementation of police reform legislation would be
sufficient to meet conditions for signing an SAA. Dodik
said that talks between coalition parties next week would
resolve outstanding issues regarding legislation and
implementation timing. In this context the worst case
scenario would see Bosnia signing an SAA by May or June of

2008.

Defense Reform
--------------


14. (C) A/S Fried urged Dodik to instruct the RS government
also adopt a constructive approach to defense reform,
particularly the issue of defense property transfers.
Dodik asserted that the terms of the defense reform
political agreement specified that the disposition of
movable property was at the discretion of the entities with
"full participation" of the armed forces. The Ambassador
interjected that the agreement actually stated that the
state was responsible for the disposition of defense
property, with eighty percent of the proceeds going to the
entities. Dodik acknowledged that the state is ultimately
responsible for liquidation, but that he had not focused on
defense reform during the recent political crisis and he
would consult with RS government experts.


15. (C) In summing up, Dodik committed to take three steps
to demonstrate his commitment to stability and reform.
First, he promised that the RS would maintain order and
stability in the wake of a Kosovo independence
declaration. Second, he would instruct SNSD deputies to
support police reform legislation. Third, he would call
publicly for Kosovo Serbs to stay and live peacefully in
Kosovo.

Silajdzic
--------------


16. (C) At a separate meeting with A/ S Fried, Bosniak
Presidency member and SNSD President Haris Silajdzic
focused his concerns on Belgrade's intentions with respect
to Bosnia. He asserted that Serbian intelligence services
are active in Bosnia and that Belgrade is beginning to
"dominate certain sectors close to Pale." Silajdzic
embarked on a catalog of alleged RS actions that supported
Belgrade's designs on Bosnia. He cited RS monitoring of
military depots, the opening of new border crossing points
and bridges across the Drina, and the issuing of weapons
licenses to thirty thousand RS hunters as examples. At the
same time there are 125 individuals guilty of war crimes at
large in the RS. "Bosniaks do not want to push," Silajdzic
said, but "the RS is busy."


17. (C) Silajdzic agreed with A/S Fried's assessment that
initialing the SAA was a setback to any Serbian interests
in Bosnia, but added it had not changed Belgrade's core
interests. Serbia had hoped to maintain two parallel
crises, one in Kosovo and one in Bosnia, Silajdzic said,
but the political agreement had deprived Belgrade of its
"RS card." He urged the allies to consider an
acceleration of Bosnia's NATO accession process as another
signal to Serbia. The closer Bosnia moves to the EU and
NATO the better for the entire region, Silajdzic added.
Once Bosnia has reached the point where it no longer needs
to fear Belgrade only then can truly display its "talents
and priorities." Serbia's own EU integration will also
help this process.


18. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about police reform
implementation, Silajdzic replied that he had two separate
versions of draft legislation ready to table. Silajdzic
stated that SBiH would insist that the RS police be
disbanded under any future reformed national police
framework.

Belgrade and Dodik
--------------


19. (C) A/S Fried asked whether Serbia's objectives were
truly aligned with Dodik's. Silajdzic replied that Dodik
enjoys his role as a "Serb hero" and would prefer to be at
the helm of an independent RS than annexed to Serbia.
Dodik will not acknowledge that he is fundamentally Bosnian
and is not accepted by Belgrade, Silajdzic said. Dodik is
a "businessman not a nationalist," but he is nonetheless
being influenced by nationalism in Belgrade. It is crucial
to keep Dodik engaged here in Bosnia with Sarajevo and with
the West in order to "keep him away from Lavrov." Russian
investment in the RS is fine, but whenever Dodik goes to
Belgrade or St. Petersburg he "gets ideas," Silajdzic
said.


20. (C) Asked whether Bosnian political leaders will be
capable of maintaining the current political momentum,
Silajdzic said that until the resolution of Kosovo status
meaningful political reforms would not be possible.
"Kosovo is killing us," Silajdzic said and, until the dust
settles, it would be best to concentrate on innocuous
economic issues. Sooner or later Bosnia would have to
tackle the core questions, but for the moment it is
sufficient to stop any linkages of Kosovo and the RS.

Tihic Urges Continued International Engagement
-------------- -


21. (C) Tihic welcomed the sudden turn around in BosniaQs
political environment, but cautioned that underlying
differences among political leaders remained and would
likely resurface as political leaders sought to implement
the Sarajevo Action Plan and discussed constitutional
reform. Tihic said that it Qwas a tragedy for BosniaQ that
the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments had
not been adopted in April 2006. He dated DodikQs
transformation from this moment, explaining that SilajdzicQ
s rhetoric during and after the constitutional reform
debate had Qcreated a new Dodik.Q Tihic noted that
Silajdzic had Qcalmed downQ in recent months, but doubted
he would remain QmoderateQ indefinitely. Tihic also warned
that Dodik was now so powerful in the RS that he felt he
could defy everyone, including the international
community. Tihic said that the international community
should not give Dodik Qany more concessions than he was
entitled to.Q


22. (C) Tihic argued that Bosnia fundamental problem was
that the state lacked the credibility and autonomy required
to sustain itself. Bosnian state-level institutions were
also young and lacked the capacity to perform the tasks
assigned to them. Constitutional reform remained essential
for BosniaQs prospects for EU and NATO membership, Tihic
said. He urged the U.S. to reengage on constitutional
reform but only after Kosovo has been resolved. Tihic also
complained that the challenges posed by organized crime and
corruption were growing, adding that politicians were
increasingly linked to both. He praised the work of
international prosecutors and judges in Bosnia, arguing
that they were still needed. Tihic maintained that one
reason Dodik and Silajdzic were uneasy with police reform
was that they wanted to maintain political control over
police in order to ensure that they were not investigated.

Lagumdzija Pledges Responsible Opposition
--------------


23. (C) SDP President Zlatko Lagumdzija pledged to A/S
Fried that he would not continue to attack the coalition
parties (in particular SDA and SBiH) for the compromises
they accepted to assure implementation of the High
Representative's October 19 measures. Rather, he said, SDP
would focus on their failure to fulfill elements of the
coalition's governance plan agreed to when the coalition
six formed a government last spring. Lagumdzija emphasized
deepening collusion among party leaders and key members, in
particular Dodik, Silajdzic and SDA's Bakir Izetbegovic,
over corrupt deals involving infrastructure such as highway
construction. He welcomed the High Representative's plan
to revive an Anti-Corruption Unit at OHR to investigate
such networks. Finally, he predicted that efforts to
launch constitutional reform would quickly founder, as the
three ethnic groups were committed to such profoundly
contradictory goals that the likelihood of common groud
was extremely remote.

ENGLISH