Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2448
2007-11-14 17:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:
BOSNIA - KEEPING THE US FLAG ON NATO HQ SARAJEVO
how-toVZCZCXYZ0008 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHVJ #2448/01 3181753 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 141753Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7366 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0495 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0075 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0470 RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUFDNBS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUFGSHD/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0186 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002448
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR ENGLISH FOR A/S FRIED AND U/S EDELMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - KEEPING THE US FLAG ON NATO HQ SARAJEVO
REF: A. SARAJEVO 1980
B. USNATO 599
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002448
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR ENGLISH FOR A/S FRIED AND U/S EDELMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - KEEPING THE US FLAG ON NATO HQ SARAJEVO
REF: A. SARAJEVO 1980
B. USNATO 599
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C/NF) Earlier this year, my predecessor concluded that it
remained critical to U.S. objectives in Bosnia for a U.S.
general officer to command NATO HQ Sarajevo (Ref A). After
careful review, I have now reached the same conclusion. I am
writing to ask you to reconsider the decision not to retain a
U.S. general officer beyond spring 2008, and to request an
extension of the U.S. presence for a further year, to April
2009.
2. (C/NF) My first month in Sarajevo has been marked by the
country's most serious political crisis since Dayton. The
leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS) has challenged the
authority of the High Representative, and by extension
Dayton, effectively calling into question Bosnia's viability
as a state. Bosnian Serb leaders, with overt backing from
Belgrade, have publicly linked the RS's future to Kosovo's,
suggesting independence for the later could justify the same
for the former. Russia is also attempting to destabilize
Bosnia by encouraging RS political leaders. The importance
of a visible U.S. role promoting stability, including through
our traditional leadership of NATO's presence here, has never
been greater.
3 (C/NF) Removing the U.S. general officer at NATO HQ would
reduce our ability to influence events on the ground and
manage the current political crisis, which given political
trends over the last 18 months, could extend well into next
year. It would send a counter productive signal about the
U.S. commitment to Bosnia just as the Dayton Peace Accords
faced their most significant challenge in 12 years. It would
also limit our capacity to shape developments over the next
15 months, which are likely to determine whether Bosnia's
current problems become chronic, putting at risk broader U.S.
strategic interests in Europe.
4. (C/NF) Our core objective in Bosnia since Dayton has been
to lock Bosnia onto a self-sustaining path towards
Euro-Atlantic integration, using the institutional framework
provided by NATO and EU to tame, once and for all, the
country's centrifugal ethnic divisions. The EU train may now
be off the tracks, possibly for a year. Events of the last
18 months have called into question whether the prospect of
EU membership is enough to overcome Bosnia's still deep
ethnically-based political differences and ensure reform here
is self-generating, and frankly, they have raised questions
about Europe's ability to lead in Bosnia. This makes keeping
Bosnia on the NATO track even more important to U.S.
objectives here.
5. (C/NF) The creation of a single, multi-ethnic Armed Forces
from the three former warring armies has been a U.S.-led and
resourced project. High-level U.S. leadership on defense
reform, both bilaterally and through our command of NATO HQ
Sarajevo, laid the foundation for Bosnia's invitation to join
the Partnership for Peace and its participation in the
Multinational Force in Iraq. Finishing defense reform is
critical if Bosnia is to take its next steps towards NATO
membership and we are to advance our longer-term goal of
locking Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic structures. The success of
this project depends on U.S. leadership at NATO Sarajevo.
Removing the U.S. flag from NATO HQ would put defense reform
at risk.
6. (C/NF) Over the past twelve years the U.S. has made a
substantial investment in Bosnia. These investments have
been critical to securing our interests here, in the Western
Balkans region, and more broadly, in building a Europe whole,
free, prosperous and at peace. It will be more difficult to
advance our interests without a U.S. general officer
commanding NATO HQ in Sarajevo. Given Bosnia's current
political trajectory and the European's inability to drive
reform, we could even see a roll back of some of our progress
on defense reform without continued, high-level U.S.
leadership. I would urge that a U.S. general officer remain
commander at NATO HQ Sarajevo, at least until April 2009.
ENGLISH
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR ENGLISH FOR A/S FRIED AND U/S EDELMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - KEEPING THE US FLAG ON NATO HQ SARAJEVO
REF: A. SARAJEVO 1980
B. USNATO 599
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C/NF) Earlier this year, my predecessor concluded that it
remained critical to U.S. objectives in Bosnia for a U.S.
general officer to command NATO HQ Sarajevo (Ref A). After
careful review, I have now reached the same conclusion. I am
writing to ask you to reconsider the decision not to retain a
U.S. general officer beyond spring 2008, and to request an
extension of the U.S. presence for a further year, to April
2009.
2. (C/NF) My first month in Sarajevo has been marked by the
country's most serious political crisis since Dayton. The
leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS) has challenged the
authority of the High Representative, and by extension
Dayton, effectively calling into question Bosnia's viability
as a state. Bosnian Serb leaders, with overt backing from
Belgrade, have publicly linked the RS's future to Kosovo's,
suggesting independence for the later could justify the same
for the former. Russia is also attempting to destabilize
Bosnia by encouraging RS political leaders. The importance
of a visible U.S. role promoting stability, including through
our traditional leadership of NATO's presence here, has never
been greater.
3 (C/NF) Removing the U.S. general officer at NATO HQ would
reduce our ability to influence events on the ground and
manage the current political crisis, which given political
trends over the last 18 months, could extend well into next
year. It would send a counter productive signal about the
U.S. commitment to Bosnia just as the Dayton Peace Accords
faced their most significant challenge in 12 years. It would
also limit our capacity to shape developments over the next
15 months, which are likely to determine whether Bosnia's
current problems become chronic, putting at risk broader U.S.
strategic interests in Europe.
4. (C/NF) Our core objective in Bosnia since Dayton has been
to lock Bosnia onto a self-sustaining path towards
Euro-Atlantic integration, using the institutional framework
provided by NATO and EU to tame, once and for all, the
country's centrifugal ethnic divisions. The EU train may now
be off the tracks, possibly for a year. Events of the last
18 months have called into question whether the prospect of
EU membership is enough to overcome Bosnia's still deep
ethnically-based political differences and ensure reform here
is self-generating, and frankly, they have raised questions
about Europe's ability to lead in Bosnia. This makes keeping
Bosnia on the NATO track even more important to U.S.
objectives here.
5. (C/NF) The creation of a single, multi-ethnic Armed Forces
from the three former warring armies has been a U.S.-led and
resourced project. High-level U.S. leadership on defense
reform, both bilaterally and through our command of NATO HQ
Sarajevo, laid the foundation for Bosnia's invitation to join
the Partnership for Peace and its participation in the
Multinational Force in Iraq. Finishing defense reform is
critical if Bosnia is to take its next steps towards NATO
membership and we are to advance our longer-term goal of
locking Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic structures. The success of
this project depends on U.S. leadership at NATO Sarajevo.
Removing the U.S. flag from NATO HQ would put defense reform
at risk.
6. (C/NF) Over the past twelve years the U.S. has made a
substantial investment in Bosnia. These investments have
been critical to securing our interests here, in the Western
Balkans region, and more broadly, in building a Europe whole,
free, prosperous and at peace. It will be more difficult to
advance our interests without a U.S. general officer
commanding NATO HQ in Sarajevo. Given Bosnia's current
political trajectory and the European's inability to drive
reform, we could even see a roll back of some of our progress
on defense reform without continued, high-level U.S.
leadership. I would urge that a U.S. general officer remain
commander at NATO HQ Sarajevo, at least until April 2009.
ENGLISH