Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2425
2007-11-13 16:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - HIGHREP'S NOVEMBER 15 REPORT TO THE UN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR EU UN BK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002425 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE
(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHCOMB),IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EU UN BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - HIGHREP'S NOVEMBER 15 REPORT TO THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL


Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 002425

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE
(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHCOMB),IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EU UN BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - HIGHREP'S NOVEMBER 15 REPORT TO THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL


Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action message. See paragraph six.


2. (C) SUMMARY: High Representative Miroslav Lajcak will make
his semi-annual report to the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) against the backdrop Bosnia's most serious political
crisis since Dayton. Bosnian Serb Chairman of the Council of
Ministers Nikola Spiric, having had his resignation formally
accepted on Monday, is now serving in a "technical mandate"
pending conclusion of negotiations on his successor.
Nonetheless, Spiric has decided to attend the November 15
UNSC session, but he is doing so without official
authorization from Bosnia's Presidency and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs -- the two state-level institutions charged
with responsibility for foreign policy. We and the HighRep
anticipate that Spiric's intervention will be unconstructive
and could complicate EU and U.S. efforts to secure renewal of
EUFOR's mandate, which expires on November 21. With this in
mind, we believe it is important that the U.S. use the UNSC
discussion of Bosnia to underscore our continued support for
the HighRep and make clear that Spiric's intervention should
be regarded as a personal statement, not official Bosnian
government policy. END SUMMARY

Bosnia: Current Political State of Play
--------------


3. (C) On October 15, High Representative Lajcak used his
Bonn Powers to announce measures design to facilitate
decision-making in Bosnian state-level institutions. With
the exception of Russia, members of the Peace Implementation
Council (PIC) have strongly supported the measures and back
the HighRep's efforts to ensure that they are implemented.
Bosnian Serbs, led by RS PM Dodik, have rejected the measures
and challenged the authority of the HighRep and the
international community, sparking Bosnia's most serious
political crisis since Dayton. Unfortunately, Dodik and the
Bosnian Serbs, with tacit support from Moscow and Belgrade,

have rebuffed several attempts to provide them with a face
saving way out of confrontation they have initiated. On
November 2, Nikola Spiric, Bosnian Serb Chairman of the
Council of Ministers (in effect the country's PM),resigned
in protest of the HighRep's measures. Bosnia's
Tri-Presidency accepted his resignation on November 12, but
Spiric and other ministers remain in office on a technical
mandate until a new government is formed.

The HighRep's Semi-Annual Report to the UNSC
--------------


4. (C) The HighRep is scheduled to make his semi-annual
report to the UNSC on Thursday, November 15 prior to the
Council's discussion of the situation in Bosnia. Spiric has
independently decided that he will also attend the HighRep's
presentation to the UNSC. Spiric's travel has not been
authorized by Bosnia's Presidency, though there is nothing
the Presidency can do to prevent it. In addition, Spiric has
not secured approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or
the Presidency for his remarks to the Council. Spiric's
conduct is not unprecedented. Former PM Terzic, a Bosniak,
did the same when the HighRep made his semi-annual report to
the UN in November 2006. At the time Terzic was serving in a
"technical mandate" -- elections having taken place just one
month prior, but a successor government had not been named.
Terzic's travel and remarks angered the Bosnian Serbs, who
argued (correctly) that Terzic lacked the authority to speak
on behalf of Bosnia.


5. (C) Spiric's remarks to the UNSC come at an extremely
sensitive and emotional period in Bosnia and are likely to
spark greater political controversy than Terzic's
unauthorized speech in 2006. Spiric is likely to challenge
the HighRep's authority, particularly the Bonn Powers, attack
his October 15 measures, and blame the HighRep's actions and
bias within the international community for Bosnia's current
political crisis. The HighRep and others in the
international community are also concerned that Spiric will
use his intervention to complicate EU and U.S. efforts to
secure UNSC renewal of EUFOR's mandate, which is critical to
OHR's standing within Bosnia.


SARAJEVO 00002425 002 OF 002


Comment and Action Request
--------------


6. (C) We share the HighRep's and others concerns that Spiric
intervention is unlikely to be constructive and could
complicate the EUFOR mandate debate. We realize it is
impossible to prevent Spiric from speaking, but it is
important that his intervention does not go unchallenged by
the U.S. and other UNSC members. With this in mind, we
recommend that the U.S. make the following points on November
15, and urge other members of the UNSC, especially Quint
members, to do the same. First, we strongly support the
HighRep and his October 15 measures. Second, we expect all
Bosnia's political leaders to respect the measures and
implement them. Third, Spiric's intervention constitutes a
personal statement only. It does not constitute the official
view of the Bosnian government or consensus among political
parties that belong to the current governing coalition.
ENGLISH