Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2369
2007-11-02 17:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

Tags:  BK IZ MARR MOPS PREL 
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VZCZCXYZ0025
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #2369 3061735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021735Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7315
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002369 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, IZ, BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

REF: STATE 150164

Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002369

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, IZ, BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

REF: STATE 150164

Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Bosnian state-level institutions remain weak.
Formulation of foreign and security policy is largely an ad
hoc process based on political agreements among ethnic
interests. The statutory framework for national security
decisions is rudimentary or nonexistent. To date, political
support from key political party leaders was critical to
securing the deployment of the six rotations of Bosnian EOD
teams to Iraq. The decision to continue, or suspend, Bosnian
deployments under a post-UNSCR regime would similarly be the
result of political, rather than legal, calculations. If
Bosnia's role in Iraq continues to enjoy political support,
we believe that the Presidency would be inclined to authorize
a continuation of the current deployment regardless of the
legal framework on the ground in Iraq. If support for the
deployment deteriorates, we can expect that the Bosnian
leadership would seek to enact legal protections for Bosnian
forces that could include the conclusion of a bilateral SOFA
with Iraq. Alternately, a new UNSCR, particularly one
authorizing a new Chapter VII mandate, would provide the
political cover necessary to continue Bosnian deployments.

2. (C) Post provides the following assessments of Bosnian
legal provisions governing deployments in the provided
scenarios:

Scenario A: In order to join as a party to an agreement,
standard Bosnian practices governing treaties and
international agreements would apply. The Bosnian Council of
Ministers would first review the agreement and forward its
recommendation to the Presidency. The Presidency would then
approve the agreement and designate a signatory on behalf of
the Bosnian government. The treaty would then be ratified by
both the House of Representatives and House of Peoples would
then be required to ratify the agreement. The Presidency can
elect to have the agreement enter into force at signing,
pending ratification. This process is analogous to Bosnia's
accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Status of Forces
Agreement, which is currently in process. Based on this
experience, we assess that this process would take 4-5
months.

Scenario B: There is no precedent for Bosnia being awarded
"third-party rights" under an existing bilateral agreement.
There does not appear to be any impediment to concluding such
an agreement by a simple exchange of diplomatic notes between
the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the parties.
Alternately, the Presidency could authorize the MFA and
Ministry of Defense to recognize the rights and obligations
of the agreement by executive order.

Scenario C: This scenario involves concluding an agreement,
so the procedures from Scenario A would apply.

Scenario D: This situation seems to mirror the current
provisions governing Bosnia's Iraq deployment. The
deployment itself would be subject to Presidency
authorization and parliamentary approval, but no other legal
action would be required.

ENGLISH