Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2293
2007-10-26 16:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR THE OCTOBER 30-31 PIC

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #2293/01 2991614
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261614Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7276
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002293 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(FOOKS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR THE OCTOBER 30-31 PIC


Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 002293

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(FOOKS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SCENESETTER FOR THE OCTOBER 30-31 PIC


Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik's
ongoing challenge to the authority of the High Representative
represents a serious challenge to U.S. interests and is the
most fundamental challenge to the integrity of the state of
Bosnia and Herzegovina since the signing of Dayton. Kosovo
is never far from the debate and Bosnian Serb leaders,
supported rhetorically from Belgrade, are increasingly
willing to evoke previously taboo linkages. The October PIC
will need to make clear that it fully supports the High
Representative and his decisions and signal clearly that
there will be consequences if Dodik further escalates this
crisis. Russia has staked out a position, opposing use of
the Bonn Powers and pushing for the closure of OHR, that is
incompatible to ours, and Russia promises to play an
unhelpful role at the PIC. This meeting of the PIC will be a
crucial juncture in implementing our core strategic
objectives in Bosnia. It has become clear that we cannot
rely on Europe alone to keep Bosnia whole and moving forward.
U.S. leadership and robust international engagement -- in
the form of a reinvigorated OHR -- are required to get us
there. END SUMMARY

Approaching the Rubicon
--------------


2. (C) Barring an unexpected change of course by Bosnian
Serbs over the October 27-28 weekend, the PIC will meet
during what might become Bosnia's worst political crisis
since Dayton. Though we are working to prevent it, we expect
the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RSNA) to hold a
special session on October 29. Based on the RS leadership's
press comments, we anticipate the RSNA will:

-- Declare the HighRep's October 19 decisions are
unconstitutional, violate Dayton, and create the possibility
that Serbs could be "outvoted" in the Council of Ministers
and Parliamentary Assembly;
-- Threaten the resignation of Bosnian Serb officials from
state level institutions and obstruction in the state
Parliament if the measures are not withdrawn.
-- Call for the abolition of the Bonn Powers;

-- Withdraw RS consent from previous transfers of
competencies to the state, including the decisions forming
the armed forces, the Indirect Taxation Authority, and the
High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council


3. (C) If the RSNA adopts these conclusions, the October PIC
will take place in the wake of a significant escalation by
the RS of its confrontation with the HighRep and the
international community. The conclusions would translate the
anti-Dayton rhetoric of RS political leaders into a formal
policy of opposition to the HighRep and undermining the
state. We anticipate Dodik would claim to be bound by the
conclusions as the "will of the Bosnian Serbs" and have no
choice but to reject the October 19 measures and begin to
enact other RSNA resolutions.

A Note On The HighRep's Measures
--------------


4. (C) Dodik's response to the HighRep's October 19 measures
has been disproportionate to their impact and willfully
disingenuous. The OHR measures essentially require Ministers
and MPs to be present at sessions of Parliament and the
Council of Ministers in order to participate in state-level
decision-making. The measures do not eliminate entity voting
or safeguards protecting the interests of Bosnian Serbs or
any other constituent people. We believe the RS leadership
fully understands this, although they have chosen to
purposefully misrepresent the measures in public. As OHR and
the international community have rebutted specific RS
objections, Dodik and the RS leadership have chosen to
prolong the standoff by raising new ones. Twice the last
week, Lajcak offered Dodik sufficient political cover to end
the confrontation; first during their meeting in Banja Luka,
and second, when OHR provided him with a legal explanation of
the measures, which makes clear purported RS fears are
unfounded. Dodik rejected
both.

What The PIC Must Do
--------------

5. (C) We believe that Dodik's real aim in forcing a
confrontation with the HighRep is to neuter the international
community's influence in Bosnia, which would allow him to
define Bosnia's future, up to and including its dissolution.
It is suggestive that, in addition to attacks on the HighRep,
Dodik's rhetoric has challenged the legitimacy of Bosnia,
disparaged the notion of a Bosnian identity, criticized the
functionality of the state, and trumpeted the efficiency and
functionality of the RS. If we back down in the face of this
kind of challenge, or are seen to lose this confrontation,
the authority of the PIC and the High Representative regime
will crumble. Bosnia's integrity as a functioning state will
not be far behind. The PIC must issue a strong communique
that backs the HighRep and lays down some markers of its own.
It must make clear that Dodik's defiance of the HighRep and
attempts to hold the state hostage to his agenda contravene
Dayton, and will carry consequences.

Managing the Russians
--------------


6. (C) Russia is becoming a serious problem in Bosnia. It
was the only PIC Steering Board country to oppose Lajcak's
October 19 measures. Russian Deputy FM Titov told Lajcak
that he should not use the Bonn Powers and questioned the
future of the Bosnian state. We expect the problems with
Russia to continue at the October PIC. At the October 26
SBA, Russia hinted that it may tabe its own, contrary legal
interpretation of the igh Representative's measures for
discussion. Tough not an ideal outcome, we should be
preparedto accept another footnoted communique, if the
Russians balk at language supporting the HighRep and warning
local politicians against anti-Dayton rhetoric and actions.
Europeans are anxious about antagonizing the Russians prior
to UNSC consideration in November of a resolution extending
the EUFOR mandate. This will complicate our efforts to
present a united front.

Kosovo
--------------


7. (C) Kosovo status has remained a consistent subtext
throughout the confrontation. SNSD Spokesman Rajko Vasic has
revived the option of calling for a referendum on RS status.
Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostinuca's October 25
comments explicitly linking the status of the RS and Kosovo
and the highest priorities of the state have, for the first
time since the beginning of the crisis, prompted Bosniak and
Croat leaders to break their silence and register their
growing concern. If Dodik succeeds in forcing the HighRep
and international community to back down, anti-Dayton,
nationalist forces in Bosnia will grow in strength and
confidence. At the same time, these forces will find it
easier to exploit Kosovo for their own purposes in a
deteriorating political situation, increasing the risk of
instability here and complicating the Kosovo end game. In
other words, we must resist the temptation, strongest among
the Europeans, to put off tough decisions and action in
Bosnia until Kosovo is resolved. These challenges cannot be
sequenced.

Debating OHR's Mission
--------------


8. (C) At the October 19 Steering Board Ambassadors (SBA),
the HighRep said he planned to incorporate a strategic
discussion of OHR's mission in Bosnia into the October PIC.
Lajcak said he would frame the discussion by presenting three
options: 1) accepting the status quo, closing down OHR in
June 2008, and declaring success; 2) keeping an ineffective
OHR open beyond June 2008, or; 3) keeping a proactive OHR
open beyond June 2008, which would ensure Bosnia is a
functional state and is locked it into a self-sustaining path
towards Euro-Atlantic integration. As we have argued for the
last several months, the right answer is the last. This has
been, and, in our view, must remain, our core strategic
objective in Bosnia. U.S. leadership and robust
international engagement -- in the form of a reinvigorated
OHR -- are required to get us there. The last 18 months have
made clear that Bosnian political leaders are either
unwilling or incapable of making the compromises necessary to
secure Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic future, and that the "pull" of
European Union membership by itself is not enough to propel
Bosnia forward.
ENGLISH