BOSNIA - SERBS CONTINUE PLANS TO CONFRONT HIGHREP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002237

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (FOOKS/STINCHCOMB);
NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EU BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SERBS CONTINUE PLANS TO CONFRONT HIGHREP

REF: A. SARAJEVO 2236

B. SARAJEVO 2195

C. SARAJEVO 2041

Classified By: Ambassador Charles L. English for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite intensive public and private
diplomacy over the October 19-21 period, Republika Srpska
(RS) PM Milorad Dodik and other leaders of the Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) still appear determined
to force a confrontation over the HighRep,s October 19 use
of the Bonn Powers to strengthen state institutions. The
SNSD main board delayed a decision to withdraw its
representatives from state-level institutions, but the
party,s rhetorical assault on the HighRep and its misleading
statements about the implications of his measures continued.
Dodik said that he would give the HighRep time to reconsider
his actions, but warned SNSD could withdraw its officials
from the executive branch and its Members of Parliament would
block all legislation, if the HighRep held firm. Dodik also
publicly attacked Assistant Secretary Fried for not
understanding the HighRep,s measures. The HighRep will meet
with Dodik this afternoon in Banja Luka and give him
opportunity to make a graceful exit from the political crisis
RS leaders have created, but the HighRep will not negotiate
with Dodik. Finally, the HighRep told the Ambassador that he
understood the importance of ensuring balance with the next
round of impositions (i.e., those outlined at the October 15
Quint and aimed Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency
Silajdzic),but expressed concern that the Europeans may balk
at plans to announce these on October 26. The Serbs have
chosen unnecessarily but deliberately to make this a
confrontation over the authority of the HighRep. We must be
prepared to meet that challenge. END SUMMARY

Dodik Ratchets Up Rhetoric
--------------


2. (SBU) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and other senior
leaders of the SNSD reacted strongly to measures announced by
High Representative Miroslav Lajcak on October 19. The
measures are designed to facilitate decision-making in
state-level executive and legislative institutions (Ref A).
Dodik has misleadingly claimed that the HighRep,s decisions
alter the constitution and would allow the Bosniaks to
"outvote" the Serbs. Dodik and other SNSD leaders have
indicated publicly and privately that they plan to
aggressively challenge the High Rep. In a series of alarming
press statements on October 19 and 20, Dodik said that the RS
will refuse to recognize the decisions and suggested that OHR
would have to use "armed forces" to implement them. Dodik
convened an extraordinary session of the SNSD main board on
Sunday, October 21 to develop a party response to the
impositions, which he had publicly hinted might include a
decision for all of or some SNSD officials to boycott their
state level posts.

Radmanovic Backs Dodik
--------------


3. (C) Before the SNSD board meeting, the Ambassador spoke by
telephone with Bosnian-Serb member of the Tri-Presidency
Nebojsa Radmanovic to council restraint. The Ambassador urged
Radmanovic to avoid an open conflict between the RS and the
international community. The Ambassador also made clear that
that the United States stood firmly behind the High Rep's
measures, and reiterated points he made to Dodik on October
19 that their sole purpose was to ensure that state-level
institutions were capable of functioning. The Ambassador
noted that the measures did not alter existing rights of
constituent peoples to protect their interests nor did they
change the constitution. Statements from the RS leadership
about the implications of the High Rep,s actions appeared
deliberately misleading, the Ambassador said, adding that it
seemed as if certain elements of the RS and SNSD leadership
were attempting to create an artificial crisis. The
Ambassador said that he hoped SNSD would not take any steps
that would open a "chasm between the RS and the HighRep, and
with it, United States," which would hurt our relationship
and make constructive dialogue difficult.


4. (C) Radmanovic, asserting that he was from the

SARAJEVO 00002237 002 OF 003


"cool-headed" faction of SNSD, responded that "dialogue is
irreplaceable," but complained that the High Rep had closed
off possibilities for "legitimate dialogue." Radmanovic
claimed that Lajcak had "tricked and lied" to him when they
met on Wednesday because the High Rep had failed to brief him
on the measures. (Note: On October 17, the High Rep briefed
members of the Presidency on the broad outlines of OHR,s
"new approach" to Bosnia. OHR briefed party leaders in
greater detail on the specific measures on October 19 before
they were announced. End Note) Radmanovic said that the RS
and SNSD had "never done anything against Dayton and would
not do so now," but stated that SNSD had the right to
interpret the measures from "different angles" and take
appropriate action. When asked directly by the Ambassador if
SNSD would consider boycotting state institutions, Radmanovic
said that any SNSD member could independently elect to do so,
as it would reflect the "will of the people." Radmanovic
closed the conversation by urging that the Ambassador
continue to discuss the issues with him in person later in
the week as "the United States has a key role to play in
Bosnia."

SNSD Board Decides to Give HighRep Time to Reconsider
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) During its October 21 main board session, SNSD voted
to reject the OHR decisions. The SNSD leadership decided to
delay a previously prepared decision to formally withdraw
their representatives from state-level institutions in order
to allow the HighRep time to "reconsider" his measures. In
the meantime, SNSD officials would only "passively"
participate. Declaring that High Representative had
"deprived (RS citizens) of basic human rights," SNSD
announced its intention to collect signatures to authorize
the submission of a case against OHR in the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg. During the main board session,
Dodik offered to resign both his post as party president and
RS Prime Minister if he "was a problem for the RS," but the
party leadership rejected his motion. Following the SNSD
meeting, Dodik continued his confrontational rhetoric,
accusing Lajcak of "destabilizing" Bosnia, adding, "Nobody
should doubt our determination to go to the end with this."
Dodik did back away from earlier comments that indicated a
violent response from Banja Luka, stating, "nobody here even
thinks of taking a sling in their hands, let alone anything
else."

Lajcak: We Must Be Ready for Escalation
--------------


6. (C) At an October 21 dinner with the Ambassador, the
HighRep said that the international community must be ready
for Dodik and the Serbs to escalate the developing
confrontation over the October 19 measures. If the Serbs did
so, Lajcak stressed that the international community could
not back down. Lajcak postulated that the Serbs, aim is to
undercut OHR,s authority and hasten its closure, adding that
this would free them to pursue their anti-state agenda
without regard to the international community,s views.
(Note: Late in the evening, Party for Democratic Progress
President Mladen Ivanic publicly argued as much, observing
that Serbs must challenge the HighRep now to ensure that he
no longer uses the Bonn Powers. End Note) Lajcak confirmed
that he would meet with Dodik in Banja Luka on October 22,
but stressed that he would not negotiate OHR measures with
him. Lajcak noted that Dodik plans to travel to Belgrade
immediately after their meeting, adding somewhat
sarcastically that Russian Deputy FM Titov will be in
Belgrade at the same time. Lajcak speculated that Dodik,s
willingness to press a confrontation might hinge on the
degree of backing for such a course he had from Moscow and
Belgrade.

The Need for Balance and a Question of Timing
--------------


7. (C) Lajcak underscored that he remained committed to
proceeding with the plan he outlined to Quint Political
Directors in Brussels on October 15, but noted that the
Europeans may be reluctant to do so now that the Serbs have
chosen to create a political crisis over his October 19
measures (Note: The Brussels plan called for the HighRep to
impose two additional measures on October 26: a) annulment of

SARAJEVO 00002237 003 OF 003


the RS Law on Security Companies, b) imposition of the Law on
Pharmaceuticals. End Note) Lajcak wondered whether it might
make sense to delay action on both until just before or just
after the October 30-31 Peace Implementation Council (PIC).
The Ambassador underscored that it was important to ensure
balance in OHR,s approach to Bosnia,s political crisis.
Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency had contributed as much
to the radicalization and rising nationalism of Bosnian
politics as Dodik had contributed. The Ambassador noted that
imposition of the Law on Pharmaceuticals was intended to
signal that OHR was prepared to challenge Silajdzic as well
as Dodik.

Dodik Attacked Assistant Secretary Fried
--------------


8. (C) RS Radio and Television (RTRS) broadcast a special,
unscheduled talk show the evening of October 21 and invited
Dodik, Ivanic and Mladen Bosic, President of Serb Democrat
Party (SDS) to discuss the HighRep,s actions. Dodik,
referring to his conversation earlier in the day with
Assistant Secretary Fried, attacked for Fried for supporting
Lajcak after having told Dodik that he had not read the
October 19 measures. He implied that Fried and other
Washington officials did not understand Bosnia or what was
happening here. Dodik also labeled Lajcak a "Muslim field
agent" and said that Lajcak must "correct" the October 19
measures. Ivanic and Bosic generally took an even tougher
line than Dodik and questioned Dodik,s commitment to
defending Serb and RS interests. Ivanic proposed that that
all RS-based parties launch a formal initiative to return
competencies transferred from the entities to the state,
which Dodik endorsed.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Despite the messages we and Washington delivered to
Dodik and other leading Serb politicians over the weekend, it
still appears that Dodik and SNSD are determined to confront
Lajcak and the international community. We, OHR, and key PIC
colleagues are engaged in a vigorous public diplomacy
campaign to a) correct the deliberately misleading statements
from the Serbs about Lajcak,s measures, b) underscore the
international community's support for Lajcak (excepting
Russia),and, c) make clear the costs to the RS of a
confrontation. We are also continuing to deliver strong
private messages to the Serb leadership.


10. (C) It appears that Dodik had been preparing for a strong
confrontation with the HighRep, and with the international
community generally, in the aftermath of the collapse of
police reform. Certainly, all of the country's political
leaders, particularly the Serbs, were anticipating HighRep
actions once police reform failed. PDP's Mladen Ivanic may
have been accurately expressing Dodik's intent when he said
last night that this confrontation with the HighRep was
critical to RS interests -- by showing that the HighRep's
actions could be ignored, the Serbs could, once and for all,
completely neuter the Bonn Powers, preventing their effective
use again. The Serbs have thus raised the stakes in this
confrontation to the point where OHR's room for tactical
maneuver is limited. If we back down, our effort to reassert
the international community's authority -- greatly eroded in
the Schwarz-Schilling era -- will crumble and with it Bosnia
as a functioning state. With this in mind, we should avoid
exchanges with Dodik that could be perceived as a negotiation
over the measures. And we must be prepared for
confrontation, escalating to match what is likely to be
complete Serb intransigence. We are stressing these points
with the High Rep and other Quint Ambassadors, and we will
continue to coordinate closely with them on this issue.
ENGLISH