BOSNIAN DEFENSE LEADERSHIP TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL

S E C R E T SARAJEVO 002142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEFENSE FOR CAGAN, FATA, BEIN
STATE FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS)
EUR/RPM
NSC FOR BRAUN
USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK IZ
SUBJECT: BOSNIAN DEFENSE LEADERSHIP TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL
IRAQ DEPLOYMENTS

REF: SARAJEVO 2047

Classified By: DCM Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) DASD Debra Cagan visited Sarajevo September 28 to
encourage the senior Bosnian defense leadership to augment
their military deployments in support of coalition operations
Iraq. DASD Cagan urged Minister of Defense Selmo Cikotic and
Chief of the Joint Staff LTG Sifet Podzic to deploy an
infantry company for static defense activities in Iraq and
begin training Bosnia,s Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
unit in counter-Improvised Explosive Device (c-IED)
activities. DASD Cagan told both men that the United States
was prepared to provide training and equipment to the Bosnian
Armed Forces if they undertook these activities. Both
Cikotic and Podzic expressed their philosophical support for
these deployments, but cited the shaky political environment
and logistical strains on the Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (AFBiH) as potential roadblocks to their
realization. Both pledged to actively engage on the issue,
and requested further US assistance in making the case to the
political leadership as to the necessity of expanding the
Iraq mission. End Summary.

BOSNIAN TROOPS AS "FORCE MULTIPLIERS"
--------------


2. (S) DASD Cagan met separately with Defense Minister
Cikotic and CHOD LTG Podzic in Sarajevo September 28 to
discuss the possible expansion of the AFBiH's support for
coalition operations in Iraq. DASD Cagan thanked the
Minister and CHOD for Bosnia's contributions to the Iraq
mission to date and told them that she was directly conveying
requests from the White House, Secretary of Defense, and
MNF-I Commander General Petraeus. DASD Cagan said that as
the President had recently stated in his address on the
future of the Iraq mission, coalition partners would be
playing an increasingly significant role in the next stage of
military activities in Iraq. In particular, trusted partners
were needed, DASD Cagan said, to deploy company-sized units
for fixed site security in Iraq. These deployments would be
"force multipliers" for US forces, and allow them to expand
their military efforts across larger areas of Iraq. DASD
Cagan requested that Cikotic and Podzic consider the
deployment within four months of a company- sized unit for
static defense activities.

TIME TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER C-IED
--------------


3. (S) DASD Cagan also requested that the Minister and CHOD
authorize Bosnia,s EOD unit to receive c-IED training that
would allow it to undertake increasingly important activities
for the coalition. DASD Cagan acknowledged that there had
perhaps been a misunderstanding about the risks and scope of
a c-IED mission, and assured Cikotic and Podzic that if
Bosnia ever decided to deploy its forces in an c-IED mission,
every possible effort would be made to mitigate the risk to
the unit. DASD Cagan pointed out that IEDs had become the
single greatest killer of civilians and coalition forces in
both Iraq and Afghanistan, and few allies and partners have
the necessary skills to combat these weapons. If Bosnia were
to develop a c-IED capacity, Cagan said, it would become one
of the US' "premier partners" and prepare itself to offer an
important niche capability to NATO.

TRAINING TO MAKE BOSNIA "STRATEGIC PARTNER"
--------------


4. (S) For both the fixed site security and c-IED activities,
DASD Cagan pledged to provide state of the art training and
equipment to the AFBiH. DASD Cagan pointed out that valued
coalition partners were eligible for substantial military
assistance outside of traditional FMF and IMET programs.
DASD Cagan told both Cikotic and Podzic that she could
arrange the training of the infantry company compatable with
"US standards" as soon as the Bosnia leadership make a
commitment to the deployment. DASD Cagan said that training
company-sized unis would develop the AFBiH into a "strong
strategc partner" of the United States, and would be of
remendous benefit to the Bosnian state. As for c-ED
training, DASD Cagan said that the EOD unit would receive
premier training in the field in the form of a 14 day program
in Kuwait.

CIKOTIC: DEFT POLITICAL MANAGEMENT REQUIRED
--------------


5. (S) In response to DASD Cagan's requests, Minister Cikotic
said that he was committed to making a "meaningful
contribution to the cause of peace in Iraq" and looked for
opportunities to expand the AFBiH's presence on the ground in
Iraq. The Minister said that DASD Cagan had made "very
strong arguments" in support of the infantry deployment and
c-IED training but noted that he faced substantial logistical
and political roadblocks to the activities, realization.
Cikotic said that he had just received a report from the
Joint Staff outlining the AFBiH,s potential deployable
assets in the near-term. Cikotic said that the AFBiH was
currently strained to its limit guarding military properties
that had yet to be returned to the entities, and because of
this fact he the Joint Staff had only recommended deploying
an infantry platoon to either Iraq or Afghanistan by
mid-2008. (Comment. The concern expressed by the Minister on
this count is real. Until the defense property issues are
resolved between the entities and the state, the AFBiH will
continue to be over-extended guarding a multitude of
facilities. All three commanders of the AFBiH,s infantry
brigades told us in our recent visits to their HQs that
nearly all of the soldiers in their command would be on guard
duty until a decision was reached as to which
"non-prospective" property sites would be returned to the
entities. End Comment.) Politically, Cikotic said that a
large deployment could be a tough sell as it would have to
make its way through the Presidency and Parliament in the
current polarized climate. Cikotic said that while he
favored the proposals as outlined by DASD Cagan, his higher
priority remained "sustaining of commitment" to Bosnia,s
overseas deployments and guarding against defense
institutions becoming mired in ethnic politics. Cikotic also
expressed some skepticism that the political will existed to
immediately transition the EOD unit to c-IED duties.


6. (S) In this context, Cikotic at first suggested sticking
with the Joint Staff's recommendation and only seeking the
deployment of an additional platoon to Iraq. Cikotic said
that he thought the platoon could be ready in four months if
the United States was to provide the training. Cikotic also
pointed out that in order to deploy a platoon, an entire
company of 120 men would have to be trained in order to
preserve a functioning program of rotations for the forces.
DASD Cagan again pushed Cikotic to consider the deployment of
an entire company, or at least a "platoon plus" of 50 men.
Cikotic said he would take it under consideration, and
requested that the USG submit a formal request in writing for


both the infantry company and c-IED training that included
DASD Cagan,s "persuasive arguments." Cikotic said that he
would present the proposal to the Presidency, Council of
Ministers and Parliament and advocate on its behalf.

PODZIC: BOSNIA HAS OBLIGATION TO HELP
--------------


7. (S) For his part, Podzic told DASD Cagan that the debt of
gratitude Bosnia owed the United States was immense, and just
as other countries helped Bosnia end and recover from its own
devastating war, Bosnia had an obligation to provide support
to coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Podzic told
DASD Cagan that in his opinion, the AFBiH could provide more
forces to coalition operations than what was included in the
Joint Staff,s recommendations to the Minister. Podzic said
that it was important that all units deployed overseas be
multi-ethnic, as it provided a model for the future
integration of the AFBiH, and he doubted that a multi-ethnic
company could be created in only four months. Podzic did
accept DAO,s suggestion of standing up a multi-ethnic
company from three mono-ethnic platoons as "very interesting"
and a "possible solution." Podzic said he desperately wanted
the training as outlined by DASD Cagan, as it would help on
"the strategic level." Podzic echoed comments by the
Minister to not push for the EOD unit assuming c-IED duties
immediately as it would "frighten politicians," but noted
that he and Cikotic already stood behind approving c-IED
training.

COMMENT: COMPANY A POSSIBILITY, KEY IS MANAGING POLITICS
-------------- --------------


8. (S) DASD Cagan,s visit was a good opportunity for the
senior Bosnian defense leadership to focus their attention on
expanding Bosnia's contributions to coalition operations in
Iraq. Not surprisingly considering their strong pro-American
orientation, both Cikotic and Podzic signaled their
willingness to support DASD Cagan's proposals for an expanded
mission for the AFBiH. Both men were correct, however, to
highlight the potential political difficulties in securing
approval for these missions. We suspect that both Presidents
Komsic and Silajdzic will initially be hesitant to support
such proposals. In our own initial assessment, we are
optimistic that we can gain approval for the fixed site
security mission at the company level, but it will require
our sustained lobbying and engagement. The politics of
c-IED are trickier, considering the perceived level of risk
of that mission.


9. (S) In moving forward, we have a couple of recommendations
as to the best manner by which to achieve the proposals as
outlined by DASD Cagan. Cikotic's request for a letter
outlining the request and providing supporting arguments for
the deployment is a good first step, and we believe that such
a letter should come from an appropriately high-level US
official. We would also recommend that a bilateral between
Cikotic and SecDef be scheduled on the margins of an upcoming
meeting to help the Bosnians get to "yes." Such a meeting
would be of tremendous benefit to our broader security goals
as well, solidifying support for defense rform and
delivering a strong message of US suppor for regional
security, particularly as we reachthe endgame of the Kosovo
final status process. e would also recommend a letter from a
senior Irqi government official, citing the parallels in
nternational efforts to stabilize Bosnia following the war
and Iraq, requesting additional Bosnian help for stability
operations in Iraq. The letter could provide the necessary
political pressure and cover for President Silajdzic to not

block the deployments.


10. (U) DASD Cagan has cleared this cable.
ENGLISH