Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO211
2007-01-30 06:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - DODIK HEARS CLEAR U.S. MESSAGE TO DESIST

Tags:  BK PGOV PINR PREL 
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VZCZCXRO2056
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0211/01 0300633
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300633Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5352
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000211 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK HEARS CLEAR U.S. MESSAGE TO DESIST
FROM DESTABILIZING LANGUAGE ON KOSOVO

REF: A. A) SARAJEVO 199

B. B) SARAJEVO 131

C. C) SARAJEVO 200

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000211

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK HEARS CLEAR U.S. MESSAGE TO DESIST
FROM DESTABILIZING LANGUAGE ON KOSOVO

REF: A. A) SARAJEVO 199

B. B) SARAJEVO 131

C. C) SARAJEVO 200

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: We met with Republika Srpska (RS) Premier
Milorad Dodik January 25 to deliver a stern warning that the
USG had lost patience with his destabilizing rhetoric,
especially on Kosovo status, as well as with press statements
like the recent article in Croatia,s &Globus8 which strike
at Bosnia and Herzegovina,s ethnic harmony or call for the
introduction of a third (Croat) entity for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH). Ambassador told Dodik that if such
rhetoric did not cease, the USG would be forced to support
punitive measures currently under consideration by the Office
of the High Representative (OHR). We also raised concerns
about media freedom in the RS, war crimes issues, and the
economy. Dodik was contrite and said he had received and
understood the message. END SUMMARY.

CLEAR U.S. WARNING
--------------


2. (C) In the course of a two-day visit to Banja Luka, the
Ambassador met RS Premier Milorad Dodik for over one hour
January 25 (REF A). He noted the history of working
relations between the USG and Dodik,s party, warning that
the future of those relations had been placed at risk by
Dodik,s campaign rhetoric on RS status referenda as well as
by implied linkages between Kosovo status and the RS. The
Ambassador stated that the success of the Kosovo status
process and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH
were among the highest policy priorities of the USG in the
Balkans, and statements and actions which placed either at
risk were direct opposition to U.S. policy and would not be
tolerated.


3. (C) The Ambassador made particular reference to remarks
Dodik made in a recent edition of the Croatian periodical
&Globus,8 namely, support for a third (Croat) entity in
BiH, threats to respond to removal by OHR with mass
demonstrations and intimations that Bosniaks were welcome in

Banja Luka, as long as they didn,t rebuild mosques. The
Ambassador told Dodik that such statements were a direct
challenge to the High Representative, were detrimental to the
stability and ethnic harmony in BiH and, most importantly,
had to stop.


4. (SBU) The Ambassador told Dodik that the U.S. had not
pressed as hard as we might have during the BiH election
period, in the expectation that Dodik,s election would be a
net plus for BiH. No such latitude remained. Dodik must
cease and desist from talk of RS status referenda, of Kosovo
status, and from calls for a third entity. If Dodik did not
stop, but rather jeopardized USG policy priorities by
continued inflammatory public statements, the USG would be
forced to support punitive measures currently being
considered by Bosnia,s High Representative Christian
Schwarz-Schilling. The Ambassador told Dodik that the USG
did not seek confrontation -- confrontation that would
jeopardize the foreign investment and economic growth that
were Dodik,s priorities -- but to avoid such a
confrontation, the destabilizing rhetoric had to stop.

DODIK -- NO INTENTION TO COMPLICATE MATTERS
--------------


5. (C) In response, Dodik said that he would rather not have
to think about Kosovo at all, but that as a politician some
topics were difficult to avoid. No matter what the eventual
decision on Kosovo,s future status was, Dodik said he
didn,t see any reason to expect excess. Dodik claimed that
he had never connected calls for an RS referendum to the
issue of Kosovo status, nor had he called for demonstrations
in response to this issue. Here the Ambassador interjected
that Dodik,s frequent promises that the &RS would put down
any demonstrations8 that resulted from Kosovo,s
independence looked like an invitation for BiH Serbs to
oppose the Ahtisaari plan. Dodik said that he took
responsibility for his statements, but felt that the OHR and
the International Community had blown his statements out of
proportion by constantly repeating them. Ambassador also

SARAJEVO 00000211 002 OF 003


warned him that splitting hairs and word games were
inappropriate -- we read the newspapers and had seen for
ourselves Dodik's unacceptable statements.


6. (C) On the issue of Kosovo status itself, Dodik expressed
particular concern for public reaction in the RS and the
region should Kosovo be declared independent outside of the
framework of a UN Security Council Resolution. He also
cautioned against seeking swift BiH recognition of an
independent Kosovo in such a case, warning that it would be
difficult for Serb politicians in BiH to contribute to
consensus on this. The Ambassador noted that it remained the
intention of the USG to seek affirmation of a Kosovo status
settlement via the UN Security Council.


7. (C) Touching on the issue of his relations with the U.S.,
Dodik said that as a politician and a person, he had always
valued good relations with the U.S. and that he tried to
gauge his actions with consideration for how they would be
received there. Dodik said he had no intention to complicate
matters by making destabilizing statements. He added,
however, that he should not be expected to be silent in the
face of personal attacks. Dodik said that he understood the
Ambassador,s message and asked that from now on, concerning
statements, we judge his future behavior and not rehash the
past.

AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES CONCERNS OVER RS BHT BOYCOTT
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) The Ambassador expressed his concern over media
freedom issues in the RS, particularly the RS Government,s
decision to boycott BiH,s nationwide public broadcaster BHT1
(REF B). Asking why everyone had made such a fuss over this
move, Dodik said that the RS Government had decided not to
give statements to BHT1 journalists in response to what he
claimed was the station,s unprofessional conduct and
constant negative coverage of the RS. Dodik said that he had
neither blocked BHT1 from covering RS Government events nor
encouraged citizens to withhold payment of the radio and
television tax, but rather had merely decided that RS
Government representatives would not give direct statements
to this outlet. Dodik said that RS Deputy Prime Minister
Anton Kasipovic would be meeting with newly appointed BHT1
Director Mehmed Agovic and said he hoped the RS Government,s
relations with BHT1 would be &fully normalized8 in the
coming days. Dodik told the Ambassador that it was important
that BHT1 become a more serious media outlet, a public
service for all of BiH,s three constituent peoples. The
Ambassador noted that politicians everywhere disagree with
the presentation and content in media, but that it was
important to use established channels for complaints, like
the BiH Communications Regulatory Agency, rather than to take
steps which limit freedom of the press. (NOTE: At our
insistence, BHT1 journalists were present to cover the
Ambassador,s meeting with Dodik and the press statements
that followed. END NOTE.)

WAR CRIMES ISSUES
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador also addressed aspects of RS Government
action to resolve outstanding war crimes issues. Premier
Dodik said that he planned to meet the wife of fugitive ICTY
indictee Radovan Karadzic early in February, to once again
encourage her to seek his surrender to authorities. Dodik
also said that he had met Esma Palic, widow of Colonel Avdo
Palic, twice since October. Dodik said that Mrs. Palic had
given him several names of persons she wanted included in the
RS Government Commission to uncover the fate of her husband
and that he had included them. Moreover, Dodik said that he
had approved and transferred 100,000 Bosnian Marks to the
Commission for its work.

DODIK ON HIGHWAYS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
--------------


10. (SBU) The interest of several American companies in
investment in the RS was a welcome sign, the Ambassador
noted. In particular, the Ambassador mentioned the interest
of AES (energy),Balkan America (wood products) and General
Electric (railroads) in significant projects in the RS.
Dodik said that he would travel to the European headquarters

SARAJEVO 00000211 003 OF 003


of General Electric in Genoa for meetings January 29 and that
he hoped that GE would take part both in revitalization of
the RS railroads and in work on developing the RS,
hydroelectric power potential.


11. (SBU) Dodik briefly touched on the RS Government,s road
building plans. He said that the RS would finance the
construction of a highway connecting Banja Luka and the BiH
border crossing with Croatia at Gradiska. He added that the
RS had agreed in principle with the Austrian construction
firm Strabag that in exchange for the right to
administer/collect tolls from this well-traveled North-South
route, Strabag would be responsible for building other
highways in the RS, including the East-West connections Banja
Luka-Kupres and Banja Luka Doboj. Dodik told the Ambassador
that while discussions were well advanced with Strabag,
binding contracts had not yet been signed, and that he would
be happy to entertain offers from interested American firms
like Bechtel. On the issue of the Corridor 5-C project,
Dodik said that the RS was prepared to construct those
portions of the Corridor 5-C that crossed RS territory but he
emphasized that all of the work on these sections would be
according to the location, size and quality specifications
set up by BiH state plans for Corridor 5-C.

WARNINGS REAFFIRMED IN ONE-ON-ONE FINALE
--------------


12. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, the Ambassador
asked that note-takers and staff be excused from the room in
order to re-emphasize with Dodik, in private, U.S. warnings
to avoid rhetoric linking Kosovo status and the RS, on RS
status referenda or on a third entity for BiH. The
Ambassador told Dodik that his public statements, including
his recent appearances with Serbian Premier Vojislav
Kostunica, had put him squarely in opposition to U.S.
objectives in the Balkans. The Ambassador repeated his
warning to Dodik to cease and desist from such statements.
Dodik said that he had received and understood the message.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) The Ambassador delivered this message to Dodik
against the backdrop of the BHT1 boycott controversy and the
imminent release of the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo status. It
is important to continue to make these points with Dodik and
other RS politicians so that they are perfectly clear that
Kosovo status is not an issue they should attempt to use for
domestic political gain. The attention of the public, and of
RS politicians, was very much focused on the decision of High
Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling to depart his post
at the conclusion of his mandate in June. The announcement
of Schwarz-Schilling,s June departure, though welcome,
weakens an already weak High Representative, placing more of
a burden on the U.S. in the search both for stability and for
progress on key reforms. END COMMENT.

MCELHANEY
MCELHANEY