Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2080
2007-10-01 16:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - DODIK-SILAJDZIC PROTOCOL ON POLICE REFORM

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL KCRM EU BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3471
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2080/01 2741614
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011614Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7145
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002080 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHOMB);
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM EU BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK-SILAJDZIC PROTOCOL ON POLICE REFORM
NOT GOOD ENOUGH


Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin. Reason 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002080

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHOMB);
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KCRM EU BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK-SILAJDZIC PROTOCOL ON POLICE REFORM
NOT GOOD ENOUGH


Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin. Reason 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Late on Friday, September 28, Republika
Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik and Bosniak Member of the
Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic signed a 3-page "Protocol on
Police Reform." The consensus among Bosnian political
leaders, OHR and other international community
representatives is that the Protocol falls well short of a
deal on police reform. It lacks crucial details and several
provisions are not consistent with EU police reform
principles. Under pressure from Brussels, the HighRep has
given Dodik and Silajdzic the opportunity to "clarify" their
Protocol, and he has also decided to give Bosnian political
leaders "a few more days" to reach a deal that would meet
European requirements. We doubt a genuine deal on police
reform is possible at this point. If the OHR (or the EU)
accepted the Protocol or any other similarly flawed deal, it
would quickly find itself enmeshed in a new set of
negotiations over issues the deal purported to resolve. In
effect, both Silajdzic and Dodik would have been let off the
hook, an outcome we are likely to regret down the road.
Silajdzic would retreat to his familiar uncompromising
rhetorical ground. Dodik would dig in further, having
concluded that if he holds out long enough the international
community will grant him concession after concession. OHR's
credibility would also take yet another hit, perhaps a fatal
one. The police reform stalemate is a symptom of a larger
political problem in Bosnia - political leaders here cannot
or will not reach meaningful compromises on key reforms.
Robust engagement by OHR and the international community
remains necessary to propel Bosnia towards Euro-Atlantic
integration. A bad deal on police reform that emboldens
obstructionist politicians and further weakens the
credibility of OHR and the international community will make
our job harder over the long run. END SUMMARY


Dodik and Silajdzic Reach a "Deal"
--------------


2. (SBU) On September 28, OHR announced that technical talks
on police reform had run their course and that participants
lacked the mandate from political leaders to reach a deal.
Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)
cemented the collapse by submitting amendments to the Lajcak
Protocol that would have institutionalized the RS police as
an administrative unit of the RS Ministry of Interior; a
proposal that violated the first EU principle and was
rejected by all non-Serb parties. (Note: The three EU
principles are 1) All competencies for legislative and budget
issues concerning police must be vested at the State level;
2) No political interference with police operations; and, 3)
Functional local police areas must be determined by technical
policing criteria. End Note) The Party for Democratic Action
(SDA) made a last ditch effort to find a compromise by
announcing it would accept the Lajcak Protocol with "minor
amendments," but in the end, only the two Croat parties
agreed to it as written. Later in the day, OHR received a
fax from the Radon Plaza Hotel containing a 3-page document
signed by Dodik and Silajdzic purporting to be an alternative
police reform deal.

Reading The Fine Print
--------------


3. (C) OHR's assessment is that the "Protocol on Police
Reform" signed by Silajdzic and Dodik describes only a
partial outline of a police model and lacks crucial detail
about the responsibilities, relationships, and legal status
of the elements of the model. According to OHR experts,
several provisions call into question the first EU principle.
For example, the document conspicuously omits any reference
to Local Police Bodies (LPB) as "administrative organizations
of the Bosnian state." The Protocol also fails to specify
where budgetary authority for police would reside. The
Protocol defers and delays to some later date other
controversial points as well, including the territorial
organization of local police areas and the names of the LPBs.
It lacks any timelines for implementation and omits any
reference to transfer of constitutional competencies from the
Entities to the State. OHR's analysis is shared by the
European Police Mission (EUPM),which has been a participant
in police reform negotiations from the beginning.

SARAJEVO 00002080 002 OF 003



Protocol Assailed By Other Parties
--------------


4. (C) Other Bosniak political leaders were quick to
criticize the Dodik-Silajdzic Protocol. SDA President
Sulejman Tihic said that "it offered solutions worse than the
Lajcak Protocol," adding, "no one in SDA would support it."
Social Democratic Party (SDP) Zlatko Lagumdzija publicly
attacked Silajdzic for reaching an agreement that failed to
explicitly provide for a Srebrenica Local Police Area and
claimed the Protocol "legitimized ethnic cleansing."
Lagumdzija told us privately that the Protocol was a
meaningless political document "without any substance
whatsoever," noting that neither Dodik, nor Silajdzic
appeared to have made a concession. SDP member and Croat
member of the Tri-Presidency Zeljko Komsic told OHR that if
the EU accepted the Protocol it would strengthen Silajdzic
and Dodik without bringing any real reform. The two Croat
political parties also expressed reservations, warning that
an agreement required the support of all three constituent
peoples. Only Mladen Ivanic's Party for Democratic Progress
(PDP),which is part of Dodik's governing coalition in Banja
Luka, supported the Dodik-Silajdzic Protocol.

Silajdzic On The Defensive
--------------


5. (C) Both Dodik and Silajdzic spent the weekend claiming
victory, heralding the Protocol as evidence that the two men
could sit down and reach agreement on the crucial issues
confronting Bosnia, and expressing confidence that their
Protocol was sufficient to allow the EU to initial a
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Their
statements about the implications of Protocol for Bosnia's
future policing structure were often at odds, however. Dodik
claimed that the Protocol ensured the continued existence of
the RS police and RS control over the budget; Silajdzic
argued the opposite. With Bosniak political leaders bitterly
divided over the Protocol, Silajdzic found it more difficult
than Dodik to explain away these inconsistencies. During a
September 29 interview with Federation TV, Silajdzic was
repeatedly attacked for conceding too much to Dodik; at one
point the presenter asked Silajdzic if he would resign if the
EU rejected the Protocol. The Mothers of Srebrenica also
turned their sights on Silajdzic, attacking his agreement
with Dodik as "shameful act" that perpetuated an institution
guilty of genocide. As Bosniak opposition mounted over the
weekend, the deal with Dodik looked less like a victory for
Silajdzic and more like a major blunder.

Europeans Vacillate Over Next Steps
--------------


6. (C) Over the weekend, there has been an internal debate
within OHR about how to respond to the Dodik-Silajdzic
Protocol. The HighRep told his staff that it was positive
Dodik and Silajdzic met, but agreed that the outcome was not
a deal consistent with the EU's three principles on police
reform. On September 29, the HighRep decided to ask Dodik
and Silajdzic for clarification on key questions their
Protocol left unresolved. According to several well-placed
OHR staffers, by Sunday, September 30, Lajcak was under
pressure from EC Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn to go
further and assert that the Protocol was evidence that the
"political majority is showing increased willingness to make
progress on police reform." Rehn reportedly told Lajcak that
the EU would sign an SAA with Montenegro and initial an SAA
with Serbia in October and would not want to "leave Bosnia
behind." Lajcak rejected Rehn's approach, but agreed to give
political leaders "a few more days" to reach an agreement on
police reform. (Note: Rehn's approach was not backed by the
EC Ambassador or Quint Ambassadors in Sarajevo. End Note)

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Our assessment is that Dodik and Silajdzic have
produced a document that they hoped would allow them to avoid
blame for police reform's collapse. Neither man appears to
have made a substantive concession, hence the Protocol's
vagueness on so many critical issues. To put it another way,

SARAJEVO 00002080 003 OF 003


the devil is not in the Protocol's details, but in the
absence of any. OHR is right, the Protocol could not provide
a legislative basis for meaningful police reform, which means
still further negotiation would be required, if it were
accepted. The bottom line is that Dodik and Silajdzic have
not really agreed to anything. While initialing an SAA would
certainly be an important milestone for Bosnia, it is
unlikely to transform the country's stubborn ethnic politics.
This is particularly true if it is premised on a
non-existent, non-implementable political compromise that
over the long-term strengthens Dodik, Silajdzic and
anti-Dayton/nationalist forces that have rallied behind them
on this and so many other issues. We must face the fact that
an SAA and the prospect of European Union membership are not
enough to overcome the still deep political differences in
Bosnia or ensure reform here is self-generating. With this
in mind, it will be important for us to continue to press OHR
and our European partners to support appropriate use of the
Bonn Powers to end the political gridlock in government and
get Bosnia back on track.
CEFKIN