Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO2073
2007-09-28 16:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - INITIAL MEETING OF WAR CRIMES RECOVERY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR PHUM ICTY KAWC KJUS MCRM BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1306
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #2073/01 2711643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281643Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0456
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0434
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7138
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002073 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE(STINCOMB) AND S/WCI(LAVINE);
BELGRADE PLEASE PASS TO OPDAT PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM ICTY KAWC KJUS MCRM BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - INITIAL MEETING OF WAR CRIMES RECOVERY
WORKING GROUP DISAPPOINTS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1547

B. SARAJEVO 1403

C. SARAJEVO 1212

D. SARAJEVO 1068

Classified By: Michael J. Murphy. Reason 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002073

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE(STINCOMB) AND S/WCI(LAVINE);
BELGRADE PLEASE PASS TO OPDAT PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM ICTY KAWC KJUS MCRM BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - INITIAL MEETING OF WAR CRIMES RECOVERY
WORKING GROUP DISAPPOINTS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1547

B. SARAJEVO 1403

C. SARAJEVO 1212

D. SARAJEVO 1068

Classified By: Michael J. Murphy. Reason 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The National Strategy for War Crimes Recovery
Working Group met for the first time on September 19. The
Working Group was established by the Ministry of Justice
(MoJ) in the wake of the February International Court Justice
(ICJ) verdict that genocide took place in and around
Srebrenica. It was tasked with drafting an
intra-governmental strategy for dealing with the effects of
war crimes committed in Bosnia during the 1992-1995 conflict.
The strategy is to include a comprehensive set of measures,
both judicial and non-judicial, that would facilitate justice
and reconciliation. If adopted and implemented, it would
diffuse the corrosive impact war crimes issues have on
Bosnian politics and society. Unfortunately, the Working
Group's inaugural session was disappointing. Leaders of
Bosnian judicial institutions failed to focus on the task at
hand. The participation of internationals seconded to the
State Court offers was a bright spot, however. The secondees
have produced a concept paper that they hope will guide
future discussions. If the secondees' efforts to shape the
strategy are backed by the international community, it could
produce a much-needed national approach to war crimes
recovery. END SUMMARY

Background
--------------


2. (C) The ICJ's February verdict that genocide took place in
an around Srebrenica in July 1995 sparked a serious political
crisis over the status of Srebrenica Municipality within the
Republika Srpska (RS). The crisis refocused Bosnian and
international community attention on war crimes issues. As

part of our efforts to address the verdict's political
fallout, we pressed Chief Prosecutor Marinko Jurcevic to
develop and implement guidelines that would assist his office
in prioritizing and selecting war crimes cases for
investigation and prosecution. Jurcevic initially resisted,
claiming that he could not do so until the Bosnian government
had first established a national war crimes strategy (i.e.,
one that dealt with judicial and non-judicial issues
associated with justice and reconciliation). The Office of
the High Representative (OHR) and the international community
supported Jurcevic's proposal, but made clear it was a
supplement to, not a substitute for, prosecution guidelines.
After several months, the Chief Prosecutor is close to
finalizing prosecution guidelines and the Working Group on
War Crimes Recovery is beginning its work.

Jurcevic: Poorly Prepared
--------------


3. (C) On September 19, the National Strategy for War Crimes
Recovery Working Group convened for the first time.
Participants included the State Chief Prosecutor Jurcevic,
State Court President Meddzida Kreso, Head of the High
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) Branko Peric,
Prosecutor's Office Deputy Registrar Toby Cadman as well as
various other lower level officials. Representatives from
OHR, OSCE, UNDP, and the U.S. Embassy also attended. The
MoJ, which created the body and reportedly organized the
meeting, failed to send a representative. Despite the
group's mandate to develop a broad strategy for dealing with
the effects of war crimes and crimes against humanity,
Jurcevic and the MoJ failed to invite representatives from
civil society, including representatives from victims groups,
educators, or cultural and religious leaders. (Comment: Civil
society participation is especially important when discussing
issues such as alternatives to criminal prosecution and
education. End Comment)


4. (C) In addition to failing to bring together the
appropriate participants, the initial meeting was
disorganized and poorly prepared. Jurcevic arrived with no
agenda, materials for discussion, or data for working group
members. Jurcevic also failed to compensate for the lack of
preparation by providing any structured direction to the

SARAJEVO 00002073 002 OF 003


meeting. In his opening remarks, Jurcevic asked for
participants' views about war crimes issues and claimed that
he would not impose his own solutions on the group. He
referred to the political situation several times, noting the
need for consensus and political support for a National
Strategy for War Crimes Recovery and suggesting that the
group should seek Council of Ministers' approval for its
report. In what some interpreted as a transparent effort to
reduce his office's political exposure and workload, Jurcevic
proposed that the Prosecutor's Office should handle a reduced
number of war crimes cases and that an additional state
institution should be created to handle the rest.

Peric: Strategy Needed
--------------


5. (C) Jurcevic's opening remarks had the effect of narrowly
focusing discussion on the question of management of the
large war crimes caseload rather than on broader questions
associated with managing war crimes recovery. Peric accepted
that the State Prosecutor could not possibly resolve all of
the war crimes cases and called for a prosecution strategy to
determine the most serious cases for immediate disposition.
(Note: In other words, Peric called for precisely the type of
prosecution guidelines that the Chief Prosecutor's Office is
already working on, which were not supposed to be the subject
of the recovery working group. End Note) Peric underscored
that time is running out, as both witnesses and perpetrators
are dying. He also emphasized the importance of informing
the public about what is realistically possible regarding
justice and war crimes cases. Peric agreed with Jurcevic that
a National Strategy for War Crimes Recovery must be discussed
at the political level and reviewed by Parliament.

Kreso: Frustration Over Numbers
--------------


6. (C) Judge Kreso expressed concern about the State Court's
limited resources. She was openly critical of the poor
planning for the working group as well as the Chief
Prosecutor's failure to develop war crimes prosecution
guidelines and to compile statistics on war crimes
investigations and case files. This lack of data, Kreso
said, undermines the Court's efforts to develop a strategy
for managing cases. (Note: Jurcevic regularly claims that
there are more than 12,000 potential war crimes cases, but
the Chief Prosecutor's Office has made no attempt to compile
an inventory of cases. Most independent observers, including
international prosecutors seconded to the State Court,
believe the potential case load, though large and probably
unmanageable given the Court's current resources, is much
smaller. End Note)

Cadman: Wake-Up Call
--------------


7. (C) After initial interventions by Bosnian judicial
officials, Cadman sought to focus discussion on the Working
Group's broader mandate. Cadman stated bluntly that there
was no way to process the large number of war crimes cases
and that the Prosecutor's Office must determine which cases
to try and which to refer to entity courts. He added that
the overall goal of the group must be a national strategy
that balances restorative and retributive justice. This
involved more than ensuring that the criminal justice system
played its proper role on war crimes (and was structured to
do so). It could include, inter alia, exploring alternatives
to criminal prosecution, incorporating war crimes issues into
school curricula, providing adequate support to the victims
of war crimes as well as to witnesses in war crimes trials,
and establishing a national War Crimes Documentation Center
or a Center for the Study of Post-Conflict Recovery. Cadman
promised to provide the working group with a concept paper
containing these and other ideas, which they could then use
to frame their future discussions.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) As expected, the inaugural meeting of the Working
Group accomplished nothing substantive. Jurcevic was poorly
prepared, and Jurcevic's Bosnian colleagues preferred to

SARAJEVO 00002073 003 OF 003


focus their interventions on telling him how the Office of
the Prosecutor could better do its job. The tensions among
Jurcevic, Kreso, and Peric could derail efforts to draft a
National Strategy for War Crimes Recovery. Nevertheless, all
is not lost. There was consensus that Bosnia faces a serious
problem regarding war crimes management and a national
strategy is necessary to address it. While Jurcevic is not
likely to drive its development, his staff, particularly the
international secondees, appear to have a keen understanding
of what a strategy must contain and what must be done to
secure it. With the active support of the international
community, the Working Group could produce the much needed
national approach.
CEFKIN