BOSNIA - CROATS SIGN CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 002057

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB);
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - CROATS SIGN CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION

REF: SARAJEVO 1672

Classified By: Political Counselor Michael J. Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (B
) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 21, the leaders of six Croat
political parties finally signed the Croat &Declaration on
Principles of Constitutional Reform.8 The final text is
notably more nationalistic than previous drafts we had seen.
Most notably, the final document includes language on
&territorial discontinuity8 for new middle level governing
units within Bosnia, a clear allusion to the Croat wartime
mini-state, Herceg-Bosna. Public reaction from Serb and
Bosniak leaders to the Declaration has been muted, but both
have been courting Croat support for their own constitutional
reform proposal over recent weeks. Serbs and Bosniaks
looking for clues in the Declaration about which way the
Croats might jump will find both language they can support
and language at odds with their interests. With
constitutional talks increasingly unlikely, the
Declaration,s significance lies in what it may tell us about
Croat politics. First, Croat political leaders were able to
put aside their often bitter differences to agree on a text.
Second, nationalist sentiment among Croats is increasing,
just as it is among Serbs and Bosniaks. END SUMMARY

Croats Sign &All Party8 Constitutional Declaration (Finally)
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2. (SBU) On September 21, after months of debate and missed
deadlines, the leaders of six Croat political parties signed
the Croat &Declaration on Principles of Constitutional
Reform8 (Reftel). Signatories included the presidents of
the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ-BiH),Bosnia,s
largest Croat political party, the Croatian Democratic Union
1990 (HDZ-1990),the Croat Peasants Party (HSS),the Peoples
Party Working for Progress (RzB),the Croatian Party of
Rights-Djapic/Jurisic (HSP-D/J),and the Croat Christian
Democratic Union (HKDU). (Note: The HKDU joined the
negotiations, which began in May, only in the last few weeks.
End Note) The Declaration was signed in the central Bosnian
town of Kresevo, which is home of one of the region,s
largest Bosnian Croat communities. During the negotiations,
several smaller parties had pressed for the Declaration to be
signed outside Herzegovina, where the majority of Bosnia,s
Croats live, in order to demonstrate the parties, concerns
for Croats living in central Bosnia and Posavina.

Final Declaration Focused More Equality of Peoples
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3. (C) The Kresevo Declaration went through several
iterations before assuming its final form. The document
signed by party leaders contains more specifics than earlier
drafts, something the smaller parties pressed for during
negotiations, and its language is more nationalistic as well.
For example, earlier drafts emphasized individual rights and
the rights of constituent peoples, but the Kresevo
Declaration,s emphasis is much more clearly on the
&equality of constituent peoples8 within Bosnia. The
Declaration calls for this principle to be reflected in
Bosnia,s governing structures, including equality of
representation within the executive and judicial branches,
rotation of senior positions among the three constituent
peoples, and consensus decision-making. While the concepts
of parity, rotation and consensus were referenced in earlier
the drafts, the Kresevo language is stronger; it even
recommends ethnic quotas for the legislative branch.

Territorial Discontinuity (read: Herceg Bosna)
-------------- -


4. (C) The final Declaration calls for an end to the current
two entity territorial arrangement, though it calls for
Bosnia to maintain three-levels of government -- state,
middle, and local. Both of these ideas were expressed in
earlier drafts, and the list of criteria for defining the
boundaries of middle level units of government is largely the
same with one important and critical addition. The final
Declaration declares that &territorial discontinuity of
certain units8 should be an option for drawing Bosnia,s new

SARAJEVO 00002057 002 OF 003


internal boundaries. &Territorial discontinuity8 was a
founding principle of Herceg Bosna, the war-time Bosnian
Croat mini-state. When we spoke with Croat party
representatives in August, it was clear that many had such an
entity in mind when drafting the declaration, but only the
smaller parties were pressing for a specific reference to
&territorial discontinuity8 in the declaration. That the
two HDZs have agreed in the end to include a specific
reference to it in the final declaration probably reflects
hardening nationalist sentiment among the Croat general
public rather than a decline in the larger parties,
political power relative to the small parties.

Serb and Bosniak Reactions Muted
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5. (C) The public reactions from Serb and Bosniak political
leaders to the Kresevo Declaration were muted. Republika
Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik commented only that the
declaration &lacks details.8 Several observes speculated
that Dodik,s &subdued8 reaction may reflect concern about
the Kresevo Declaration,s call for abolishing the two
entities, but in our private exchanges with them, most Croat
party representatives have implied their bottom-line was a
Croat federal unit within Bosnia, an outcome that did not
preclude the RS as a federal unit. We suspect Dodik has
received similar messages from Croat leaders. Bosniak member
of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic stressed that ethnicity
should not drive new constitutional arrangements, adding that
creation of a third entity would harm Croat interests.
Silajdzic,s Legal Advisor Damir Arnaut added that it would
be better if one of the new middle levels of government
encompassed the Posavina region (i.e., the current Posavina
Canton and those municipalities from historic Posavina that
are now part of the RS).

Something for Serbs and Bosniaks
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6. (C) A major impetus behind the Kresevo Declaration were
concerns among leading Croats, particularly the Catholic
Church, that splits among Croat political parties going into
this fall,s anticipated constitutional reform talks would
limit Croat leverage at the negotiating table. (Note: The
HighRep has said that the international community will not
take up constitutional reform if police reform fails, which
appears likely. End Note) As Croat positions converged during
negotiations over the declaration, both the Serbs and the
Bosniaks have sought to secure Croat support for their
constitutional reform positions. Dodik has been the most
aggressive suitor, publicly supporting creation of a
Croat-dominated federal unit in Bosnia. Haris Silajdzic and
Sulejman Tihic, President of the Party for Democratic Action
(SDA),have consulted with Croat leaders about their
&Bosniak Platform for Constitutional Reform,8 which they
expect to complete soon.


7. (C) The Kresevo Declaration contains language that Serbs
and Bosniaks could each interpret as evidence that Croats
would side with them during constitutional reform talks. The
Serbs will welcome the Declaration,s emphasis on constituent
peoples, their rights, and the importance of equality of
rights among constituent peoples; its call for a
decentralized state with a strong middle level of government;
and the proposal to create a Sarajevo District, which
Bosniaks generally read as code for dividing the country into
three ethnic-based entities. The Bosniaks will welcome the
Declaration,s criticism of the country,s current two entity
structure and its calls for an entirely new constitution
rather than amendments to the Dayton constitution.


Comment
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8. (C) In 2000, Croats issued the Novi Travnik Declaration,
an uncompromising nationalistic document that essentially
launched the third entity movement. As we noted in the past,
Croats have learned since 2001 that they must repackage their
nationalist agenda in more politically acceptable language.
The Kresevo Declaration appears to us to be an attempt to do

SARAJEVO 00002057 003 OF 003


that. It is significant that bitter political rivals Dragan
Covic, President of HDZ, and Bozo Lubic, President of
HDZ-1990, could agree on the Declaration,s text. We do not
think it heralds a merger of the two parties, but it does
suggest both men wanted to ensure that Serbs and Bosniaks do
not set the agenda for future constitutional reform talks at
the expense of Croats. The decision to include language on
territorial discontinuity in the final text, the
Declaration,s most overt appeal to Croat nationalism,
underscores arguments we have made previously, namely that
the nationalist rhetoric of Dodik and Silajdzic, has
emboldened Croats to challenge Dayton as well.
CEFKIN