SCENESETTER FOR DASD CAGAN VISIT TO SARAJEVO

S E C R E T SARAJEVO 002047

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN; STATE FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE
(HOH, FOOKS); EUR/RPM; NSC FOR BRAUN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN;
TIRANA PLEASE PASS TO CAGAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PINR BK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DASD CAGAN VISIT TO SARAJEVO
SEPTEMBER 28

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1584

B. SARAJEVO 1929

Classified By: CDA Judith Cefkin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. Bosnia has provided valuable assistance to
coalition operations in Iraq over the past two years with the
deployment of its Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit.
After the visit of DAS Butler (Reftel A),we secured approval
from civilian and military officials at the Ministry of
Defense to provide the EOD unit with counter-Improvised
Explosive Device (c-IED) training, which would prepare the
EOD unit to take on an expand IED mission should the
coalition authorities in Iraq believe it necessary. We have
also reiterated that the coalition authorities may request
that the AFBiH provide security for the UN at its Baghdad
headquarters. Minister of Defense Cikotic and CHOD LTG
Podzic are personally committed to greater Bosnian
participation in both the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, but
the deteriorating political climate here will make it more
difficult to secure political support for either a change in
the current EOD mission or an additional large-scale
deployment. An expanded EOD mission or new deployment would
require approval by the Presidency and the Parliament, and
neither would be a sure thing. In order to maximize the
prospects for securing additional Bosnian commitments, we
must have clear priorities about requirements before
presenting any formal requests to the Bosnian government.
End Summary.

IRAQ: BOSNIAN BOOTS ON THE GROUND FOR OVER TWO YEARS
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2. (S) The sixth rotation of Bosnia's EOD unit departed for
Iraq September 24. When the rotation finishes its mission
next spring, the EOD unit will have been deployed in Iraq for
nearly three years. While our successful advocacy to extend
the mandate of the previous rotation initially met stiff
political resistance, primarily from President Haris
Silajdzic, opposition to the EOD unit's deployment has
subsided. In a well-publicized trip, all three Presidency
members visited the Bosnian troops at Camp Echo in Iraq in
May. At the time they told us that they would look favorably
on extending the deployment's mandate through the end of 2008
to allow for a seventh rotation. Continued Bosnian government
support for coalition operations remains one of our highest
priorities.

TRAINING FOR OF C-IED
--------------


3. (S) After the visit of DAS Butler, we encouraged MOD
Cikotic and LTG Podzic to authorize c-IED training for the
EOD unit, explaining it as an opportunity to develop an
important niche capability that might be needed in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and future coalition missions. Cikotic and
Podzic, consistently strong allies of our bi-lateral security
agenda, agreed to authorize the training, but stressed that
it could not be directly tied any change of mission in Iraq.
After looking into the issue, both agreed that c-IED
activities would be a substantive change of mission for the
EOD unit, and would require Presidency and Parliamentary
approval. (Note: At the time of DAS Butler,s visit, Cikotic
was unsure about this request. End Note.) Cikotic and Podzic
pointed out that the level of risk associated with a c-IED
mission, particularly the possibility of casualties, could
draw political opposition; hence our decision to focus now on
training only.

UN GREEN ZONE PROTECTION
--------------


4. (S) We also continued our informal conversations with
Cikotic and Podzic about the potential deployment of an
infantry company to Iraq to fulfill the UN request for

coalition security forces at its Baghdad headquarters. Both
Cikotic and Podzic told us that this mission would be
feasible. However, they noted that it would take time to
stand-up and train an appropriate multiethnic unit to perform
the mission. Cikotic and Podzic would need to create a new
multiethnic company from Bosnia's nine infantry battalions,
which remain ethnically segregated. (Note: We agree with
their assessment that this would be the best way to meet a
formal request from coalition authorities in Baghdad. End
Note).

UNCERTAIN POLITICS OF DEPLOYMENTS
--------------


5. (C) Following up on DAS Butler,s visit, we raised
informally the possibility of the expanding the EOD,s c-IED
mission and a UN Protection mission with Presidency members
and their senior staff. Based on these conversations, we
believe that both Presidents Komsic and Silajdzic would
initially balk at approving the c-IED mission. President
Komsic also expressed some hesitance about the UN Green Zone
deployment. Both men are concerned about the prospect of
casualties. The reactions of both Komsic and Silajdzic
suggest that securing Presidency approval for a more robust
Bosnian role in Iraq would be difficult in the best political
circumstances. Bosnia,s deteriorating political environment
exacerbates the challenge. It is easy to imagine any
deployment becoming mired in the ugly ethnic politics that
have become the norm.

MATERIAL SUPPORT
--------------


6. (C) Bosnia maintains a large stockpile of surplus arms,
ammunition and weapons systems. While the state-level and
entity governments would certainly prefer to sell these
items, we have pushed them to consider donating some of the
surplus items to Iraqi and Afghan security forces. We have
discussed the possibility of donating surplus M84 tanks to
Iraq with Minister Cikotic (Reftel B),and seek additional
guidance as to how to proceed on this issue. We should also
be looking for further opportunities to donate surplus items
to the Iraqi and Afghan governments, which has the added
benefit of removing potentially dangerous items from what
remains an unstable region.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Bosnia has developed into a reliable security partner
for the United States. Despite simultaneously undertaking
comprehensive defense reform, Bosnia has provided important
support to coalition operations. We want to see Bosnia
continue to develop its capacity to "export security" and
have quietly encouraged the Bosnian government to consider
additional missions it might undertake to support coalition
operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. We look forward to
welcoming DASD Cagan to Sarajevo, and see her visit as an
opportunity to advance USG objectives in Bosnia. However,
given the deteriorating political environment here and the
controversial nature of additional missions in Iraq, we must
proceed carefully. The Bosnians will want a clear
explanation of deployment priorities, and the risks
associated with them. We believe that we have an opportunity
in the near-term to shape Bosnia,s overseas deployments for
the next several years, and we should take this opportunity
to develop a set of deployment priorities consistent with the
AFBiH,s expanding capacities, but cognizant of the political
dynamics here.
CEFKIN