Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1999
2007-09-20 08:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - DEFENSE REFORM PROGRESSES BUT

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR BK 
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VZCZCXYZ0020
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #1999/01 2630851
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200851Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7070
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0451
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0430
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0161
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 001999 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS),EUR/RPM;
DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN; NSC FOR BRAUN: NAPLES FOR ADMIRAL
ULRICH, AMBASSADOR CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DEFENSE REFORM PROGRESSES BUT
DETERIORIATING POLITICAL SITUATION COULD JEOPARDIZE GAINS

REF: A. 06 SARAJEVO 2259

B. SARAJEVO 1563

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 001999

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS),EUR/RPM;
DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN; NSC FOR BRAUN: NAPLES FOR ADMIRAL
ULRICH, AMBASSADOR CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DEFENSE REFORM PROGRESSES BUT
DETERIORIATING POLITICAL SITUATION COULD JEOPARDIZE GAINS

REF: A. 06 SARAJEVO 2259

B. SARAJEVO 1563

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During the past six months, Bosnia has made
important progress in defense reform. Defense Minister Selmo
Cikotic and his senior deputies have demonstrated that they
are committed to reforms and moved quickly to fill the
leadership vacuum that existed at the Ministry of Defense
(MoD) in the months following the October 2006 elections.
The Ministry and the Bosnian Armed Forces (ABiH) completed
the long-delayed personnel selection process and both
institutions are nearing full strength. The ABiH force
structure has been largely stood up, and most new units have
been manned and moved to their home bases. For the most
part, defense reform has not been the subject of bitter
ethnic political debates that have paralyzed most other
reforms, which has provided Cikotic and his team the space
they need to make progress. Defense reform is by no means
complete, however. Defense property issues remain
unresolved, and recent visits to the new infantry brigades'
headquarters highlighted the negative consequences this is
having for the Armed Forces. Over the longer-term, Bosnia
will have to re-evaluate the military's force structure, and
develop a more rational, stream-lined force based on what the
state can actually afford rather than on the need to balance
competing ethnic interests. U.S. engagement and influence
remain crucial to ensuring defense reform remains on track.
We will continue to try and insulate defense issues from the
wider political tumult in Bosnia, but if the situation
continues to deteriorate, it is unlikely that defense reform
will remain immune from the bitter ethnic politics that have
plagued Bosnia over the last 18 months. END SUMMARY

GOOD TEAM AT MOD
--------------


2. (C) Minister of Defense Cikotic has proven himself a

competent and dedicated proponent of defense reform and adept
at managing the challenges attendant to operating in a
rapidly deteriorating political environment. He is a strong
supporter of the U.S. and NATO, and he shares our vision of a
multiethnic Bosnian Armed Forces integrated into the Atlantic
Alliance. Ministry employees have praised Cikotic's
management style, which includes regular planning meetings
for all Ministry senior staff -- something that had
previously never occurred. Deputy Defense Minister Igor
Crnadak, who will soon also be formally appointed as Bosnia's
first "NATO Coordinator," has also been impressive. On his
own initiative, he has begun drafting strategic policy
guidelines on important defense issues such as Bosnia's
overseas deployments and procedures for the disposal of
surplus small arms and light weapons. The joint staff, under
LTG Podzic's leadership, continues to provide effective
guidance to the Armed Forces, and our conversations with
senior military leaders indicate that morale and the
commitment to reform remains high within this group.

REACHING FULL STRENGTH
--------------


3. (C) Under Cikotic's leadership, defense reform, which
stalled following the October 2006 elections, has regained
its forward momentum in recent months. The MoD made progress
hiring civilian personnel, and the Ministry should be at
close to full-staffing by the end of September. Former
entity defense officials were given preference during the
hiring process. Though not all of these are as committed to
our vision of a multiethnic defense establishment as we would
like, overall the new staff enhances the MoD's operational
effectiveness. Some important jobs, particularly those
dealing with NATO and other international cooperation issues,
remain unfilled, but Crnadak's commitment to the PfP/NATO
process is enough to overcome these gaps in the short-term.
The Bosnian Armed Forces has nearly completed filling out its
new force structure, with the new units manned and stationed
at their home bases. Most of the units, with their
multiethnic command structures, have been declared
"operational." The new forces were put to their first test
this summer in assisting local authorities in extinguishing
the forest fires that raged across southeastern Bosnia.
While the response of state and local officials to the fires
has been widely criticized, the Armed Forces acquitted
themselves admirably and is regarded as the only institution
to effectively respond to the crisis.

NOT A POLITICAL FOCUS FOR NOW
--------------


4. (C) For the most part, defense reform is not the hot
button political issue it once was, and thus far, defense
reform issues have not been caught up in the nasty ethnic
politics we have seen over the last 18 months. Recent
comments from RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik aside,
political leaders appear to accept the necessity of defense
reforms as key to Bosnia's accession into Euro-Atlantic
institutions. (Note: Dodik recently attacked the Bosnian Army
as a "NATO force" and implicitly demeaned those serving in
it. We made clear to Bosnian Serb political leaders that
this kind of attack on one of the most successful post-Dayton
reforms was unacceptable. End Note) Minister Cikotic recently
told us that he preferred it when leading politicians
"ignored" his work, since it provided him the political space
and opportunity he needed to complete defense reform and keep
it insulated from the divisive political climate here. Major
General Dragan Vukovic, Commander of the Armed Forces Support
Command in Banja Luka, told us he had noticed a change in the
past year in the positions of senior RS officials vis-a-vis
defense reform. For the first time since the reforms were
adopted, Vukovic said that he no longer felt any political
pressure from Banja Luka on defense issues.

REAL CHANGE ON THE GROUND
--------------


5. (C) One year after similar trips made by the Ambassador
(Ref A),we visited the headquarters of the three infantry
brigades and the main military training facility in late
August and early September. In our visits and discussions
with the brigade commanders in Capljina, Tuzla and Banja
Luka, and at the training facility in Manjaca, we were
impressed by the strides made by the ABiH. (Note: Each
infantry brigade consists of three mono-ethnic infantry
battalions, one Bosnian-Serb, Croat, and Bosniak. End Note.)
Unlike last year, all soldiers were wearing the appropriate
Bosnian military uniform instead of the old entity variety
and all insignia and other designations of the former entity
armies had been removed from the bases. The units themselves
had been stood up and were at approximately 80% of their
projected manpower. The shortfall was due primarily to a
lack of Bosnian-Croat recruits. All the brigades' commanding
generals told us that they had not had any ethnic problems in
their units' integrated command elements, an assertion backed
up by their staffs. In one exchange, Brigadier General
Mirsad Gutic, the Bosniak commander of the Fifth Infantry
Brigade in Tuzla, asked his Bosnian-Serb Chief of Staff to
share his views about ethnic relations and his move from
Bijelina to Tuzla. Gutic then left the room so his Chief of
Staff could speak freely. The Chief of Staff confessed that
he had been apprehensive about leaving the RS, but confirmed
that his fears had been unfounded, and that he had been
well-received. He commented that ironically it was the Armed
Forces that had made the most progress with ethnic
reconciliation.

DEFENSE PROPERTY UNDERMINES ARMED FORCES
--------------


6. (C) The visits also exposed the adverse effect that the
failure to resolve the defense property issues was having on
the Armed Forces. Defense property remains the largest
unfinished element of defense reform, with the entities and
state yet to develop a binding property transfer agreement
following July's political agreement (reftel B). All three
brigade commanders told us that while their units are
"operational," the brigades were stretched thin guarding
defense related sites that may or may not be transferred to
the state. General Ante Jelic, the commander of the 4th
Brigade in Capljina, told us that nearly all the men under
his command, including cooks and drivers, were currently
engaged in guarding such sites, and that they would have to
do so until a legal transfer arrangement was reached that
released control of unwanted sites to the entities. In
addition, unresolved property issues affected units' ability
to meet their logistical needs. Under the new force
structure, the main combat training facility was located in
Manjaca in the RS. The commander at Manjaca told us that he
was unable to get needed supplies from the former Federation
training facility in Glamoc. According to the commander, no
senior military official was willing to sign an order
transferring equipment across the entity boundary line in the
absence of a formal, legally binding transfer agreement.

NEED FOR A "RATIONAL," NOT "POLITICAL," FORCE STRUCTURE
-------------- --------------


7. (C) In Banja Luka, we met with Major General Dragan
Vukovic, the commander of the Support Command. Vukovic told
us that he believed the military had met or exceeded the most
optimistic expectations with regards to standing up its force
structure and implementing other elements of defense reform.
Nonetheless, Vukovic said that the current force structure
was not sustainable for the long-term, noting that it made
little sense for a country the size of Bosnia to maintain
three combat infantry brigades. He stressed that the
decision to have three infantry brigades, one each based in
traditional Bosniak, Serb and Croat areas, was political, not
based on bottom-up review of the country's defense
requirements. Vukovic said that the Bosnian leadership would
eventually have to look at cutting the force to a level that
would be affordable. Vukovic noted that the Armed Forces
currently used over 80% of the defense budget for salaries,
and little additional resources for basic maintenance,
facility upgrades or deployments. Even if Bosnia raised
defense expenditures to 2% of GDP, the NATO standard, it
would still leave the Armed Forces starved of resources. In
his view, Bosnia needed only one infantry brigade and should
maintain a force of 5-6,000 active duty soldiers,
approximately 60% the size of the current force.

COMMENT: US INVESTMENT PAYS OFF, BUT VIGILANCE REQUIRED
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Eighteen months after the Law on Defense went into
effect, we are seeing concrete progress on defense reform.
Under the able leadership of Minister Cikotic and his chief
civilian and military deputies, one single Armed Forces has
been formally stood up and is operational, and the country is
moving closer to NATO. These accomplishments are impressive
given the deteriorating political climate in Bosnia. We have
worked hard to ensure defense issues reamin insulated from
the current political fray and have provided strong support
to Cikotic and his team. This support and our continued
engagement remain critical to keeping the defense reform
process on track. In particular, we must continue to push
the political leadership to complete the transfer of defense
properties, since further delays directly impact the Armed
Forces' capacity to fulfill its missions. General Vukovic's
observations about Bosnia's force structure are valid, and
over the long-term, and hard choices will have to bring the
force structure in line with the country's budgetary
realities. We should expect to assist in the development of
such a leaner, more rational force. In the near-term, we
need to focus on keeping the rising nationalism from
infecting the MoD and Armed Forces. However, if the
situation here deteriorates too much, that may not be
possible. The MoD and Armed Forces are post-Dayton success
stories, but they remain fragile institutions and works in
progress. A sustained effort to undermine their legitimacy
or effectiveness would likely prove successful.
MCELHANEY