BOSNIA - LAJCAK DELIVERS POLICE REFORM STRATEGY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001987

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PINR EUN UN RS BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - LAJCAK DELIVERS POLICE REFORM STRATEGY TO
QUINT AMBASSADORS

REF: SARAJEVO 1872

Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: High Representative Miroslav Lajcak presented
to Quint Ambassadors on September 18 his strategy for
securing a deal on police reform. OHR will continue with
technical talks on police reform while maintaining political
pressure on party leaders to compromise. After a two-hour
meeting on September 17, Lajcak doubts Bosniak Member of the
Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic is prepared to compromise.
However, he told Quint Ambassadors that senior members of the
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) have signaled to OHR staff
that party President Sulejman Tihic may be prepared to break
with Silajdzic on police reform. With this in mind, Lajcak
will spend the next two weeks trying to isolate Silajdzic and
urging Tihic and Dodik to reach a deal on police reform.
Lajcak characterized this approach as the "last chance" for a
deal before October and said if it failed, he was not
prepared to continue with business as usual in Bosnia,
commenting that he "refused to be a spectator here." He
presented Quint Ambassadors with a non-paper detailing his
plans for the police reform end game and asked them to share
it with Political Directors prior to the September 19 Quint
meeting in London (see paragraph EIGHT below). On a separate
issue, Lajcak reported that the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia
had told him that his government opposed Bosnian entry to
NATO and was determined to see OHR close in June 2008. END
SUMMARY

Ongoing Technical Police Reform Talks
--------------


2. (C) Lajcak opened his meeting with Quint Ambassadors by
offering a somewhat positive assessment of the ongoing
technical talks on police reform. The session held today
(September 18) had been more constructive than the initial
exchanges on September 12, he claimed. Lajcak said that the
Croats, particularly HDZ-BiH representative Minister of
Justice Barisa Colak, have been helpful in promoting
consensus, while SNSD representative RS Minister of Interior
Stanislav Cadjo was slightly more constructive this week than
last. The biggest problem remained the SBiH representatives,
Damir Arnaut and Sejfudin Hodzic, both of whom are on
Silajdzic's staff and are not SBiH members. (Comment: We have
a representative at the talks. While we share Lajcak's view
about the unhelpful approach taken by Arnaut and Hodzic, our
appraisal of today's talks is less sanguine than OHR's For
example, after an hour of discussion, the group was unable to
reach consensus on an issue as minor as a central law
enforcement database. End Comment)


3. (C) OHR plans to continue the talks next week with
sessions scheduled for September 24 in Sarajevo and September
27 in Banja Luka. (Note: The Serbs have complained about
traveling to Sarajevo for them. End Note.) These might be
followed by a round of talks in Mostar as well. The talks
will continue to focus on less contentious issues before
turning toward more politically charged issues involving
budgeting and the name of the RS police. Lajcak does not
believe that the technical talks will bear any results by
October 1, but what happens next is unclear. At one point,
Lajcak told Quint Ambassadors that the European Commission
had approved a two-week extension of the talks, but he later
claimed there would be no extension. Instead, he would make
a statement on October 1 noting that OHR/EUSR remained ready
to facilitate talks, but would no longer make police reform a
priority because the parties had demonstrated that they were
not willing to engage seriously or constructively. He would
also announce that there would be no constitutional reform
talks this fall and that OHR would turn its attention to
outstanding Dayton implementation issues.

Plan to Separate Tihic from Silajdzic
--------------


4. (C) Lajcak told Quint Ambassadors that he had met with
Silajdzic on September 17 for two hours to discuss police
reform. Lajcak left the meeting convinced that Silajdzic
will never support a police reform deal. Silajdzic
repeatedly claimed that he was ready to deal with technical
issues, but each time Lajcak raised one, Silajdzic responded

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with his traditional rhetoric about the RS and Dodik. On the
other hand, Lajcak informed Quint Ambassadors that senior
members of SDA had signaled to his staff that the party might
be prepared to break with Silajdzic over police reform.
According to OHR staff, senior SDA figures had expressed
concern about the appearance that their party was nothing
more than a shill for Silajdzic and his agenda. They did not
want to be blamed for blocking Bosnia's path towards
Euro-Atlantic integration. With this in mind, Lajcak wants
to try and persuade SDA President Sulejman Tihic to break
with Silajdzic.


5. (C) Based on OHR analysis, Lajcak believes Tihic can be
convinced to abandon Silajdzic if four conditions are met.
First, Tihic will want guarantees that he will not be
criticized within the SDA for shifting his position on police
reform. Second, Tihic will want overt political support for
his decision from the Head of the Islamic Community
Reisu-l-Ulema Mustafa effendi Ceric as well as Dnevni Avaz
owner Fahrudin Radoncic. Third, Tihic will want public
acknowledgment and support from the international community.
Fourth, OHR and the international community press for a split
with Silajdzic on police reform only. As part of this
strategy, Lajcak said that OHR plans to use SDA's membership
in the European People's Party to pressure Bosnian SDA
members and Tihic to deal on police reform. Lajcak
maintained that Tihic could reach a deal with Dodik if he had
such political cover, though he conceded that Dodik might
balk given his previous Serb refusals (other than on March
14) to finalize a police reform deal.

Additional IC Lobbying required
--------------


6. (C) Lajcak told Quint Ambassadors that he will deliver
speeches on police reform over the next two weeks to the RS
National Assembly and the Federation Parliament. Lajcak
believes that political leaders are already under
considerable pressure to compromise from the public and the
media and his speeches will be calculated to ratchet up that
pressure. (Comment: We do not share OHR's assessment that
political leaders are in danger of any public backlash if
they fail to reach a police reform deal. End Comment).
Lajcak asked individual Quint Ambassadors to conduct
bi-lateral meetings on police reform and asked the U.S. to
approach Dodik and Tihic. Lajcak also related that the
European Union would not drop police reform as a condition
for signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement.
Lajcak noted that Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj has proposed
to several EU capitals that the political leaders be allowed
to sign a political declaration on police reform instead of
concluding a deal; Lajcak asked the UK, German, Italian and
French Ambassadors to make clear to Silajdzic and Alkalaj
that this was unacceptable.

Non-Paper on Next Steps Should Police Reform Fail
-------------- --------------


7. (C) In the face of tough question from Ambassadors, Lajcak
conceded that the prospects for a police reform deal were
slim, but that he wanted to make one last push before
abandoning OHR's most recent effort. If talks failed, Lajcak
stressed that OHR and the international community would have
to change its approach to Bosnia. "Business as usual" was
not an option, he said, adding that he "would not remain in
Bosnia as a spectator or lame duck." He presented the Quint
Ambassadors with a non-paper outlining some of his
assumptions and conclusions related to police reform and the
way ahead and asked that they share it with their Political
Directors prior to the September Quint meeting in London. He
asked for their strong support for his strategy for the next
two weeks and any actions he might take over the next several
weeks.


8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER:

BIH - POLICE REFORM AND WAY AHEAD

ASSUMPTION:

-- There is a significant risk that the talks on police
reform will not be successful by end September despite the

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best efforts of OHR/EUSR and the broader IC.

-- There is no alternative to the approach taken by HR/EUSR
Lajcak. There is no other proposal that could serve as the
basis for agreement and none that would stand any chance of
being adopted by all three parliaments (state and entity).

-- Police reform as a precondition to the initialing/signing
of the SAA will not be dropped by EU Institutions and EU
Member States.

-- The BiH municipal elections in October 2008 will not
improve the atmosphere for police reform in BiH.

-- There are a considerable number of outstanding Dayton
implementation issues that are time-critical, that have been
pending during the focus on police reform.

CONCLUSIONS:

-- OHR/EUSR will do its best to facilitate an agreement by
end September. In support of these efforts and to underline
what is at stake, support from Embassies is requested in
lobbying key players.

-- While it is clear that SBIH will not change its position,
we assess we may be able to exert pressure on SDA and SNSD to
support the Protocol.

-- At the same time, OHR/EUSR and the wider IC must be fully
prepared for a possible failure of the negotiation effort.

-- If one or several parties block adoption of an agreement,
HR/EUSR will choose a mechanism to highlight who specifically
carries responsibility. HR/EUSR will highlight that he is
working to mediate an agreement, but that an agreement cannot
be reached without political will of local politicians. It
must be clear for the citizens of BiH and also for IC that
the politicians are responsible for the failure of the Police
reform and not signing the SAA.

-- If the negotiation effort does fail at the end of
September, there must be an immediate reaction by the IC.
The goal would be to increase pressure on the parties with a
view to reaching agreement prior to publication of the
Commission's Progress Report (early November).

-- If there is no negotiated resolution on police reform, we
assess that there is no chance of an agreement on
constitutional change or any other state-building issue. We
can expect a deterioration of the political climate,
especially in the light of any Kosovo Final Status
settlement. OHR would therefore move to focus on outstanding
issues aimed at strengthening the state and fully
implementing the Dayton Agreement.

-- OHR would need to be backed up strongly by Brussels and
the PIC, particularly the Quint. There is a significant
chance that such a strategy would need to involve use of the
Bonn Powers, given likely non-agreement or compliance on the
part of one or more groups of politicians.

-- We aim to produce a strategy aimed at gradually asserting
OHR's authority and tackling these issues in turn. We would
start with low risk issues and build up to outstanding issues
that we assess a higher risk.

-- We will share a detailed issues paper in the coming weeks,
and will ask for your support well in advance of any action.

-- In parallel, HR/EUSR would continue to highlight the
European perspective for BiH and the need for political
parties to conclude the SAA. HR/EUSR would aim to seek an
agreement on police reform as soon as the political
conditions allow it.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER

A Short Note on the Russians
--------------


9. (C) Following the exchange on police reform, Lajcak

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reported that he met recently with the Russian Ambassador to
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian Ambassador had told him that
while Russia supports Bosnia's entry into the EU, it opposes
Bosnian membership in NATO. The Russian Ambassador blamed
Silajdzic alone for the failure of reforms and was adamant
that OHR must close in June 2008. According to Lajcak, the
Russian Ambassador signaled that his government planned to
use the UN Security Council's consideration in November of a
resolution extending EUFOR's mandate in Bosnia to lay the
groundwork for OHR's closure.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Most of the Quint Ambassadors, including us, were
skeptical that Lajcak could secure a police reform deal in
the next several weeks. We believe that his staff has
presented him with an overly optimistic assessment of the
technical talks, and we believe that there is little basis
for OHR's assessment that Tihic is ready to break with
Silajdzic on police reform. Just a few weeks ago, Tihic
explicitly stated that he would follow Silajdzic's lead on
police reform, a posture the SDA negotiator has maintained
during the technical talks. That said, we read Lajcak's
non-paper as intended to begin the process of building
support among the Europeans for his use of the Bonn Powers in
the wake of the talks, collapse. We would have preferred
Lajcak present a harder hitting paper as well as one that
makes the case for tough action based on the overall
deterioration of the political climate. Nonetheless, this
was a welcome first step. We remain concerned that Lajcak
and OHR are moving too slowly, however. A clear plan of
action needs to be in place well before we reach the police
reform talks end game, which is only eight days away
(assuming Lajcak sticks to his September 30 deadline). The
Quint talks in London present an opportunity to press the
Europeans to take a more robust approach to Bosnia and
underscore our support for the HighRep.
MCELHANEY