CONTINUED NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN US MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 001980

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS),EUR/RPM; DOD
FOR FATA, BEIN; NAPLES FOR ADMIRAL ULRICH, AMBASSADOR
CURRAN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: CONTINUED NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN US MILITARY
LEADERSHIP, PRESENCE IN BOSNIA

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Replacing the US military commander of NATO
HQ Sarajevo with a European is premature and would adversely
affect US interests in Bosnia. Turning over NATO HQ to the
Europeans would make the organization virtually
indistinguishable from EUFOR, and undermine its standing and
influence among Bosnians who do not see EUFOR as a credible
partner. This would slow progress in implementing defense
reform, Bosnia's largest state- building success post-Dayton.
Furthermore, removing the remaining US military presence
here sends the wrong message about our security commitment to
the country and region, at a time when the Bosnian political
climate is deteriorating and tensions over Kosovo are
mounting. We are convinced that a final US military drawdown
risks jeopardizing the gains realized from our substantial
military, political, and financial investment in establishing
a democratic, stable, and prosperous state here. End Summary.

FINAL DRAWDOWN
--------------


2. (C) We are aware that in the regular course of personnel
review drawing down our remaining military presence in Bosnia
at NATO HQ Sarajevo is under consideration. It is our
understanding that the current NATO HQ Commander, a US Army
Major General, could be replaced by a European, or less
likely a US officer at the Colonel rank, when his term
expires in the early spring. The departure of the US general
officer commanding NATO HQ would lead to the departure of the
US HQ staff, and would almost certainly result in the closing
of the US National Intelligence Cell (USNIC) and National
Support Element (NSE). The trickle down effect of removing
the US general officer would reduce the US military footprint
in Bosnia to almost zero, with the exception of our DATT and
ODC office and any remaining personnel assigned to the NATO
Advisory Team (NAT). We believe that this plan would
adversely affect US interests for several important reasons.

SENDING A POLITICAL MESSAGE
--------------


3. (C) The departure of the US general officer from the NATO
HQ command would undoubtedly be viewed by the Bosnian
government and public alike as the final exit of the US
military mission that has been on the ground since 1995. For
the past decade and a half, the US has been the glue that has
held Bosnia together. More specifically, no other
institution or actor has been able to project the level of
power and credibility of our Armed Forces, which have been
the key to establishing the security environment necessary
for post-war reconstruction and state-building. The United
States remains the single greatest force for change on the
ground here, and the need for our continued active engagement
is universally recognized by all parties as crucial for the
long-term development of a democratic, stable, and prosperous
Bosnia. While the security environment has vastly improved
since the days of IFOR and SFOR, the political climate here
has greatly deteriorated in the past eighteen months.
Removing the US military commander, and with him our last
remaining military presence here, would spread the perception
that we are "abandoning" Bosnia.

IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY
--------------


4. (C) While we remain hopeful that the Kosovo final status
decision will have limited spillover effects here, we must
recognize that the possibility exists for serious reactions
in Republika Srpska (RS). One of the more recent troubling
developments is the reemergence of RS Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik's rhetoric linking the status of Kosovo and the RS.
Dodik and other senior Bosnian-Serb politicians have told us

that such statements are to placate the base of RS voters who
feel strongly, as Serbs, about Kosovo independence. We and
our European partners have made clear in our private
discussions with the RS leadership that we are prepared to
respond to any regional contingencies, but EUFOR's decision
to remove nearly all of its operational forces from the RS
this past Spring has undercut this message. In this context,
the departure of the last vestiges of the US military
presence in the midst of the Kosovo process would further
weaken an already weak hand in terms of the credibility of
our message to senior RS politicians.

US LEADERSHIP REQUIRED FOR DEFENSE REFORM
--------------


5. (C) Bosnian defense reform has been one of the biggest
post-Dayton success stories for the country. Defense reform
has succeeded in merging the two former adversarial armies
and creating a functioning state-level Ministry of Defense.
The resulting improved security situation in the country
allowed for the drawdown of US operational military forces
and the turning over of key military installations to the new
Bosnian Armed Forces. Progress in implementing defense
reform also led to NATO's decision to extend an invitation to
Bosnia to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP),Bosnia's only
real anchor in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Without a doubt,
defense reform would not have been possible without the
strong US leadership exercised through the NATO HQ command.
The US general officers at the helm of NATO HQ have played a
key and highly visible role in pushing the political actors
here to make the hard choices necessary for defense reform to
succeed. While much has been realized to date, defense reform
remains unfinished and continued US direction and attention
are required to complete it. The Europeans do not have the
clout or credibility, nor have they demonstrated the
political interest in doing the heavy-lifting to move defense
reform forward. Absent strong US leadership on defense
reform through NATO HQ, we expect slippage in the
implementation process.

MORE TIME NEEDED
--------------


6. (C) Our strong recommendation is to maintain the US
military presence through NATO HQ at its approximate level
for the near future. This would require the replacement of
the current NATO HQ commander with a US general officer and
the continuation of his headquarters staff, the USNIC, and
NSE. With normal rotations in place, this would allow for a
re-evaluation our position and the security situation in
early to mid-2009 when the next commander is due to depart
Bosnia and when the NATO/EUFOR "Camp Butmir" is slated to be
transferred to host government control. This would certainly
present a better opportunity to determine if we have
"weathered the storm" here and ensure that Bosnia is more
firmly on the path towards full NATO integration. We
certainly understand the current, acute resource demands on
our Armed Forces, but we remain convinced that the United
States needs to maintain a small but important presence here
to ensure the huge investment we have made here is protected.
MCELHANEY