BOSNIA: DODIK AND SILAJDZIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001914

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: DODIK AND SILAJDZIC

REF: SARAJEVO 1872

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)s

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During separate meetings with Milorad Dodik and Haris
Silajdzic, Ambassador urged both leaders to consider the
consequences of a police reform collapse on Bosnia's
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) prospects.
Ambassador warned Dodik that his rhetoric over recent weeks
has crossed the line from provocative to destabilizing,
particularly in light of ongoing Kosovo status negotiations.
Ambassador warned Dodik that he cannot continue to criticize
the functionality of the central government while blocking
all attempts to improve it. Silajdzic asserted that High
Representative Lajcak's proposal gave major concessions to
the Serbs and reiterated the unacceptability of any reform
that named the "RS Police." Silajdzic suggested that the EU
could consider initialing the SAA if Bosnian parties promised
to take up police and constitutional reform in the future.
END SUMMARY.

Dodik Warned on Rhetoric
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2. (C) During a September 3 meeting, Ambassador McElhaney
gave Repulika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik a
stern warning about his recent inflammatory comments on
Kosovo and public remarks critical of the integrity of the
Bosnian state. In recent weeks, Ambassador noted, Dodik had
publicly criticized the role of the central government,
promised to review and attempt to reclaim competencies he
claims have been transferred "illegally" from the RS to the
Bosnian state, and called the Bosnian army a "NATO force" of
no interest or use to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has too
characterized the RS a "permanent category" while Bosnia will
survive only as long as there is an international interest to
support its existence, and has increasingly alluded to
linkages between Kosovo independence and the status of the
RS.


3. (C) Ambassador reminded Dodik of his promise to EUR
Assistant Secretary Fried not to bring up Kosovo or to link
its future to that of the RS. Ambassador told Dodik that his
rhetoric is beginning to create unrealistic expectations
among Serbs in the RS that they can somehow follow the Kosovo
example and gain independence. This had implications for
political stability in BiH and in the region, and crossed
every policy redline. Dodik responded characteristically by
disavowing the statements and accusing the media of
misquoting him. Dodik reiterated his long-standing position
that Kosovo negotiations should continue until both sides
reach an agreement; and that it would be impossible for
Bosnia to recognize a unilateral declaration of Kosovo
independence.


4. (C) In response to the Ambassador's questioning on
transfers of competencies, Dodik replied that the RS could
make better and more efficient use of resources at the entity
level and it was therefore not in the interest of the RS to
relinquish any competencies unless there was a clear and
undisputed constitutional reason to do so. Ambassador agreed
with Dodik that the state government is weak, but warned
Dodik that he cannot continue to publicly criticize the
central government, while at the same time blocking all
attempts to strengthen and improve its functionality. He
told Dodik that his statements were creating a dangerous
situation by creating new divisions among Bosnia's Serbs,
Croats and Bosniaks.

Dodik on Police Reform
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5. (C) Turning to the police reform proposal tabled by High
Representative Lajcak and rejected by Bosniak and Serb
parties (reftel),Dodik asserted he had not intended to
publicly reject it, but High Representative Lajcak had asked
him to "find a smart way to reject the proposal" in order to
counter criticism he has a pro-Serb bias. Dodik showed
Ambassador a text message purportedly from Lajcak conveying
this request. Noting that the Lajcak plan made significant

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concessions to the Serbs and any additional adjustments would
remove all remaining substance from the proposal, the
Ambassador asked if Dodik had any ideas to salvage the SAA
process. Dodik replied that although the proposal is
unacceptable it could constitute the basis for further
discussions and, "with certain additions," could become
acceptable to the Serbs.

Silajdzic on Police Reform
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador September 4 met with Bosniak Presidency
member Haris Silajdzic who complained that Lajcak's proposal
made too many concessions to the Serbs. It allowed the RS
police to continue to exist, eliminated the Federation
police, and created 10 Cantonal police forces. This was a
step back for Bosniaks, he added. Devolving existing police
competencies from the Federation to the Cantons was
"dangerous for Bosnia" and could spark a "latent
Bosniak-Croat conflict." Silajdzic claimed the proposal
amounts to a Dodik "wish list" by reinforcing the continued
existence of the RS police within its own borders and
controlling its own budget. He added that the proposal did
not meet the three EU principles, and failed to make any
reference to the Police Reform Directorate (PRD) report.


7. (C) Silajdzic complained that police structures, like the
army, must be based on subordination, not "coordination and
consensus," and added that the proposal gives no real
oversight role to the BiH state. He said that BiH needs a
multi-ethnic police force, and added that police in the RS
must be recognized as "BiH police in the RS," not "RS
police." Silajdzic said he would reject any proposal that
allows the RS police to continue to exist, claiming that it
remains an "ethnically clean" institution that has "committed
genocide" and protected Hague indictees. He accused Dodik of
wanting to keep the police as the equivalent of an "RS army."
Silajdzic agreed to give us a copy of his official comments
to Lajcak on the plan.

Silajdzic: Keeping the SAA Alive
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8. (C) Silajdzic asked rhetorically why police reform was
"so important" to the Europeans, and speculated that the EU
now regrets making police reform a pre-condition for signing
a stabilization and association agreement (SAA). He inquired
whether it could be possible to initial an SAA now with a
promise by political parties to address both constitutional
and police reforms in the future. Ambassador responded that
the U.S. supports the EU decision conditioning the SAA to
implementing police reform, a criteria that is unlikely to
change.


9. (C) Raising Dodik's recent statements supporting the
establishment of a Croat entity, Silajdzic said the concept
would lead to further divisions in an already divided state.
Silajdzic said he wished the RS, the Federation and its
Cantons could "disappear tomorrow." He said that he was
"ashamed" of the tripartite presidency on which he sits,
calling it a "joke." He continued, saying that he "cannot
accept the idea that we (Bosnians) cannot live together," and
insisted that there must be common interests that can unite
the people of Bosnia. Ambassador agreed that the creation of
a third entity was not going to happen, and even mentioning
it portended renewed instability, threatening the resolution
of the problems of governance in Bosnia.

Comment
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10. (C) Exchanges with Dodik and Silajdzic suggest neither
appreciates that their uncompromising positions on police
reform are likely to derail SAA negotiations for at least
another year, which would constitute a major setback for
Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. On September 4, the
HighRep told Quint Ambassadors that although all political
leaders claim to be ready to negotiate, he hopes to keep some
semblance of a process alive for at least the next couple
weeks. That said, with Dodik and Silajdzic remaining so far
apart on fundamentals, the HighRep is under no illusions
about the prospects for salvaging a deal. The HighRep would
like to allow the current dynamics to play themselves out

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through September before taking any action. He will be in
Brussels next week to discuss this approach and seek Solana's
and Rehn's support. We continue to believe that robust
action by the HighRep is required to retrieve a deteriorating
political situation and that the U.S. needs to encourage the
Europeans to support such an approach. Nonetheless, we
should allow the HighRep time he seeks to work the local
political leaders before any OHR action. End Comment.
MCELHANEY