Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1872
2007-08-31 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - BOSNIAKS TORPEDO PROSPECTS FOR POLICE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK 
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VZCZCXRO5819
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1872/01 2431546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311546Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6957
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001872 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAKS TORPEDO PROSPECTS FOR POLICE

REFORM

REF: A. SARAJEVO 595

B. SARAJEVO 1663

C. 06 SARAJEVO 3271

D. 05 SARAJEVO 2374

Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)s

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001872

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS),NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KJUS PINR EUN BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAKS TORPEDO PROSPECTS FOR POLICE

REFORM

REF: A. SARAJEVO 595

B. SARAJEVO 1663

C. 06 SARAJEVO 3271

D. 05 SARAJEVO 2374

Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)s

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Since assuming office in July, High Representative
Miroslav Lajcak has stated publicly that his first major task
would be concluding an agreement on Police Reform in
September, allowing Bosnia to initial an SAA with the EU.
Lajcak circulated a draft of the proposal in private talks
this week with Quint embassies and Bosnian political parties.
The draft walks back some of the more politically
contentious elements of previous proposals in an effort to
bring Bosnian Serbs on board but remains, according to the
EU, consistent with the three EU principles on policing. The
day after meeting the High Representative, Haris Silajdzic
and Sulejman Tihic publicly rejected the Lajcak proposal.
Milorad Dodik and Serb party leaders followed suit one day
later. The rejection of the proposal on which Lajcak has
publicly staked his credibility represents a serious
challenge to the new High Representative. Unless he acts
quickly and forcefully to reassert his authority, Lajcak
faces being ignored by Bosnian politicians for the remainder
of his tenure. End Summary.

Silajdzic and Tihic Reject Lajcak's Police Reform Proposal
-------------- --------------


2. (C) High Representative Miroslav Lajcak on August 27
shared with Quint Ambassadors a new proposal for a police
reform agreement. Citing instructions from Brussels, Lajcak
said he had made police reform his top priority and that he
aimed to conclude an agreement by September 30 (Ref B).
Lajcak told the Quint that a deal before October would allow
the EU to initial a Stabilization and Association Agreement
by the end of the year. On August 30, Silajdzic and Tihic
held a joint press conference in which they rejected Lajcak's

proposal. Their press conference came just one day after
Lajcak had presented the proposal to them and before Lajcak
had even completed his consultations with other party
leaders.


3. (C) Silajdzic and Tihic claimed that they remained
committed to police reform, noting that they had accepted
previous proposals (e.g., the Martens Report, the Vlasic
Agreement, and the Police Reform Directorate Report),but
asserted that Lajcak's proposal violated all three principles
the EU said must guide police reform. (Note: The three
principles are: 1) All legislative and budgetary competencies
for all police matters must be vested at the State level, 2)
No political interference with operational policing, 3)
Functional local police areas must be determined by technical
policing criteria, where operational command is exercised at
the local level. End Note.) Lajcak's proposal represented
further concessions to the RS, both Silajdzic and Tihic said.


4. (C) In addition to their "technical objections" to
Lajcak's proposal, Silajdzic and Tihic also raised political
concerns. They argued that the reform would impact the
Federation only by forcing it to disband Federation Police
while leaving in place the RS and Cantonal police forces.
Silajdzic also repeated previous claims that the
International Court of Justice had found the RS guilty of
genocide, stressing that he could not support reforms that
legitimated these crimes, the institutions that committed
them, or the "ethnocracy" that resulted from them. Silajdzic
defiantly acknowledged that the Bosniaks were taking a risk
in publicly rejecting Lajcak's proposal before talks had even
begun, but asserted that in doing so they were defending a
"multiethnic Bosnia."


5. (U) The following day, Republika Srpska President Milan
Jelic and other representatives of Serb political parties met
to discuss the proposal. In a public statement released
following the meeting the Serb parties announced they also
found the Lajcak proposal unacceptable and would forward
their own draft law on police reform to the state parliament.

SARAJEVO 00001872 002 OF 003


Serb parties described the Lajcak proposal as
"unconstitutional." The press release stated that the Serb
proposal would leave existing police structures in the RS and
the Federation intact and simply establish a consolidated
national police budget.


6. (C) At the weekly meeting of the PIC Steering Board, a
clearly disconcerted High Representative commented that the
reaction by Silajdzic and Tihic was unfortunate, unfair and
had violated assurances of confidentiality under which he had
discussed the proposal with party leaders. He stated,
however, that the negotiation process on the agreement would
continue. EC Ambassador Kourkoulas said that Brussels had
taken note of the actions of Silajdzic and Tihic and Olli
Rehn was preparing a strongly worded response adding that the
"European perspective of the country is at stake." He noted
that the assertion by Tihic and Silajdzic that the proposal
was inconsistent with the three EU principles was spurious
and that it was the EU, not Bosnian leaders, that is charged
with making this assessment. Steering Board ambassadors
expressed support for the High Representative and pledged to
use bilateral contacts to press political leaders to sign on
to the agreement.

One State-level Structure
--------------


7. (C) Under the Lajcak proposal all local police districts
will fall under the authority of the State-level Ministry of
Security and be governed by State-level legislation. As with
earlier proposals, an office of the Director of Police would
be established to oversee and coordinate the work of local
police operations. The Director would have three subordinate
Assistant Directors responsible for policing in the territory
of the RS, Federation, and Brcko District. The Lajcak
proposal sidesteps the contentious issue of the continued
existence of the entity Interior Ministries but implicitly
provides them with a "consultative role" through a new
Ministry of Security "Collegium". Silajdzic's staff told us
that they view the Collegium, despite its advisory role, as
providing an avenue for RS leaders to exercise political
influence over police operations


8. (C) The current proposal is silent on the politically
sensitive issue of naming local police units, specifically
whether to retain the name RS Police. During the last round
of negotiations (Ref A),Silajdzic rejected any agreement
that would allow retention of the name RS Police, labeling it
a "genocidal institution." The current report simply refers
to Local Police Bodies on the territory of the Republika
Srpska, the Federation, and the Brcko District. However, it
also refers to "RS Police Administration," which Silajdzic's
staff told us is unacceptable. They argue that it confirms
the RS police's continued existence despite the new
State-level control of Local Police Bodies.

Softening the Line on Local Police Areas
--------------


9. (C) To date, the EU has maintained that local police areas
must be based on technical criteria without regard for the
current inter-entity boundary line (IEBL). The RS strongly
opposed police zones crossing the IEBL, and as a result, OHR
and EU concessions reduced the number of IEBL crossings
until, by the March proposal, it was crossed only in the
greater Sarajevo metropolitan area. The Lajcak proposal
eliminates any provisions for cross-IEBL police zones calling
simply for more than one local police body in the RS and the
Federation, and one in Brcko. The Lajcak proposal does call
for a local police area covering the Srebrenica municipality.
It is debatable whether this provision is in line with the
requirement for "technical efficiency" in the second
principle.

Concessions on Police Budgets
--------------


10. (C) The Lajcak plan's most significant concessions to the
RS are related to budgetary control. To date, OHR and the EU
have insisted on state-level control of the police budget.
In a February 22 letter to RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik,
former High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling wrote

SARAJEVO 00001872 003 OF 003


that "there is no room under (the first) principle for entity
and cantonal institutions to exercise budget responsibility
of any kind." However, in an effort to bring the RS on
board, the Lajcak proposal seeks to create the appearance of
a role for the entities and cantons. The proposal calls for
local police districts to prepare draft budgets for approval
by the RS National Assembly, Cantonal Assemblies, and Brcko
District Assembly. Assemblies would then forward budget
proposals to the Ministry of Security. The Ministry of
Security Collegium would approve them by consensus or
majority (as long as the majority includes a representative
of each Entity and each constituent people). Separate escrow
accounts would be created for the RS, each of the Cantons,
and the Brcko District. Funds earmarked to cover the
expenditures of the local police bodies located in the RS,
the Cantons, and Brcko District would be channeled through
them.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) It is not surprising that Silajdzic and Tihic have
objections to Lajcak's proposal. It does include further
concessions to the RS beyond those already offered in a
series of negotiations which ended unsuccessfully on March 14
(Ref A). It is also weaker than even the model suggested in
the Police Reform Directorate Final Report (Ref C),and it is
a far cry from the technical criteria envisioned in October
2005 when the EU principles were established. Nonetheless,
their decision to publicly blast the High Representative's
proposal before talks began raises profound concerns about
their willingness to make the compromises necessary for
Bosnia to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA).


12. (C) Our judgment is Silajdzic and Tihic, now joined by
Serb parties, have virtually eliminated any prospect for a
police reform deal in September, which admittedly were never
all that bright to begin with. The High Representative now
finds himself at a pivotal point in his tenure. He staked
his reputation, credibility and authority on a September
police reform deal. The Bosniak challenge over police reform
comes on the heels of RS PM Dodik's anti-Dayton rhetoric and
decision to essentially ignore a warning from Lajcak to cease
and desist. Lajcak's staff have told us that the High
Representative understands he must react. "Do nothing is not
an option," one aide told us. The aide is right, and given
the disdain Serbs and Bosniaks have displayed, Lajcak's
response will need to be robust. We need to indicate our
full support for any action Lajcak takes and help him stiffen
the resolve of the Europeans to confront both Dodik and
Silajdzic.
MCELHANEY