Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1862
2007-08-30 14:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - AMBASSADOR DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 301453Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6947
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0152
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 0118
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001862 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC
FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR FATA, BEIN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - AMBASSADOR DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT RADMANOVIC OVER SERB RHETORIC

REF: SARAJEVO 1839 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001862

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(FRIED/DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); NSC
FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR FATA, BEIN; USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - AMBASSADOR DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT RADMANOVIC OVER SERB RHETORIC

REF: SARAJEVO 1839 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Bosnian Serb member
of the Presidency Nebojsa Radmanovic August 29 to deliver a
strong message that the USG was growing increasingly
concerned by recent comments from Republika Srpska Prime
Minister Milorad Dodik, radmanovic himself, and other senior
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) leaders. In
the past two weeks, Dodik and others have directly linked the
Kosovo final status process with the possibility of holding
an RS independence referendum and made a series of comments
that appear aimed at undermining Bosnian state-level
institutions. Ambassador told Radmanovic that this strident
and patently anti-Dayton rhetoric was reminiscent of the
attitudes of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and warned that
it could not continue. Radmanovic claimed that "Bosnian Serb
citizens" were increasingly concerned about Kosovo and this
put "tremendous political pressure" on Dodik and others to
comment. He added these comments were designed to "manage
the situation." Radmanovic described his and Dodik's comments
on competencies as only intended to highlight the
inefficiency of state-level institutions and raise the issue
of whether certain functions could not be handled more
effectively at the entity level. The Ambassador also urged
Radmanovic to support High Representative Miroslav Lajcak's
police reform proposal. In a seperate meeting, the
Ambassador also urged Party for Democratic Action (SDA)
President Sulejman Tihic to support Lajcak's efforts to
conclude a police reform deal in September. With both men,
the Ambassador stressed the importance of police reform to
Bosnia's future and as a test of the country's political
leaders willingness to reach the compromises necessary to
restart the stalled reform process. END SUMMARY

WHERE DOES SNSD STAND?
--------------


2. (C) Noting that recent comments by PM Dodik and other

senior SNSD officials were "highly unacceptable" to the USG
(Reftel),the Ambassador sternly informed President
Radmanovic that SNSD and the RS leadership risked a serious
reaction from the United States and our international
partners if they continue. Ambassador told Radmanovic that
his party's rhetoric was futher polarizing an already tense
political environment. In recent weeks, SNSD rhetoric
rivaled, and perhaps even exceeded, some of the worst
statements from former SDS governments, the Ambassador
observed. Ambassador stated that aside from just verbally
challenging the core of the Bosnian state as constructed
under Dayton, the RS had also recently taken concrete steps,
such as blocking demarcation of the Sava River, to undermine
state institutions and prevent them from functioning. In
essence, SNSD was preventing the state from doing its job and
then turning around and attacking it for inefficiency. The
U.S. was also unhappy with the implications of SNSD's recent
comments that state-level competencies, including those
outlined as such in the Dayton Constitution, needed to be
returned to the entities. U.S. officials were now
questioning whether SNSD were the reformers they claimed to
be and how the party ought to be treated if, as their recent
rhetoric suggests, they were actually anti-Dayton
obstructionists determined to block the development of
functioning state structures.

CROSSING RED LINES ON KOSOVO
--------------


3. (C) On Kosovo, the Ambassador told Radmanovic that Dodik's
August 20 comment linking the final status process to an RS
referendum was a threat to stability throughout the region,
not just in Bosnia, and warned that this type of comment must
stop now. The Ambassador reminded Radmanovic that Dodik had
pledged to A/S Fried during his April visit to Bosnia that he
would not publicly mention Kosovo or renew calls for a
referendum. The Ambassador warned that Dodik's statements
only served to make the U.S. effort to resolve Kosovo final
status more difficult. Radmanovic responded by noting that

SARAJEVO 00001862 002 OF 003


he, as a President of Bosnia, had never once linked Kosovo's
status with that of the RS, and that he had consistently and
publicly said that Kosovo was an issue for Serbia, not
Bosnia. Radmanovic said that he understood Kosovo and the RS
were entirely different. In an attempt to defend Dodik,
Radmanovic claimed RS politics "compelled" Dodik to comment
on Kosovo. "99% of Serbs in the RS feel the same way about
Kosovo as Serbs do in Serbia," Radmanovic explained, and the
RS political leadership had to "at least rhetorically
recognize this sentiment." The Ambassador countered that
Dodik and other RS officials had repeatedly told him and
other U.S. officials that the opposite was true -- that
Bosnian Serbs were not concerned at all with Kosovo.
Radmanovic shrugged but said both he and Dodik support U.S.
efforts to resolve Kosovo status peacefully.

QUESTION OF COMPETENCIES
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador directly challenged comments by Dodik
that Bosnia was an "interest category" and temporary, and
statements by both Dodik and Radmanovic that dozens of
competencies had been illegally transferred from the entities
to the state and were subject to return. The Ambassador
asked Radmanovic what specific competencies he and Dodik were
referring to; for example, did they include such state-level
competencies as defense and foreign affairs? Radmanovic
attempted to defend the statements by claiming that Dodik and
he were only speaking of competencies that were being poorly
administered by the state and could be better executed at the
entity-level. Radmanovic asserted that an "independent team
of analysts and experts" working for the RS government and RS
President had researched the topic and identified the
competencies, many of which were being filled by "bureaucrats
in Sarajevo making large salaries and doing no work."


5. (C) The Ambassador pressed, but Radmanovic declined to
name a single competency transferred illegally to the state.
Instead, he suggested that there were legal questions
surrounding those institutions created by the HighRep using
his Bonn Power. To the Ambassador's question as to whether
he or the rest of the RS leadership were challenging the
legality of the Bonn Powers, and by inference the Dayton
Accords, Radmanovic demurred saying only that he only hoped
that the Bonn Powers would be gone one day. The Ambassador
pointed out that the Bosnian Serbs have consistently blocked
the creation of many state-level institutions associated with
state-level competencies under Dayton, which has forced the
High Representative to use his Bonn Powers. The RS
leadership then turns around and complains about the
imposition even while arguing OHR is no longer necessary
because Bosnian leaders can reach agreement on reforms
without international community pressure. (Note: We have also
raised the issue of competencies with Dodik's and
Radmanovic's staff several times in the past week. No one
has been able to provide us a single example of the "dozens"
of competencies to which the SNSD leadership has been
referring. End Note.)

IGNORE POLITICAL TALK
--------------


6. (C) Not surprisingly, Radmanovic also claimed that much of
Dodik's rhetoric was in response to the words and actions of
leading Federation politicians. In particular, Radmanovic
criticized Silajdzic's anti-RS rhetoric and said SDA
President Tihic's comments that "no more concessions would be
made to the RS" required a political response from Bosnian
Serb leaders. Radmanovic also criticized President Komsic's
August 27-28 visit to the United Nations where he, claiming
to speak on behalf of the Bosnian Presidency, publicly threw
the state's support behind a letter written by him and
President Haris Silajdzic requesting UN remedies against
Serbia and RS institutions based on their interpretation of
the ICJ genocide verdict. In closing, Radmanovic, regaining
his usual composure, expressed his hope that the United
States recognized that the SNSD leadership was moderate and
committed to a future RS within a Bosnian state. While
professing not to be "Dodik's advocate," Radmanovic said that

SARAJEVO 00001862 003 OF 003


the PM often made extreme and outlandish statements for
political purposes that should not be taken seriously.

URGING THE SERBS TO SUPPORT POLICE REFORM
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador also urged Radmanovic to support High
Representative Lajcak's new police reform proposal, which
Radmanovic confirmed the HighRep has presented to him earlier
in the day. The Ambassador told Radmanovic, who will be the
RS's representative in upcoming talks, that the plan
attempted to address many RS concerns by linking local police
to the territory and institutions of the RS. With regards to
the name, the Ambassador said that the HighRep's proposal was
similar to what was tabled during the May Washington talks
between Dodik and Silajdzic. The Ambassador urged Radmanovic
to engage constructively on police reform. Radmanovic
replied that he had not yet had time to review Lajcak's
proposal, but would give it full consideration. Radmanovic
predicted that he would seek changes to the plan, however,
based on his cursory review, and warned that it would
ultimately have to be acceptable to the RS National Assembly.
Radmanovic doubted that the HighRep would meet his
self-imposed September 15 deadline for concluding an
agreement.

AMMBASSADOR PRESSES TIHIC ON POLICE REFORM
--------------


9. (C) In a separate meeting on August 28, the Ambassador
also raised police reform with Bosniak SDA Party President
Tihic. (Note: Quint Ambassadors had met on the 27th and
agreed to begin lobbying party leaders on police reform. End
Note.) The Ambassador underscored that Lajcak's proposal
would secure a police reform in which only the Bosnian state
would pass laws related to policing. In addition, all
bodies, including the local police bodies in the RS, would be
legally defined as organizations of the Bosnian state, but
the name issue would be deferred. The Ambassador stressed
that Lajcak viewed the upcoming police reform talks as a test
of each political leaders willingness to compromise and play
a constructive role in the reform process. It was in Bosniak
political leaders interest to keep the international
community's pressure focused on Dodik and the Bosnian Serbs.
With this in mind, the Ambassador urged Tihic be flexible,
particularly with regard to the name - the issue on which
Silajdzic had allowed a police reform deal to collapse in
March
MCELHANEY