Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1815
2007-08-23 08:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - BOSNIAN CROATS PARTIES AND THE CROATIAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR BK 
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VZCZCXRO7870
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230858Z AUG 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6894
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0410
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001815 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH/FAGAN/STINCHCOMB)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAN CROATS PARTIES AND THE CROATIAN
ELECTIONS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1678


B. SARAJEVO 1672

C. SARAJEVO 757

Classified By: POL Michael J. Murphy. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001815

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH/FAGAN/STINCHCOMB)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - BOSNIAN CROATS PARTIES AND THE CROATIAN
ELECTIONS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1678


B. SARAJEVO 1672

C. SARAJEVO 757

Classified By: POL Michael J. Murphy. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: When Zagreb holds national elections in
November, Bosnian Croat voters will also go to the polls to
select representatives for the "Croat Diaspora" electoral
unit in the Croatian Sabor. In the past, HDZ-BiH, Bosnia's
largest Croat political party, has backed the candidate list
put forward by its sister party in Zagreb, HDZ-Croatia.
Relations between the two parties have been strained since
Croatian PM Sanader and HDZ-Croatia leader openly backed the
breakaway HDZ-1990 in Bosnia's October 2006 elections,
however. There is widespread speculation that HDZ-BiH may
put forward its own candidate slate, a decision that could
cost HDZ-Croatia several seats in the Sabor. HDZ-BiH leader
Dragan Covic will likely use the threat that HDZ-BiH will
compete rather than cooperate with HDZ-Croatia as leverage to
force Sanader to curtail his support for HDZ-1990. For its
part, HDZ-1990 has already publicly endorsed HDZ-Croatia's
electoral list. Whatever the outcome of the political
jockeying on this issue, for Bosnian Croat political leaders
the November Croatian elections will be about politics and
influence in Mostar, not Zagreb. Bosnian Croat preoccupation
with the Croatian election may be a distraction in the fall
when OHR and others are seeking to revive political talks on
major reforms. END SUMMARY.

Bosnia Croat Voters and Croatia's Diaspora Election Unit
-------------- --------------


2. (C) All Croatian diaspora constitute Croatia's 11th
electoral unit, which carries five seats in the Sabor. A
majority of Croatia,s 300,000-plus registered diaspora
voters reside in Bosnia, which means that Bosnian Croat
voters often determine what party wins all five seats.
Bosnian Croat voters have traditionally favored HDZ-Croatia,
which has enjoyed unwavering support from HDZ-BiH in the
past. The split in HDZ-BiH that resulted in the creation of

HDZ-1990 has changed the nature of the election, adding a
layer of uncertainty to the once-predictable outcome.
HDZ-1990 has maintained sisterly relations with HDZ-Croatia,
while HDZ-BiH and HDZ-Croatia have grown increasingly
estranged. Bosnian Croat participation in Croatian elections
has been declining despite an increase in the number of
polling stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Croat
voters understand that the composition of the 11th electoral
unit has little impact on their daily lives.

The Bosnian Croat HDZs
--------------


3. (C) Though the April 2006 constitutional reform provided
the policy pretext for the split within HDZ-BiH, many believe
that personal politics as much as the dispute of the
U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments prompted
Bozo Ljubic and others to form HDZ-1990. Ljubic and his
allies, particularly Martin Raguz, had long chafed under
Dragan Covic's leadership of HDZ-BiH. At the time of the
split, most Bosnian Croat observers suspected that Ljubic and
Raguz acted with Croatian PM Sanader's encouragement given
the reported bad blood between Sanader and Covic. Sanader's
decision to endorse HDZ-1990 in Bosnia's October 2006
elections was interpreted as confirmation of these
suspicions. HDZ-1990 used its single issue and Sanader's
support to transform itself into an important political force
within Herzegovina, but it did not deliver a knock out blow
to Covic and HDZ-BiH, which remains the largest and most
influential Bosnian Croat political party.


4. (C) Since the October elections, Bosnian Croat community
leaders, particularly the Catholic Church, have sought to
heal divisions among the two HDZs and encourage greater
cooperation among all Bosnian Croat political parties on
major reforms. The attempt by the five main Bosnian Croat
political parties to reach agreement on an "All Croat"
Declaration on Constitutional Reform is the most prominent
manifestation of these efforts (Ref B). For whatever reason,
Sanader and HDZ-Croatia have also stepped back from the types
of overt interventions they made in Bosnian Croat politics

SARAJEVO 00001815 002 OF 002


during 2006. These changes have not put an end to the
political trench warfare between the two HDZs, as
demonstrated by as the prolonged, often bitter, struggle for
control of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton government (Ref A).


5. (C) With Covic still standing and, many speculate, eager
to take political revenge on Sanader, the Bosnian Croat
political capital is rife with rumors that HDZ-BiH may
nominate its own candidates for Croatia's 11th electoral unit
rather than support HDZ-Croatia's list. There is widespread
speculation that Covic may even seek a seat in the Sabor
himself. Covic commands a sufficient percentage of the
Bosnian Croat vote to present a serious challenge to
HDZ-Croatia if he runs a competing list. Thus far, HDZ-BiH
spokesman Miso Relota, when asked to comment on the rumors,
has studiously avoided a clear public endorsement of
HDZ-Croatia. Relota would only tell us that HDZ-BiH is not
yet focused on the Croatian elections.


6. (C) Undoubtedly, more is happening behind the scenes than
Covic and others in HDZ-BiH are willing to discuss. A
political agreement between Covic and Sanader on a support
for HDZ-Croatia's electoral list remains possible, but
Covic's asking price will likely be high. At a minimum, he
would want Sanader to call off his political dogs once and
for all. Covic would also likely use a deal to strike a blow
against his HDZ-1990 rivals, perhaps by securing a commitment
from Sanader to exclude HDZ-1990 names from HDZ-Croatia's
11th unit electoral list. Though Covic is keeping his cards
close to his chest, Mostar-based observers believe he has
considerable leverage over Sanader because political
commentators in Herzegovina predict the Croatian elections
will be close and Sanader will need all five diaspora seats.
For its part, HDZ-1990 has publicly reiterated its support
for HDZ-Croatia and Sanader, vowing to support and nominate
as many HDZ-1990 members as possible to any list Sanader
proposes.

Other Bosnian Croat Parties
--------------


7. (C) Whatever the outcome of the political battle between
HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990/HDZ-Croatia over the 11th unit electoral
list, it appears likely there will be at least two competing
Bosnian diaspora candidate lists in Croatian elections this
fall -- one submitted by HDZ-Croatia and another by the
Croatian Peasants Party in Bosnian and Herzegovina (HSS-BiH).
HSS-BiH President Marko Tadic has already announced his
party's intention to generate its own independent candidates
list. The Croatian Party of Rights-Djapo/Jurisic (HSP-D/J)
intends to follow the lead of its sister party in Croatia and
support Sanader in the hope that HDZ-Croatia will include
HSP-D/J on its list. Though HSP-D/J has been effective at
raising its political profile among Bosnian Croats, most
doubt that this will translate into meaningful influence on
the HDZ-Croatia list issue.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Some Bosnian Croats had hoped that the Croatian
election would serve as a uniting force for HDZ-BiH and
HDZ-1990. They reckoned that the two opposing parties might
work together to increase the odds of an HDZ-Croatia victory
over its rival Social Democratic Party, which envisions
abolishing the diaspora vote. This, in turn, could serve as
springboard for greater Bosnian Croat unity within
Herzegovina and Bosnian politics. Covic, however, may view
November elections as an opportunity to settle an old score
with Sanader and weaken his HDZ-1990 rivals. Ljubic and
HDZ-1990 also appear unlikely to set aside past differences
with their HDZ-BiH rivals. As a consequence, for Bosnian
Croat parties, the November Croatian elections are likely to
be meaningful due to their impact on Mostar politics, not
Zagreb. If HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990 do not rally around the
HDZ-Croatia list, we expect that the two parties will focus
their attention this fall on the campaign rather than on
OHR's plans to revigorate the reform process.
MCELHANEY