Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1671
2007-08-03 07:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - CROATS REVIVE THIRD ENTITY CONCEPT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR BK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0208
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1671/01 2150718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030718Z AUG 07 ***ZDK***
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6756
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001671 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH;FAGAN),NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - CROATS REVIVE THIRD ENTITY CONCEPT


SARAJEVO 00001671 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Judith Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001671

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH;FAGAN),NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - CROATS REVIVE THIRD ENTITY CONCEPT


SARAJEVO 00001671 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Judith Cefkin. Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Croat political leaders have become
increasingly open in their search for a politically palatable
way to repackage old demands for a third Croat entity. The
nationalist rhetoric of Haris Silajdzic and Milorad Dodik,
which has included statements about abolishing entities and
"federalizing" Bosnia, has emboldened Croat political leaders
to openly challenge Dayton without fear of immediate
consequences. Underlying Croat efforts to resuscitate the
issue of the third entity is a prevailing fear of Croat
identity being lost in Bosnia. In anticipation of
constitutional reform talks this fall, the five major Croat
political parties have been negotiating a draft "All Croat"
declaration on Bosnia's constitutional structure. They
anticipate signing the declaration after the summer holidays.
While all Croat parties largely agree that Bosnia's two
entity structure should be modified, they have differing
positions on how to achieve this goal. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On July 24 and 25, we met with senior members of the
five main Croat parties in Mostar to discuss their views on
the structure and governance of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
still unsigned All-Croat Declaration on Constitutional Reform:

-- Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia Herzegovina (HDZ-BiH):
Secretary General Vlado Rogic
-- Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ-1990): Secretary
General Josip Merdzo and HDZ Spokesman Miso Relota
-- Croatian Peasants Party (HSS): Secretary General Zoran
Stojanovic
-- Peoples Party Working for Progress (RzB): Party President
Mladen Ivankovic Lijanovic
-- Croatian Party of Rights of Djapic Jurisic (HSP-DJ): Party
Chairman and West Herzegovina Prime Minister Zvonko Jurisic

We also traveled to Posavina on August 1 to meet with
Posavina Cantonal officials and representatives from Croat
returnee communities in Republika Srpska (RS) and the
Federation.

All-Croat Declaration Background

--------------


3. (C) Since May, Croat political leaders have been engaged
in drafting a joint Declaration on the Principles of
Constitutional Reform. Among other things, the draft
All-Croat Declaration calls for abandoning the two entity
structure and imposing a three-level system of governance
(state, middle, and local) based on geographic, historical,
economic, and ethnic criteria. Most recently, Croat leaders
met in Posusje on July 18 with the stated intention of
signing the declaration, but failed to do so, owing to the
absence of HDZ-BiH chairman Dragan Covic. Covic maintains
that other commitments prevented him from attending the
Posusje meeting, noting that he sent a representative in his
place. Representatives from the other Croat political
parties believe Covic deliberately failed to attend, perhaps
to delay signature of the Declaration. Regardless, Croat
leaders resolved to reconvene in late August/early September
to attempt to sign the Declaration again.

Different Maps, Similar Outcomes
--------------


4. (C) Publicly, Croat political parties have emphasized the
multiethnic character of their proposed middle levels of
government and avoided offering specifics about where their
boundaries might be drawn. They were more forthcoming in
their exchanges with us. HDZ-BiH advocated a Bosnia of
three, possibly four, federal units and with Sarajevo
designated a special district, stressing that these units did
not need to be territorially contiguous. In this context,
Rogic's description of the federal unit centered on
Herzegovina sounded strikingly like wartime Herceg-Bosna.
HDZ-1990 also proposed linking the current Posavina Canton to
a federal unit centered on Mostar. HSS suggested a Bosnia of
6 to 8 federal units and shared with us draft maps showing
their boundaries. In both the 6 and 8 federal unit
scenarios, HSS's maps envisioned merging Herzegovina-Neretva
West Herzegovina and Livno Cantons into a single
Croat-dominated federal unit, a position supported by HSP-DJ
as well.

SARAJEVO 00001671 002 OF 003



The Rise of Posavina in Croat Politics
--------------


5. (C) Bosniak political leaders' call for special status for
Srebrenica in the wake of the International Court of
Justice's (ICJ) February verdict prompted calls by HSP-DJ
leader Jurisic for special status for formerly Croat majority
municipalities in the Posavina region of Republika Srpska
(RS). Jurisic has toned down his special status rhetoric
since then, but he has continued to present himself and his
party as the champion of all Bosnia's Croats, not simply
those resident in Herzegovina. Jurisic's aim is to undermine
support for the two HDZs, the largest and most influential
Croat parties, which are widely perceived as unconcerned
about Croats living in Posavina and central Bosnia. Jurisic
told us that Bosnia's new constitutional structure should
include two Croat entities, one in Herzegovina and the other
in "historic Posavina."


6. (C) Though Jurisic's strategy has failed to elevate
HSP-DJ's political position vis-a-vis HDZ-BiH or HDZ-1990, it
has impacted the intra-Croat political dialogue. Both
HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990 underscored with us the importance of
addressing the concerns of Posavinian and central Bosnian
Croats in the anticipated constitutional reform talks. HSS
endorsed Jurisic's call for a Posavina entity, which it
suggested should also include portions of Brcko District.
Posavina Canton political leaders and Croat returnees who we
spoke with welcomed the renewed attention from Croat leaders
based in Herzegovina, but were skeptical it would translate
into meaningful support during constitutional reform
negotiations. One Posavina Canton official told us,
"Herzegovinian Croats are interested in grabbing all the
political power and will not hesitate to sell out the
interests of Posavinian and central Bosnian Croats."

The RS By Any Other Name Would Still Be The RS
-------------- -


7. (C) The draft All Croat Declaration objects to the current
two entity system and Croat political leaders argue that the
RS should not remain a federal unit in a new constitutional
structure. Our conversations suggest the Croat position is
considerably more flexible than their public pronouncements
imply. HDZ-1990 told us that they wanted a federal unit
encompassing all of historic Herzegovina, which includes much
of the Eastern RS south of Gacko. However, HDZ-1990
acknowledged that if Bosnian Serbs objected to this
territorial shift, HDZ-1990 would acquiesce. HSS's maps
included a single federal unit in what is now the RS.
HDZ-BiH implied that though the RS's name might change, its
territorial boundaries might not. Only Jurisic insisted
that, in the end, the RS would have to be broken up into
smaller federal units.


8. (C) Nonetheless, all parties agreed that the special
privileges the RS enjoys under the Dayton Constitution,
notably entity voting, would have to end unless similar
privileges were granted to all Bosnia's constituent peoples.
Our impression was that most Croat party representatives
preferred a State-level legislature that included either
vetoes for the new federal units or a system of ethnically
weighted voting in order to protect Croat interests rather
than simply eliminating entity voting. Regardless, none of
the Croat parties advocated a strong central government.
Most envisioned that new federal units would combine the
competencies currently enjoyed at the entity and canton
levels. Intriguingly, RzB proposed that a new constitution
provide for only two levels of government, State and
municipal. The current State-level electoral districts would
provide a "virtual" middle-level of government with their MPs
enjoying the right to block legislation detrimental to their
district's interests.

The Bosnian Croat Psyche
--------------


9. (C) RzB emphasized that Bosniak and Serb nationalist
rhetoric is impacting public attitude among Croats and
generating anxiety among them about "their place" in Bosnia.
In this environment, Croats believe their only protection, as
the country's smallest constituent people, is to have their
own territorial unit within Bosnia, something all party

SARAJEVO 00001671 003 OF 003


representatives stressed. Though not new, this urge for
"territorial protection" is more intense, according to
observers of the Croat political scene. Perceptions,
probably accurate, that Croats as a percentage of Bosnia's
population has shrunk dramatically from its pre-war figure of
17 percent, also fuels concerns among Croats that Bosniaks
and Serbs will ultimately carve up the country between them.
Even though Croats recognize that many of their political
leaders are corrupt, as one non-political party contact put
it, "Croats prefer a Croat hand in the Croat pocket to good
governance under Bosniaks or Serbs."

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Croats leaders are raising more openly than any time
since the Third Entity Movement, the need for a territorial
reorganization of Bosnia that addresses Croat concerns.
These demands are not new, but Croat leaders most likely have
been emboldened by months of nationalist rhetoric from
Silajdzic and Dodik, particularly their regular calls to
either abolish entities or create additional federal units.
This time around, the Croats are being much more careful
about how they describe their aspirations. The draft "All
Croat Declaration" is deliberately vague, and there have been
no public calls for a "Third Entity." Croat political
representatives description of their aspirations certainly
suggest that this is what they are aiming for, however.
Croat politicians have seemed content to play the Bosniak and
Serb leaders off each other, while trying to forge a common
position within a fractured Croat polity. Croats will
eventually have to choose an ally in any future
constitutional reform arrangements and are likely to find
Dodik, who has openly courted the Croats with his "federal
Bosnia" concept, to be a more attractive partner than
Silajdzic.
MCELHANEY