BOSNIA - THE NEW HIGHREP: A NEW STYLE, NEW HOPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001663

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH);NSC FOR BRAUN;
USEU FOR CARVER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KAWC KJUS MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - THE NEW HIGHREP: A NEW STYLE, NEW HOPE
AND A CLEARER AGENDA

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1564

B. SARAJEVO 1519

C. SARAJEVO 1503

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: In his first few weeks on the job, new
High Representative Miroslav Lajcak has moved quickly to take
charge of OHR and improve its operations. He has also sent a
clear signal to Bosnian political leaders and the Bosnian
public that he will be a different kind of HighRep than his
predecessor, Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Lajcak has
delivered stern private messages that the damaging political
rhetoric of the last 12 months must stop and made early use
of his Bonn Powers. Lajcak's polite, but firm approach has
won praise from the press and raised expectations among the
Bosnian public that he can deliver on his public promise "to
move Bosnia forward." OHR staff have told us that Lajcak
will make concluding a police reform deal his top priority
after Europe's August holidays. He will not take up
constitutional reform until October at the earliest. In the
meantime, he also hopes to raise the profile of his role as
European Special Representative (EUSR). From our
perspective, Lajcak is off to a good start. We are
particularly pleased with his willingness to consider use of
the Bonn Powers and his recognition that progress on major
reforms requires a strong international hand. Sooner or
later he will have to confront the Europeans, particularly
the French and Germans, who have been the strongest
supporters of a "Bosnians do it yourself" approach. We will
need to support his strong leadership if we want to avoid
another lost year in Bosnia. END SUMMARY

There is a New Sheriff in Town
--------------


2. (SBU) Just two days into his tenure, High Representative
Miroslav Lajcak signaled to Bosnia's political leaders and
the Bosnian public that his approach to his responsibilities
will be much different than his predecessor's. In a July 2
nationally-televised address, the soft spoken Lajcak was
blunt about the challenges Bosnia confronts, observing that
"in the process of EU integration BiH is today in last
place." He blamed the current state of affairs on the
country's political leadership, which he chastised for their
failure to compromise and to take "practical steps" that
would improve the quality of life for all Bosnians
"immediately." He characterized his immediate challenge as
improving "mutual trust among politicians" and laid down a
clear marker that he would not tolerate "any activities of
statements that push BiH back into an atmosphere of tensions
and hatred."


3. (C) Lajcak was also explicit that he would "not hesitate"
use his Bonn Powers should it be necessary "to help Bosnia
move forward." He wasted no time signaling that he meant
what he said, announcing several impositions related to
Srebrenica and war crimes on July 10 (Ref C). More recently,
Lajcak has implied publicly that he is prepared to stiffen
sanctions imposed by Schwarz-Schilling on political parties
in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton if they failed to form a
Cantonal government before the end of July (Ref B).
According to one OHR staffer, Lajcak privately suggested to
one shocked European ambassador that he would consider using
his Bonn Powers to resolve the dispute within the Federation
over public broadcasting, one of three conditions the EU has
set for signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) (Ref A). (Note: The EU has argued that these issues
cannot be imposed by the HighRep, but must be settled by
Bosnian political leaders themselves. End Note).

New Hopes and High Expectations
--------------


4. (C) According to OHR staff, Lajcak has been just as clear
in his private meetings with Bosnian politicians that he will
not tolerate the type of rhetoric from Bosnian political
leaders heard over the last year, that he is prepared to
publicly blame those who block specific reforms, and that he
will use his Bonn Powers. In his initial exchange with
Silajdzic, Lajcak delivered what one OHR staffer called a

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"clear and tough rebuttal" of some of the public criticisms
Silajdzic had been making about the international community's
role in Bosnia. Silajdzic and other Bosnian political
leaders have been notably gracious in their public comments
after meeting Lajcak, pledging to work with him
constructively. Though these pledges probably reflect the
honeymoon period we would expect any new HighRep to enjoy,
the public deference stands in stark contrast to the public
disdain with which political leaders, particularly Dodik,
treated Schwarz-Schilling.


5. (C) Unsurprisingly, Lajcak's initial meetings and public
comments have received a lot of press coverage, much of it
favorable. Many political pundits attribute the recent
rhetorical cease fire between Bosniak member of the
Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic and Republika Srpska (RS) PM
Milorad Dodik to Lajcak and to their anxiety over his
possible use of the Bonn Powers. The current calm in the
rhetoric battle may have more to do with the onset of summer
holidays and/or an interest in avoiding an early falling out
with the HighRep than with Lajcak's persuasive powers,
however. Regardless, it has raised expectations among the
Bosnian public that Lajcak can deliver on his promise "to
move Bosnia forward."

Police Reform is the Priority
--------------


6. (C) We understand that Lajcak will make concluding a deal
on police reform his immediate priority. Lajcak believes
that a September deal is possible (because the parties are so
close to one already) and critical (because EU officials have
told him that failure to reach a deal before they issue their
October "progress report" on Bosnia would likely delay an SAA
by at least a year). He will use the next six weeks to lay
the political ground work for talks, which, his staff tells
us, will involve shuttle diplomacy on Lajcak's part. OHR
staff appreciate that though the differences between Dodik
and Silajdzic on police reform may be minimal on paper, the
ideological gulf between the two men is wide and potentially
unbridgeable in the short-term. Nonetheless, Lajcak is
genuinely optimistic about the prospects for a September
deal, OHR staff tells us.

After Police Reform
--------------


7. (C) Lajcak understands that constitutional reform is
crucial to Bosnia's future, but he does not want to take on
this issue until after his September attempt to negotiation a
police reform deal. Ideally, he hopes a success on police
reform can build momentum for a deal on constitutional
reform. A member of his cabinet suggested that Lajcak will
disregard the constitutional reform process developed by
Schwarz-Schilling, but that he has not settled on an
alternative approach. Lajcak is also interested in elevating
his profile as European Special Representative (EUSR),which,
his staff argues, is necessary to increase the EU's "pull"
for the inevitable painful reforms that come with preparing
for membership. (Comment: With most senior OHR officials now
double-hatted, we will need to ensure that increasing the
EUSR's profile does not come at the expense of the Peace
Implementation Council's agenda. End Comment).

Lajcak Gets Down to Business at OHR
--------------


8. (C/NF) High Representative Miroslav Lajcak has already
made important and positive changes at OHR. At the weekly
Steering Board Ambassadors (SBA) meeting, for example,
Lajcak, who works with minimal notes and has already
demonstrated a clear command of his brief, has kept
discussions focused on the SBA agenda. Where appropriate, he
has effectively steered the SBA to concrete conclusions and
clear support for OHR-proposed actions. His ability to
manage a meeting, including his skill at tactfully taking the
floor back from those ambassadors inclined to long-winded
interventions, has helped keep SBAs, thus far, to under an
hour. SBA Ambassadors have commented favorably on the
contrast with Lajcak's predecessor, Christian
Schwarz-Schilling, whose SBAs oddly combined heavily scripted

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briefings with long, desultory exchanges that generally
failed to produce results.


9. (C/NF) Lajcak has also tightened operations of OHR's
bureaucracy, which was notoriously dysfunctional and without
direction for much of Schwarz-Schilling's tenure. Lajcak
abolished the position of Senior Deputy High Representative
(SDHR),which had become a laughingstock within OHR and
around Bosnia. In addition, he has moved to impose
discipline on the rest of OHR, elements of which had been
prone to free-lancing under Schwarz-Schilling's rudderless
leadership. OHR staffers tell us that Lajcak's cabinet
appears better organized than his predecessor's, though they
also perceive it as more closed and less accessible. We had
hoped that Lajcak would strengthen the PDHR's line authority,
but Lajcak has allowed all OHR Departments to report directly
to him provided they "keep PDHR informed." (Comment: This
arrangement may reflect an initial intention to gauge the
work of his departments more directly, but could be
problematic in the future, if the most senior USG official at
OHR is completely bypassed on key decisions. End Comment).

Comment: So Far, So Good - We Need to Keep it that Way
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Though just a few weeks into the job, Lajcak has
already demonstrated greater political skills than his
predecessor. He has moved quickly to repair some of the
damage Schwarz-Schilling did to OHR's prestige and its
institutional capacity. From our perspective, it is
particularly noteworthy that the word "ownership" did not
appear in his July 2 address to the Bosnian public. While
Lajcak would prefer that the Bosnian political leadership
reach compromises on their own, he seems to appreciate that
progress on major reforms requires a strong international
hand, including the occasional use of the Bonn Powers. His
greatest challenge in the near future will be keeping the
Europeans on board, as the softer, "Bosnians do it yourself"
approach advocated by France and Germany in particular, will
clash with the direction he wishes to apply to the reform
process. His more forward-leaning moves of late may well
have been blessed by EUHR Javier Solana, who consistently has
wanted to apply more pressure than EU Enlargement
Commissioner Rehn. This is a proclivity that we should
reinforce, if we want OHR to reemerge after a one-year hiatus
as an effective engine for advancing U.S. objectives in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
MCELHANEY