Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO162
2007-01-23 15:22:00
SECRET
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC RAISES ALGERIAN 6 GUANTANAMO

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL PINR BK 
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VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #0162 0231522
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231522Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5291
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SARAJEVO 000162 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR L, EUR, EUR/SCE; NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC RAISES ALGERIAN 6 GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES

REF: A. 06 SARAJEVO 3270

B. 06 SARAJEVO 3144

C. 06 STATE 125002

D. 06 SARAJEVO 2575

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SARAJEVO 000162

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR L, EUR, EUR/SCE; NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SILAJDZIC RAISES ALGERIAN 6 GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES

REF: A. 06 SARAJEVO 3270

B. 06 SARAJEVO 3144

C. 06 STATE 125002

D. 06 SARAJEVO 2575

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: At a January 18 meeting, Bosniak member of
the Tri-Presidency raised the Algerian 6 with the Ambassador.
Silajdzic said that his impression was that the U.S. planned
to release the six men and posed several questions about how
their citizenship might impact that decision. We followed up
with two members of Silajdzic's staff and explained the
Accountability Review Board process based on guidance
provided in Ref C. It is unclear what prompted Silajdzic's
interest in the Algerian 6, but if it endures management of
the issue will become more difficult. END SUMMARY


2. (S) At a January 18 meeting on other matters, Bosniak
Tri-Presidency Member Haris Silajdzic requested clarification
from the Ambassador on issues regarding the Algerian 6.
Noting that the lawyers for the detainees had been in contact
with the Presidency, Silajdzic told the Ambassador that it
was unclear what Bosnia's responsibilities would be if any of
the detainees were released from U.S. custody. Silajdzic
said that as he understood from President Bush's new detainee
policy, it was likely the men would be released from
Guantanamo Bay and possibly transferred to Bosnia. (Note:
Silajdzic is referring to the President's September 6 speech
on the subject. It appears that Bosnia's Ambassador to the
U.S. reported that speech as signaling release of the
Algerian 6. End Note).


3. (S) Silajdzic outlined three possible scenarios involving
the nationality of the 6 detainees, and queried the
Ambassador as to what Bosnia's responsibility would be under
each circumstance. Silajdzic, claiming he was unaware of any
Bosnian government decision regarding each of the detainee's
citizenship, asked what would be asked of the Bosnian
government if any of the detainees were: 1) Bosnian citizens;
2) Stateless persons; or, 3) Algerian citizens. Silajdzic
asked whether Bosnia would be asked to organize the men's
extradition back to Bosnia, or initiate any criminal
proceedings against them. As for the third option, Silajdzic
noted that Bosnia may have special responsibilities because
if the men were to be extradited to Algeria, they could face
the death penalty.


4. (S) We followed up with two members of Silajdzic's staff,
Sejfudin Hodzic, Foreign Affairs Advisor, and Damir Araud, a
former State Department lawyer, who is Silajdzic's Advisor on
Constitutional and Legal Affairs, and presented them with
information about the Accountability Review Board process
outlined in Ref C. We also noted that this same information
had been provided to acting Prime Minister Adnan Terzic's
office as well as to advisors to Presidency Chairman Nebojsa
Radmanovic. Though 30 days had passed since those exchanges,
we explained that we would forward any material provided by
GBiH to appropriate authorities in Washington.


5. (S) Comment: It is unclear what prompted Silajdzic to
weigh-in on the Algerian 6. As we have noted previously the
rise in Bosniak nationalism coupled with a more aggressive
and effective lobbying campaign on behalf of the Algerian 6
have raised their profile. It has also prompted much outside
criticism, including from European human rights activists, of
the Bosnian government's management of their cases. Both may
explain Silajdzic's interest. Of course, it is possible that
internal memorandums about the Embassy's December 2006
exchange with the Presidency on the Algerian 6 are only now
hitting Silajdzic's desk. Arnaud and Hodzic told us that the
three Presidents' staffers do not hold any regular
coordination meetings. Regardless, if Silajdzic's interest
endures, given his politics, it is likely to make U.S.-GBiH
management of the issue more complicated.
MCELHANEY