Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO161
2007-01-23 14:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR REACTION TO

Tags:  PREL YI SR BK 
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VZCZCXRO5772
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0161/01 0231445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231445Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5287
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 000161 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH,FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL YI SR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR REACTION TO
KOSOVO STATUS DECISION

REF: A. STATE 5652


B. SARAJEVO 117

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 000161

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH,FOOKS); NSC FOR
BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL YI SR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR REACTION TO
KOSOVO STATUS DECISION

REF: A. STATE 5652


B. SARAJEVO 117

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Over recent months RS Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik has adopted an increasingly confrontational stance with
the international community. Although he has steered clear
of redlines, Dodik has repeatedly linked Kosovo independence
with the status of the Republika Srpska (RS). In this
context, the announcement of an Ahtisaari final settlement
for Kosovo has the potential to trigger destabilizing actions
by Dodik, and other Bosnian political leaders, advancing the
cause of RS autonomy and weakening the state-level structures
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the announcement of the
Ahtisaari timeline, we have engaged in preventative diplomacy
with Dodik and other Bosnian leaders. Most have said the
right things in private. However, in light of Dodik's past
reckless public comments the prospects for adventurism in the
RS are high. This cable examines a range of scenarios, and
options for possible USG responses. While we consider
unlikely the most destabilizing scenarios, including violence
and referenda on RS status within Bosnia, we have nonetheless
examined a spectrum of possible outcomes in order to
stimulate thinking about possible action should the situation
take a turn for the worse. We believe that early and
forceful U.S. messages, combined with a robust use of public
diplomacy tools, should keep RS politicians from
precipitating a crisis. However, we cannot discount, and
should be prepared for, the need for more punitive measures.
END SUMMARY.

Background
--------------


2. (C) Bosnian Serb political leaders, notably RS PM Milorad
Dodik, have rhetorically linked Kosovo independence to the
status of the Republika Srpska (RS) in the past. Dodik's
comments, as well as those of other leading Bosnian Serb
politicians, have generally described how Bosnian Serbs might
react to Kosovo independence, including the possibility it
could increase support among the RS public for secession,
much as Kosovo has been separated from Serbia. We suspect

most of these observations were intended, at least in part,
to support Belgrade's efforts to derail or delay Kosovo
independence by raising fears within the international
community about the potential destabilizing impact it would
have in Bosnia. Nonetheless, they were made in the context
of rising nationalist tensions in Bosnia fueled largely by an
irresponsible public debate about RS independence, which was
sparked by the May 2006 Montengrin referendum and Bosniak
Tri-Presidency member Haris Silajdzic's exploitation of the
failure of constitutional reform for political purposes
during the October 2006 election.

State Level Leaders Constructive
--------------


3. (C) For several months, we have engaged Bosnian Serb
political leaders, particularly Dodik, strongly underlining
USG expectations that they refrain from making Kosovo
independence a domestic political issue. All have pledged
privately to take a constructive approach, but they have also
asserted that they will face significant public pressure to
comment on a Kosovo independence decision. More recently,
the Ambassador met with all three members of the Bosnian
Presidency during the week of January 15 to discuss the
Ahtisaari timeline (Ref A). Serb Presidency Chairman Nebojsa
Radmanovic (of Dodik's SNSD) told the Ambassador that he
considers Kosovo to be a "matter between Serbia and the
international community" and added that while Bosnian Serb
politicians could not realistically be expected to endorse
Kosovo independence, they also would not use the issue to
advance nationalist goals. Encouragingly, incoming Serb
Prime Minister Nikola Spiric publicly downplayed any link
between Kosovo independence and the RS's status on January

17. Both Silajdzic and Zeljko Komsic, the Bosniak and Croat
members of the Presidency respectively, also told the
Ambassador they would take a constructive approach and seek
to downplay the issue with their constituencies.

Dodik Remains a Problem

SARAJEVO 00000161 002 OF 004


--------------


4. (C) Despite these private pledges, we believe an Ahtisaari
recommendation for Kosovo independence has the potential to
destabilize Bosnian politics, at least in the short-term.
Silajdzic, despite his pledge to the contrary, has a history
of making deliberately inflammatory statements designed to
provoke irresponsible reactions from Bosnian Serbs. Prior to
the October 2006 election, Silajdzic's aim was winning the
Presidency; today it is to create the conditions necessary to
ensure that the international community remains in charge
here. Even assuming Dodik's private assurances are genuine,
his proclivity for bombastic statements and his seeming
inability to exercise self-control when presented with a
microphone are cause for concern. One such statement is
enough to ignite a point/counter-point exchange with Bosniak
nationalists that could precipitate a broader political
crisis. More disconcertingly, Dodik has been increasingly
willing to challenge the international community, including
OHR's authority, and he and other Bosnian Serb leaders could
decide to use Kosovo to justify problematic political
rhetoric and behavior that could complicate our efforts to
anchor the country in the Euro-Atlantic community.

Spectrum of Potential Problematic Behaviors
--------------


5. (C) We are already engaged in preventative diplomacy,
delivering clear messages to senior Bosnian political
leaders, aimed at preventing Kosovo from infecting Bosnian
politics. In addition to his meetings with Presidency
members, the Ambassador will meet PM Dodik and SDS President
Mladen Bosic on January 25 and 26 to deliver a firm message
outlining USG expectations that they refrain from reckless
rhetoric and behavior in response to Ahtisaari's decision.
However, we have also examined a range of possible
statements/actions that Dodik and others might take in the
wake of a Kosovo independence settlement and considered
possible USG reactions to them. Bosnian Serb reactions to
Kosovo are presented below from the most to the least likely,
and are linked to possible USG responses. The most egregious
of these possibilities are admittedly unlikely, but our
objective is to identify thresholds of action and preview
appropriate responses in order to be able to take timely
action to prevent an escalation. The proposals contained in
the following paragraphs are notional only.

Likely
--------------


6. (C) We expect Bosnian Serb citizens, RS-based media or
RS-based civil society groups, such as veterans associations,
to comment negatively on Kosovo independence. Some of these
statements undoubtedly will be irresponsible and include
calls for actions that are inconsistent with Dayton. We will
make use of traditional public diplomacy tools to shape
public opinion here. Though we should not expect RS
government officials or Bosnian Serb political leaders to
embrace Kosovo independence, we can and should hold them to a
higher standard than we hold their constituents.

-- RS Criticism of Kosovo Independence: Our concern should be
statements from Dodik and others that implicitly encourage
Bosnian Serbs to embrace the logic: "if Kosovo independence,
why not the RS?" More problematic would be tacit support
from the RS government and/or Bosnian Serb political leaders
for protests by ordinary Bosnian Serb citizens.

-- Statements Explicitly Linking Kosovo Independence with the
Status of the RS: To date, most of the referendum talk from
Dodik and others has been linked to Montenegrin independence
and election-related attempts to turn out the nationalist
vote. That could change after Ahtisaari announces his
decision. At its most basic, this might include
"observations" about the similarities between Kosovo and the
RS or comments "explaining" how Bosnian Serbs feel as opposed
to outright calls for a change in RS status.



7. (C) Possible Responses: We believe strongly worded private
and/or public statements from the Ambassador, as well as
senior Washington officials, would be appropriate in order to

SARAJEVO 00000161 003 OF 004


prevent these types of statements from escalating into more
problematic rhetoric/actions. We would work to coordinate
any response with OHR and our European partners, but Dodik
has demonstrated his willingness to defy OHR and is often
contemptuous of the EU. The Europeans, too, are hesitant to
stand up to the Bosnian Serbs, preferring to hope issues soon
blow over. Dodik remains responsive to forceful USG
statements.

Less Likely
--------------


8. (C) We judge the following rhetoric/actions less likely,
but possible if public debate on Kosovo gets out of hand, or
if one accepts the view that Dodik and other RS politicians
could see Kosovo independence as a vehicle for advancing an
anti-Dayton agenda.

-- Proposal for a Referendum on Police Reform: Though not
directly linked to Kosovo or RS status, it is probable that a
police reform referendum would quickly become a de facto
referendum on RS independence. Dodik has threatened such a
referendum in the past. Doing so in the context of Kosovo
would be more problematic.

-- Proposal for a Referendum on RS status: Regardless of the
claimed context (i.e., as a response to comments by Bosniaks
for the abolition of the RS),such a proposal would be
particularly inflammatory in the immediate aftermath of
Ahtisaari's decision.

-- Statements in Support of Violence/Unwillingness to
Maintain Civil Order: Dodik has privately committed to
putting down any Kosovo-related civil unrest, and we believe
he means it. Other Bosnian Serb political leaders may
publicly excuse violence, however (i.e., SDS politicians
seeking to exploit the difficulties civil unrest would pose
to the SNSD-dominated government in Banja Luka).

-- Obstruction of State-level Institutions by Bosnian Serb
Politicians.


9. (C) Possible Responses: In our judgment, each of these
actions, except the proposal to hold a police reform
referendum, would constitute a clear challenge to Dayton
that, we believe, should trigger serious consideration of a
Bonn Powers removal as well as several measures by the USG
from among those outlined in paragraph eleven below.
According to OHR, the proposal to hold a police reform
referendum is technically legal under Dayton. In this
instance, we believe a coordinated message from senior
officials in PIC capitals coupled with private warnings would
be necessary.

Least Likely
--------------


10. (C) Finally, though we judge it highly unlikely,
post-Kosovo independence developments in the RS could defy
expectations and take a dangerous turn. This might manifest
itself in the actions described below.

-- Refusal by Dodik to Comply with a Bonn Powers Removal: In
his January 17 GLOBUS interview, Dodik implied he would do
just that should the HighRep act against him or others in the
RS government.

-- Concrete Preparations for a Secession Referendum in the
RS: This could include the circulation of petitions,
preparations for a vote, or consideration of referendum
legislation in the RS National Assembly.

-- RS Withdrawal from/Boycotting of State-level Structures:
At its most extreme, this could include withdrawing troops
from the Bosnian armed forces or reconstitution of the RS
armed forces. More likely would be attempts to reclaim
competencies granted to the State or implementation of
policies deliberately designed to undermine State-level
structures.


11. (C) Possible Responses: In our view, such steps would
require use of Bonn Powers, including removals, as well as

SARAJEVO 00000161 004 OF 004


rapid, unilateral and forceful USG action. USG measures we
judge appropriate could include: 1) Suspension or termination
of USAID grants in the RS, particularly NDI's assistance to
SNSD; 2) Findings of visa ineligibility per INA 212(f); 3)
Recommendations for OFAC asset freezes for individuals or
parties; and, 4) Urging EU missions to implement similar
penalties such as a Quint visa ban or EU asset seizures.
MCELHANEY