Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1584
2007-07-23 16:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

EXPANDING BOSNIA,S IRAQ MISSION

Tags:  PGOV PREL BK 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1584/01 2041615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231615Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6668
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0025
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0064
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0141
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0061
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001584 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH/FAGAN/STINCHCOMB)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: EXPANDING BOSNIA,S IRAQ MISSION


Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001584

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH/FAGAN/STINCHCOMB)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: EXPANDING BOSNIA,S IRAQ MISSION


Classified By: DCM Judith B. Cefkin Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. Summary: (C) On 18 July, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Iraq Lawrence Butler and OSD Director of Coalition
Operations Peter McVety had constructive meetings with
Minister of Defense Selmo Cikotic, Chief of Defense LTG Sifet
Podzic, and Council of Ministers Chairman Nikola Spiric to
discuss Bosnia,s military cooperation in Iraq. They thanked
the Bosnian government for its five EOD unit deployments to
Iraq and briefed on USG plans associated with Coalition
efforts in Iraq. Butler spoke to all three officials about
the possibility of changing the nature of Bosnia's role in
the Coalition to include expanding the duties of Bosnian
troops in Iraq. Security at the UN compound in Baghdad was a
need that could match Bosnia's goal of enhancing its military
policing capabilities. Expanding the role of the EOD unit to
include IED disposal could also develop a valuable niche
capability for the Bosnian armed forces, Butler said.
Cikotic and Podzic each expressed some level of support for
Butler,s proposals while Spiric stressed Bosnia would be in
a position to assess possible changes to its coalition
presence later in the fall. All three leaders emphasized
that expanding and redefining Bosnia,s mission in Iraq would
require approval by the Presidency, and most likely,
parliamentary approval. END SUMMARY

Mission Expansion Politically Sensitive
--------------


2. (C) DAS Butler and Director McVety began each of their
meetings with Cikotic, Podzic, and Spiric by thanking each of
them for their contributions to Iraq, particularly as Bosnia
continues to implement defense reform. Butler highlighted
that Iraq is facing many of the same problems as Bosnia has
experienced in its post conflict period, emphasizing that
Bosnia, therefore, is well-suited to help Iraq through this
challenging time. Butler briefed on the growing need for
counter-IED capabilities and asked Cikotic and Podzic to
consider allowing Bosnian troops in Iraq to undergo training
to develop this niche capability. Butler raised the
possibility of deploying an additional Bosnian unit (to form

all or part of a company size 150-160 soldiers) to Baghdad to
provide security for the UN compound in the Green Zone.


3. (C) Cikotic said that morale within the EOD unit is high.
He noted that during his last visit to Iraq in May the EOD
unit was clearly committed to its mission, despite the
hostile security environment. Cikotic said that he would not
oppose augmenting Bosnia,s troop presence in Iraq but that
such a change would face political opposition. Cikotic said
he would argue that Bosnia must demonstrate its readiness for
NATO membership by continuing to contribute to coalition
operations. Cikotic noted, however, that public support for
NATO membership has decreased slightly in both entities, and
that Bosnia,s EU aspirations continue to present certain
complications for cooperation with NATO. Both Cikotic and
Butler agreed, nonetheless that the processes are largely
complimentary.


4. (C) Spiric said that his government's troop contributions
in Iraq are a token of appreciation for all the U.S. has done
in Bosnia. Spiric added that Bosnia seeks to continue its
role in the coalition, both for the sake of U.S.-Bosnian
bilateral cooperation and for its own interests. The defense
reform process will improve Bosnia's ability to contribute to
this effort. Although Bosnia hopes to comply with all U.S.
requests to the extent of its abilities, the government must
first assess both the situation on the ground in Iraq, and
its own capabilities, before stating its position. He
acknowledged that Bosnia's military capabilities are greater
than being currently provided by the EOD unit. However,
Spiric noted that the situation in Iraq would become clearer
in September and Bosnia looked forward to being able to
articulate its position at that time.


5. (C) Spiric said that, in addition to military
capabilities, Bosnia looked forward to being able to
contribute to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. He noted
that after the war in Bosnia, he understood the destruction
resulting from conflict and was unhappy to see similar scenes

SARAJEVO 00001584 002.2 OF 003


in Iraq. For example, after the completion of police reform,
Bosnia would be in a position to contribute to law
enforcement capabilities in Iraq. In the meantime, however,
a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Iraq would
allow a decision on whether Bosnia could increase its
military contributions. Spiric added that any change in the
size or role of the deployment would require approval by the
Presidency and, most likely, parliamentary approval.


6. (C) LTG Podzic noted he has daily contact with his liaison
officer in Baghdad and is well briefed on the situation in
Iraq. Podzic said that although he had previously been
cautious in response to U.S. requests to expand Bosnian
deployments to Iraq, the nature of the bilateral partnership
had changed and he now believed such changes were possible.
Podzic told Butler the USG could count on his support for
proposals to expand Bosnian participation in coalition
operations. However, he stated that such changes would first
require political endorsement by political leaders.
Nonetheless, Podzic asserted that many politicians, and the
general public, understand the need for, and benefits of,
expanded Bosnian deployments.


Counter-IED Capabilities
--------------


7. (C) Butler explained that acquiring a counter-IED
capability would position Bosnia to fill a unique niche
capability as a prospective NATO member. He stated that
Bosnia would not be required to increase troop numbers and
could simply train the existing EOD unit in Iraq. Cikotic
replied that this new mission would present new risks and
would therefore require evaluation at the political level
including approval by the Presidency and the parliament.
Moreover, according to Cikotic, there would likely be
resistance to the idea within key political parties,
including the SDA. Podzic said that he is aware of the
mounting IED threat and is well briefed on the issue. He
assessed that Bosnia is capable of taking on this additional
responsibility but echoed Cikotic's caveat that a political
decision would be needed to expand the mission. Butler
encouraged his interlocutors to consider commencing training
while politicians are debating the proposal so that units
would be prepared to deploy after political approval of the
new mission.

UN Protection Unit
--------------


8. (C) Butler raised the need for a unit to provide security
at the UN headquarters building in the Green Zone and urged
the Bosnian armed forces to consider filling this need in the
next six months. He explained that as a Peace Support
Operation this has the advantage of paying UN salaries, yet
the unit still comes under the MNF-I chain of command. While
recognizing that BiH does not have the troops to deploy for
this purpose immediately, he asked that BiH consider it in
its future planning. Cikotic responded favorably adding that
Bosnia has been considering the deployment of a military
police unit to Afghanistan in 2008. He was receptive to the
possibility, however, of instead providing security to UNHQ
in Baghdad. Cikotic, nonetheless, said that he could not
commit to the mission before consulting with the Presidency
and the parliament.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Cikotic and Podzic were all careful not to make any
formal commitments to changing the nature of Bosnia,s
engagement in Iraq. Spiric was clearly aware of upcoming USG
strategic assessments and signaled that Bosnia would wait to
hear the results of those reports before considering changes
to its Iraq mission. Podzic took pains to present himself as
at the mercy of politicians, explaining that he and Minister
Cikotic do not always agree on strategic issues. However,
all three leaders accurately pointed out that any change in
the Bosnian deployment would require approval from political
leaders and members of parliament which would involve public

SARAJEVO 00001584 003 OF 003


debate. End Comment.


10. (U) DAS Butler did not have an opportunity to clear this
message prior to his departure.
MCELHANEY