Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1545
2007-07-13 15:11:00
SECRET
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA: SCENESETTER FOR THE JULY 19-20 VISIT OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR BK 
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DE RUEHVJ #1545/01 1941511
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O 131511Z JUL 07
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TO RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6633
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SARAJEVO 001545 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NAPLES FOR ADMIRAL ULRICH AND AMBASSADOR CURRAN, SECDEF FOR
FATA AND BEIN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE, USNATO FOR
REID, UNDERWOOD, SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SCENESETTER FOR THE JULY 19-20 VISIT OF
ADMIRAL ULRICH

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1209

B. SARAJEVO 832

C. SARAJEVO 467

D. SARAJEVO 728

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SARAJEVO 001545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NAPLES FOR ADMIRAL ULRICH AND AMBASSADOR CURRAN, SECDEF FOR
FATA AND BEIN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE, USNATO FOR
REID, UNDERWOOD, SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SCENESETTER FOR THE JULY 19-20 VISIT OF
ADMIRAL ULRICH

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1209

B. SARAJEVO 832

C. SARAJEVO 467

D. SARAJEVO 728

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Your visit comes at a time of high political
polarization in Bosnia. Increased tensions have resulted in
the near total paralysis of government and the reform
process. Nationalism has even begun to impact the defense
reform agenda, where we have seen some recent slippage in the
so far successful efforts to stand-up a single armed forces
and national-level ministry of defense. Despite this,
defense reform remains a success story for Bosnia, and
Bosnia's inclusion into the Partnership for Peace has
provided the country its first formal link to Euro-Atlantic
institutions. We have continued to develop a robust
bilateral security relationship with Bosnia, and have been
successful in securing continued support for coalition
operations. During your visit, you will want to engage with
senior Bosnian leaders on these important issues, and
encourage their sustained strong commitment to move forward
down the Euro-Atlantic path. End summary.

Objectives
--------------


2. (C) From the Embassy perspective, both the public aspects
of your visit as well as your meetings with Bosnian officials
will serve to:

-- Urge political leaders to look toward the future rather
than focusing on past wrongs.

-- Underline the importance the U.S. places on Bosnia and
continuing reform; including in the defense sector.

-- Warn those who challenge Bosnia's system, or stability,
that the West Balkans are crucial to NATO/U.S. security.

-- Compliment Bosnia on its deployment to Iraq as well as its
participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Ethiopia and
Eritrea and Congo.


Deteriorating Political Climate
--------------


3. (C) Your visit comes against the backdrop of a political

climate that has not been as difficult in many years. Kosovo
looms for the Serbs here as a pretext for unilateral moves to
distance the Republika Srpska from the Bosnian state. The
February 26 verdict of the International Court of Justice,
ruling that genocide occurred in Bosnia during the war, has
refocused Bosniak (Muslim) grievances and has caused Serb
politicians to retrench in defensive positions. This hostile
environment has precluded any meaningful work on the reform
agenda, with politicians seemingly incapable of abandoning
ethnic platforms. For the past sixteen months the Office of
the High Representative was ineffective and failed completely
to advance meaningful reform or improve the functioning of
the deadlocked government. We are hopeful that Miroslav
Lajcak, the new High Representative who took office on July
1, will be more effective in exerting control over disruptive
political leaders. Despite these growing concerns, European
Union member states continue to promote a Bosnia policy that
is process-oriented rather than substantive. Despite
Washington's efforts to get Bosnians back to the reform
process, including a June meeting of RS Prime Minister Dodik
and Bosniak Presidency member Silajdzic in Washington, these
factors have complicated our ability to push Bosnia forward,
and its prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration appear to be
receding further into the future.

Defense Reform: Work Still to be Done
--------------


4. (C) Defense reform is one of the biggest success stories
in Bosnia since Dayton. In a two year period, Bosnia adopted
a Law on Defense, abolished the two entity-level Ministries
of Defense and created a single state institution in their
place. Consulting with NATO HQ, the Ministry of Defense
decided on a force structure for the new, joint Armed Forces
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Presidency approved in
July 2006. The new units created under the decision have
been established, and should be fully-staffed by mid-summer.
A clear and direct command and control structure has been
developed and adopted. The new Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces have worked well together, and undertaken successful
joint planning activities such as the deployment of the
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit to Iraq. The new
state-level institutions met the conditions for PfP
membership, and the decision to invite Bosnia into the
organization was partially seen as validation of the progress
to date. On July 12 Prime Minister Spiric led the entities
to agreement on the long outstanding issue of transfers of
defense property to the state. Although the agreement grants
the Ministry of Defense ownership of military equipment and
use of military facilities, it remains to be seen if the
arrangement meets NATO legal standards.


5. (C) Personnel issues also loom large, and the civilian
side of the Ministry of Defense remains severely
under-staffed. The military is in the process of filling out
its force structure, and hopes to have new units in their new
locations by the close of the year. Another cause for concern
is the recently proposed defense budget cuts at this crucial
juncture in the reform process, just as Bosnia is joining
PfP. During your meetings with the senior Bosnian leaders,
you will want to push them to see defense reforms through to
their conclusion, and adequately fund the Armed Forces to a
level to allow them to be active PfP participants.


6. (C) On a positive note, the Ministry of Defense
leadership has finally stabilized. Defense Minister Selmo
Cikotic assumed office at the end of April, filling a vacuum
that had existed since the October election. Our dealings
with Cikotic have left us impressed with his straightforward
commitment to seeing the defense reform agenda through to
completion. Cikotic is, by his own admission, decidedly
pro-American and has been a strong ally in pursuing items on
our bilateral agenda. We remain concerned, however, that
long-standing allegations of war crimes against Cikotic may
eventually cause him political problems. However, we believe
that the charges against him are without merit and any legal
action against him would have political motivation (reftel B).

Bilateral Security Agenda and Domestic Politics
-------------- --


7. (C) Our bilateral security relationship with Bosnia is
strong and strengthening. Without U.S. material and
technical assistance provided to the government, defense
reform would not have been possible. We have targeted our
security assistance to supporting the Bosnian Armed Forces'
efforts to create a NATO-compatible force capable of
deploying on overseas missions. To that end, we have
supported the creation and training of the EOD unit, which
has deployed five platoon rotations to Iraq since 2005. The
presidency and parliament extended the mission's mandate
until the end of 2007. Looking ahead, we are targeting our
security assistance towards the establishment of other
niche-capable and deployable units, including a Military
Police unit.


8. (S) Gaining approval of the continued deployment of the
EOD unit was not easy. The general rightward drift of
Bosniak politics here, as led by President Haris Silajdzic,
has proved to be a substantial impediment to realizing
enhanced or augmented coalition deployments. Silajdzic has
stated, both privately and publicly, that the Bosnian public
is not prepared to take on additional international burdens,
and indicated that he will wield his substantial political
clout to block further missions. There has been some
discussion of the Bosnian EOD unit assuming
counter-Improvised Explosive Device (c-IED) capacity, though
no formal request has been made. Minister Cikotic recently
informed the Ambassador that he hopes to have several

deployable units established within the next year, but noted
that the approval of deployments would be a political rather
than logistical matter.

U.S. Drawdown, Eagle Base Closure
--------------


9. (C) The decision to remove the last U.S. troops from
Bosnia was not popular here, especially among Bosniaks. For
many, the U.S. presence here is viewed as the glue that holds
the country together. A majority of Bosnians believe the U.S.
military drawdown will have an adverse effect on the domestic
security situation. Though the PfP invitation has gone some
way to fill the perceived security void, substantial anxiety
remains following the drawdown.

NATO Aspirations
--------------


10. (C) Full NATO membership enjoys strong public and
political support across ethnic lines. While European Union
accession is many years away, Bosnians view membership in the
premier collective security organization to be within reach
and absolutely necessary for their country's long-term peace
and prosperity. The PfP invitation was widely hailed here as
the first tangible proof that Bosnia's future lies in
Euro-Atlantic institutions, and a signal that real progress
has been realized in the past decade. The Bosnian political
and military leadership have announced their intentions to
put Bosnia on the fast-track for full membership, with some
officials publicly asserting that membership is a
possibility by 2009.


11. (C) This overly optimistic prognosis is indicative of a
broad lack of understanding of the implications and
requirements of NATO membership. As a result, we are
confronted with the delicate task of keeping the Bosnians
motivated, while simultaneously injecting a dose of realism
into the discussions. In the two months since Bosnia acceded
to PfP, there has been little political and public discussion
about what the path forward entails, particularly the
necessity of reform across the board, including in civilian
institutions. Bosnia is inarguably in a better position than
some other PfP invitees in that the NATO-directed defense
reform process established a military and defense ministry
that should eventually be capable of NATO membership. Bosnia
remains far ahead of the curve, having finished their
Framework Document, IPP, PARP surveys, and is on the verge of
signing the PfP SOFA. But most Bosnian leaders still do not
seem to understand that NATO requires a host of commitments
(and basic reforms) from the entire state, not just the
Ministry of Defense.

War Criminals: Good and Bad News
--------------


12. (C) The arrest and transfer to The Hague of Ratko Mladic,
Radovan Karadzic and Stojan Zupljanin remains one of our
priority mission goals and an imperative that we raise at
every opportunity with Bosnian leaders. It is likely that
all three ICTY indictees are outside of Bosnian territory.
On May 25, convicted war criminal Radovan Stankovic escaped
from custody in Foca Prison and is still at large.
Stankovic's escape, which was clearly effected with the
complicity and assistance of Foca prison officials, calls
into question Bosnia's ability to manage additional ICTY
transfers. The RS government is aware of the potential
repercussions of this incident and many observers view the
sudden arrest and transfer to The Hague of Zdravko Tolimir on
May 31 as an attempt by Milorad Dodik and others to
ameliorate the damage of the Stankovic escape.


MCELHANEY