Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SARAJEVO1401
2007-06-22 14:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA: DEFENSE MINISTER POSITIVE ON WIDER

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR BK IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #1401 1731414
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221414Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6498
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0138
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SARAJEVO 001401 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR FATA, CAGAN AND BEIN, DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D
(SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM
(BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE,
USNATO FOR REID, UNDERWOOD, SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK IZ
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: DEFENSE MINISTER POSITIVE ON WIDER
COALITION DEPLOYMENTS BUT VAGUE ON SPECIFICS


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SARAJEVO 001401

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR FATA, CAGAN AND BEIN, DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO),D
(SMITH),P (BAME),EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS),AND EUR/RPM
(BROTZEN),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE,
USNATO FOR REID, UNDERWOOD, SHAFFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK IZ
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: DEFENSE MINISTER POSITIVE ON WIDER
COALITION DEPLOYMENTS BUT VAGUE ON SPECIFICS


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. Minister of Defense Selmo Cikotic told the
Ambassador that he remains committed to exploring options for
expanded Bosnian coalition deployments in the coming year.
Cikotic said that he would focus the ministry and military on
developing further niche capable units, with an eye towards
deploying to Afghanistan. Regarding broad proposals for the
Bosnian Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit in Iraq to
undertake counter-Improvised Explosive Ordnance (c-IED)
missions, Cikotic was less sanguine than he had been
previously, telling the Ambassador that the risk associated
with such a mission might draw resistance from political and
military leaders. End Summary.


2. (S) The Ambassador met with Defense Minister Selmo Cikotic
June 18 to discuss Bosnia's coalition deployments, and
possibilities for augmenting contributions to Iraq. Cikotic
again asserted his broad support for such missions, and told
the Ambassador that one of his highest priorities remained
the development of niche capable units in the new Armed
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, Cikotic
said that he was particularly focused on developing a
deployable military police and intelligence capacity that
could possibly support coalition efforts in Afghanistan.
Cikotic said that he hoped to have some additional capacities
within the next year that could be offered to NATO and other
international partners for deployment overseas (Comment: The
Bosnian Armed Forces has just begun the process of
standing-up the units Cikotic mentioned, and will rely on
substantial USG security assistance to train and outfit the
units. A one-year timeline for their deployment might be
overly optimistic. End Comment).


3. (S) Regarding Iraq missions specifically, the Ambassador
asked whether Cikotic had any further thoughts on the EOD
unit assuming a c-IED function for future rotations.
Cikotic, acknowledging that he had discussed the issue at
both the April Coalition Conference in Tampa and during his
May visit to Iraq, voiced greater hesitation than he had
previously in accepting such a mission. Cikotic said that
senior military leaders had expressed "serious reluctance"
over such a mission due to the heightened risk. Cikotic
further stated that he now believed a c-IED component would
fundamentally alter the EOD mission, and would require
approval by the Council of Ministers, the Presidency, and
Parliament. (Note: This is a change from the position Cikotic
had earlier articulated. As recently as three weeks ago, he
had indicated that he believed it possible to consider the
c-IED function as a part of the existing mission. End Note.)
Cikotic said he would anticipate serious political obstacles
at all these levels, though refused to explicitly state from
where he thought opposition might arise. When pressed on
options for c-IED training, Cikotic said his preference would
be for any training to occur in Bosnia, with outside trainers
training both the unit and Bosnian trainers for future
rotations. Cikotic said that his opinion was that the
Ministry of Defense should be looking for deployments of
"medium risk," somewhere between the simple EOD duties and a
c-IED mission.


4. (S) Comment. Cikotic's assertion that the senior military
leadership might oppose a c-IED mission as too risky rings
hollow. Our numerous discussions with CHOD LtGen Sifet
Podzic and his senior deputies indicate that any resistance
from the military side on deployments is logistical,
considering that the Armed Forces remain in the process of
filling out their new force structure. In all likelihood,
Cikotic has faced political pressure on the issue, probably
from President Haris Silajdzic who visited Iraq with the
Defense Minister and received briefings on the c-IED mission.
Cikotic's backtracking from earlier commitments on the c-IED
mission does indicate that it could be a political issue,
and, if a request for the mission is made, it will have to be
handled delicately. Our position remains that the c-IED
mission should not be treated as a new deployment, but rather
a continuation of the EOD mission. We await further
information on the parameters of the c-IED mission to
continue our discussions at the political level. End Comment.
MCELHANEY