BOSNIA: SCENESETTER FOR THE JUNE 18-19 PIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2017
TAGS: BK PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: SCENESETTER FOR THE JUNE 18-19 PIC


Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

Summary
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1. (C) The June 18-19 PIC will take place against a political
climate that has not been as difficult in many years,
possibly since the outbreak of the war. The February 26
verdict of the International Court of Justice, ruling that
genocide occurred in Bosnia during the war, has refocused
Bosniak (Muslim) grievances and has caused Serb politicians
to retrench in defensive positions. This hostile environment
has precluded any meaningful work on the reform agenda, with
politicians seemingly incapable of abandoning ethnic
platforms. The Office of the High Representative has
remained ineffective and has failed completely to advance
meaningful reform or improve the functioning of the
deadlocked government. European Union member states have
been unable or unwilling to shoulder responsibility for
de-escalating the political situation and have promoted a
Bosnia policy that is process-oriented rather than
substantive. These factors have complicated our ability to
push Bosnia forward on its reform path, and its prospects for
European integration appear to be receding further into the
future. At the June 18-19 meeting of the Peace
Implementation Council, we need to demonstrate clear U.S.
leadership by pushing the Europeans to join forces with us.
End Summary.

Silajdzic and Srebrenica
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2. (C) The February 26 ruling by the International Court of
Justice continues to roil the waters here and promises to
remain a destabilizing factor for the foreseeable future.
Haris Silajdzic has seized on the ruling as the basis for his
claims that the Republika Srpska is an unlawful creation of
genocide. He has enlisted Srebrenica victims groups
(including those now camped in protest here in the capital)
to exert political pressure for the removal of the
municipality from the RS, a strategy that is clearly intended
to serve as a proxy for a legal challenge to the existence of
the RS itself. Silajdzic has also promoted his intention to
force the UN to "implement" the ICJ verdict which he believes
ruled that the existence of the RS, as a state party to
genocide, is unlawful (it did not). The recent work of
Ambassador Clifford Bond, OHR Special Envoy for Srebrenica,
has exerted a moderating impact on the political discourse
among Bosniaks. Nonetheless, an initiative to remove
Srebrenica from the RS, launched with the clear backing of
Silajdzic, continues to exercise RS Bosniaks and victims
groups who have issued a July 11 ultimatum for its passage.
The initiative enjoys the patronage of high-level members of
the Bosniak SDA and SBiH parties and, without forceful
intervention by the international community, threatens to
present a serious challenge to Dayton in the coming weeks.

Dodik on Counterattack
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3. (C) Sprksa Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has responded
defensively to Siljadzic by adopting positions increasingly
hostile to the state and Bosniak parties. Through members of
his SNSD party, Dodik has launched an initiative to reclaim
all RS competencies that have been transferred to the state
level and has announced his intention to flood the
Constitutional Court with related legal challenges. Dodik
has also ratcheted up his nationalist rhetoric with recent
outbursts bordering on racism, including claims that Bosniaks
are seeking to institute an Islamic state in Bosnia and that
the RS is being infiltrated by Islamic terrorists from the
Federation. We expect that his willingness to continue to
back the U.S.-brokered constitutional reform package will
waver over the coming weeks.

Government at a Standstill
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4. (C) In this context the national government of Prime
Minister Nikola Spiric is barely functional. Although a
minimum of day-to-day governance continues, since its
formation the new government has been able to adopt only
thirteen pieces of legislation, the majority of which were
drafted by the previous government. Important initiatives in
the fields of counterterrorism, law enforcement, health care
and social security have faltered or stalled altogether. The
implementation of defense reform, which had been a bright
spot among other stalled reform initiatives, seems as well to
have fallen victim to the political gridlock with PM Spiric
unable to bring the entity Prime Ministers together to
discuss defense property transfers.


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OHR Remains Ineffective
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5. (C) The Office of the High Representative has continued to
flounder in the face of the deteriorating political
situation. High Representative Schwarz-Schilling has
announced multiple deadlines, on issues such as RS ICTY
cooperation and Cantonal government formation in Herzegovina,
which he has subsequently allowed to lapse. The High
Representative has focused his staff almost exclusively on
his personal goal of establishing a constitutional reform
committee and secretariat in the Parliament. This initiative
has received minimal traction among local politicians and
appears increasingly untenable. Bosnian politicians, and the
general public, regard the High Representative with open
scorn. Upon the delivery of an anodyne farewell address to
Parliament on June 13, a prominent local commentator called
it "uninspiring and vague, like the tenure of the High
Representative." His nickname, "The Sleeper," from his
lapses into slumber during meetings, is used frequently in
the press. Were it not for Deputy High Representative
Gregorian, who has worked hard to push reform, the High
Representative's Office would be completely irrelevant.

Kosovo
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6. (C) Regional developments, most notably events in Kosovo
and Belgrade, have the potential to exert a destabilizing
impact on the political situation in Bosnia. Although RS
officials have, to date, generally avoided the redlines laid
down by the USG and the international community on using
Kosovo as a domestic political issue, rhetoric from Belgrade
linking Kosovo independence to the status of the RS has
tempted Bosnian Serb leaders to adopt increasingly
confrontational postures. Although the issue of Kosovo
independence has not yet become a political flashpont in the
RS, Serb politicians are mindful that it could be used as a
counterpoint for the legal arguments of Haris Silajdzic.
Most recently, Milorad Dodik warned that Bosnian Serbs would
consider the issue of recognition of an independent Kosovo
absent a UNSC resolution as worthy of a Bosnian Serb veto.
The parallels between a generally Muslim Kosovo getting
independence and a Serb entity (RS) forced to remain a
minority in a Muslim-dominated BiH will be heard increasingly
if Kosovo remains a headliner.

Police Reform and the SAA
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7. (C) Police reform has stalled completely and, as a result,
the prospects for the conclusion of a Stabilization and
Association Agreement with the EU this year are growing
increasingly dim. This situation has been compounded by
disjointed messages from EU member missions, the Commission,
the OHR and the and EU Police Mission. Although EU
Ambassadors engage in frequent hand-wringing over the
collapse of the SAA and appeals for leadership from Bosnian
politicians, few have demonstrated any willingness to take a
hard line with political leaders or push for clear
consequences for blocking the Agreement. As a result, Dodik
has felt sufficiently empowered to state publicly that he is
willing to make Bosnia "wait for a hundred years" for EU
membership rather than relinquish the RS police.

Constitutional Reform
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8. (C) There has been no further progress on constitutional
reform. The process could be potentially complicated as High
Representative Schwarz-Schilling hopes to leave his mark in
Bosnia by engineering an agreement for a constitutional
reform commission and secretariat housed in the state
Parliament. The German government has acquiesced to this
objective as part of the High Representative's golden
handshake. On June 6 the High Representative will attempt to
convoke political parties to reach an agreement on a process
to be funded by the Commission. Most supporters of the
original package, particularly SDA President Sulejman Tihic,
have told the Schwarz-Schilling that his process is bereft of
substance and misplaced in a body with no power to make
decisions. For out part we have attempted to bridge the gap
between party leaders pointing out to them that the new
"process" can easily be incorporated into progress made thus
far. Schwarz-Schilling will demand that the process be
blessed by the PIC, regardless of whether the party leaders
have reached agreement.

Recommendations
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9. (C) In this difficult political context, most PIC members

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have high expectations for the inauguration of new High
Representative Miroslav Lajcak. It will be important for the
USG to issue a strong endorsement of Lajcak who must act
early and forcefully in order to normalize the political
climate here. A message of continuing commitment to the
reform process, both police and constitutional, will also be
essential in order to assist Lajcak in refocusing Bosnian
politicians on the SAA process. The USG message should also
make explicit that challenges to Dayton, such as the
Srebrenica secession initiative; and adventurism threatening
regional stability, such as Dodik's incipient defiance over
Kosovo, will not be tolerated.


MCELHANEY