YOUR JUNE 13-14 VISIT TO SARAJEVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001317

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON FROM AMBASSADOR MCELHANEY; GENEVA
FOR AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV KAWC KJUS PREL ICTY BK
SUBJECT: YOUR JUNE 13-14 VISIT TO SARAJEVO

REF: A. SARAJEVO 677

B. SARAJEVO 556

C. SARAJEVO 1212

Classified By: Amb. Douglas L. McElhaney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
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1. (C) Your visit comes at a particularly troubled time in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a reemergence of nationalism and
inflammatory rhetoric has elevated the political temperature
to levels some say has not been seen since before the war.
With Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Stojan Zupljanin
remaining at large, war crimes remain at the top of our
political agenda here while nationalist politicians on all
sides manipulate Bosnia's wartime legacy for political
purposes. Bosnia's two most prominent political leaders,
Serb Milorad Dodik and Bosniak Haris Silajdzic, are engaged
in a prolonged political struggle over the nature of the
state and its future as a multi-ethnic country, and both
leaders regularly invoke the war to advance confrontational,
nationalist agendas. The standoff has resulted in the
paralysis of the national government and the stalling of
critical reforms. While law enforcement and judicial
structures have made progress, political leaders regularly
undermine these institutions by politicizing trials and other
war legacy issues. The divisive political discourse further
erodes the already low level of public confidence in the
judicial system, fosters unrealistic and counterproductive
expectations among victims, and drowns out the few voices
calling for constructive, multi-ethnic engagement. Your
visit presents an opportunity to reshape the national
political debate by urging political leaders to refrain from
cynically appropriating Bosnia's wartime legacy for
nationalist goals and to support institutions working towards
reconciliation. END SUMMARY.

War Crimes Frame Political Debate
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2. (C) In the past year Bosnia's political discourse has
deteriorated to levels not seen since the pre-war period.
Bosnia's two most powerful political leaders, RS PM Milorad
Dodik and Bosniak Presidency Member Haris Silajdzic, are both
holding the reform agenda hostage to maximalist ethnic
agendas. Since your last visit, beginning in the campaign
for the October 2006 general election, politicians have
repeatedly manipulated Bosnia's wartime history in pursuit of
short-term political gains. Bosniak Presidency member Haris
Silajdzic regularly invokes war crimes as justification for
irresponsible, provocative demands. Republika Srpska Prime
Minister Milorad Dodik, whom you met during your 2006 visit,
has raised the issue of RS secession from Bosnia and has
deployed nationalist rhetoric that borders on racism. The
result has been continuing political gridlock over critical
reforms, particularly constitutional and police reform. This
has complicated the already slow process of ethnic
reconciliation and threatened to undermine Bosnia's progress
towards NATO and EU membership.

War Criminals: Good and Bad News
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3. (C) The arrest and transfer to The Hague of Ratko Mladic,
Radovan Karadzic and Stojan Zupljanin remains one of our
priority mission goals and an imperative that we raise at
every opportunity with Bosnian leaders. While Mladic, and
probably Karadzic, may well be outside of Bosnian territory,
most believe Stojan Zuplijanin remains within the territory
of the Republika Srpska, or moves between the RS and Serbia.
In January, High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling
issued an ultimatum to RS Interior Minister Stanislav Cadjo
to arrest Zuplijanin or face removal. However, as with other
deadlines, the High Representative's ultimatum met with no
meaningful response from RS authorities and Cadjo remains in
office. On May 25, convicted war criminal, and Bosnia's
first 11bis transferee, Radovan Stankovic escaped from
custody in Foca Prison and is still at large. Stankovic's
escape, which was clearly effected with the complicity and
assistance of Foca prison officials, calls into question
Bosnia's ability to manage additional ICTY 11bis transfers.

SARAJEVO 00001317 002 OF 003


The RS government is aware of the potential repercussions of
this incident and many observers view the sudden arrest and
transfer to The Hague of Zdravko Tolimir on May 31 as an
attempt by Milorad Dodik and others to ameliorate the damage
of the Stankovic escape. (Ref C).

ICJ Decision Impact
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4. (C) The International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict and
accompanying political fallout have exacerbated inter-ethnic
tensions and further politicized the war crimes debate. In
the wake of the ICJ verdict, Bosniak leaders have called for
"justice," but have focused their post-ICJ political energy
on pressing for a constitutional amendment that would remove
Srebrenica and surrounding municipalities from the Republika
Srpska (Ref B). Bosnian Serb leaders view the initiative as
an attempt to undermine the integrity of the RS and advance
Haris Silajdzic's stated goal of eliminating the RS
altogether. We have made clear that practical steps are
required that are designed to address the justice, security,
economic and social concerns of Srebrenica's residents.
However, Bosniak leaders continue to peddle faulty legal
logic about the ICJ verdict's implications and to encourage
their constituents to believe that secession from the RS is a
viable political option. Proponents of secession have gone
so far as to stage an attack against a Bosniak resident of
the municipality and then use it as evidence that Bosniaks
are not safe in Srebrenica.

State Institutions and Reconciliation Lack Support
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5. (C) Bosniak political leaders have done little to
translate their post-ICJ concern for war crimes issues into
tangible political support for the State Prosecutor's Office
or the State Court. Nor have they shown any interest in
providing the additional substantive resources (e.g., judges,
prosecutors, investigators, legal assistants) required to
enable these institutions to address war crimes issues more
efficiently, effectively and quickly. Serb leaders have
internalized, and fostered, the perception that all war
crimes efforts are directed at them and are therefore
unwilling to be perceived as publicly supporting a
progressive war crimes agenda. More generally, few Bosnian
leaders have realized the ramifications of the ICTY's planned
closure in 2009 or that additional political and financial
support to state level law enforcement and judicial
institutions will be required to handle a growing caseload
that was not anticipated when the State Prosecutor's Office
and State Court were established. Political leaders fuel
popular discontent and cynicism about the judicial process by
criticizing the courts whenever they fall short of these
unrealistic expectations. At the same time, these leaders
often deflect their own responsibility for improving the
legal system in which these institutions operate (Ref A).
This lack of support for judicial institutions and truth and
reconciliation mechanisms by senior politicians has
engendered a reluctance within the justice sector to adopt a
proactive approach to these issues for fear of negative
political ramifications.

Comment
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6. (C) Your visit presents a well-timed opportunity to
contribute to our goal of normalizing the political debate
here by calling on Bosnian leaders to cease their political
maniuplations of the war and war crimes. It will also be
important to demonstrate U.S. support for judicial and NGO
mechanisms aimed at promoting justice and reconciliation.
Your media work will be particularly important in conveying
to the broader Bosnian public the need for realistic
expectations about judicial mechanisms and the rejection of
nationalism. You should encourage the State Court and State
Prosecutor's Office's to be more vocal in their internal
advocacy for a national war crimes strategy. You will also
want to press key political figures to refrain from
politicizing war crimes, and to provide political,
legislative and financial support to the institutions
necessary for the State Court and State Prosecutor's Office.

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End Comment.
MCELHANEY